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tion. However, HRM research has failed to empirically establish this
relationship.
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oral performance. We focus our attention on the concept of the
psychological contract. The psychological contract is defined as: “an
individual’s belief, shaped by the organization, regarding reciprocal
obligations”. The psychological contract connects organizational
level and individual level perspectives because of its focus on the
exchange relationship between organization and the individual.
Based on a sample of 49 organizations with 2099 individual respon-
dents we investigated the signalling value of HRM for employees’
assessment of the degree of violation of their psychological contracts,
using a multi-level analytical technique. The findings indicate that
there is a significant relationship between HRM, organizational
design factors and the degree of perceived psychological contract
violation. These findings provide us with one of the first empirical
indications on how HRM leads to effectiveness.
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VOORWOORD (PREFACE IN DUTCH) 
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Frits Kluytmans van de Open Universiteit ben ik veel dank verschuldigd voor de 
dataverzameling. Paul Boselie wil ik bedanken voor zijn bereidheid tot sparren, hij is een 
groot voorbeeld voor mij. Jan de Kok, tja wat had ik zonder de hulp van Jan de Kok 
gemoeten? Ik denk met veel plezier terug aan de mensen die onderdeel zijn geweest van de 
Vakgroep Organisatie, zoals Daina, Joke, Tulay, Jos, Truus, Janneke, Ton, Ludwig, 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Introduction 
What are the drivers of high performing organizations? This question is central in 
contemporary management research and practice (e.g. Kirby, 2005) and is important for 
research in Human Resource Management (HRM).  
 
In organizational level HRM research, the relationship between HRM and 
organizational performance has increasingly become a matter of interest, as can be seen in 
the numerous articles and books on High Performance Work Systems (e.g. Appelbaum et 
al., 2000) and the rising interest in “HR scorecards” (e.g. Becker et al., 2001; Paauwe, 
2004). However, according to authors in this field (see for instance Delery, 1998; Delaney 
& Huselid, 1996) we know little about the mechanisms through which HRM influences 
organizational performance.  
 
Individual level HRM performance research mainly focuses on analyses of the 
relationship between characteristics of individual employees, their work perceptions and 
behavioral aspects of performance such as intention to leave the organization and 
employee satisfaction (e.g. Herriot & Pemberton, 1997; Rousseau, 1995/1998; Guest, 
1998).  
 
In this study we ‘bridge’ both streams of HRM research, organizational level research 
towards the relationship between HRM and performance and individual level research on 
the relationship between work perceptions and individual performance. We bridge these 
two streams of research by focusing our attention on the concept of the psychological 
contract. The psychological contract is defined as: “an individual’s belief, shaped by the 
organization, regarding reciprocal obligations”. The psychological contract consists of 
three aspects: perceived employee obligations; perceived employer obligations; and 
perceived fulfillment/ violation of employer obligations. 
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The concept of the psychological contract connects organizational level and individual 
level HRM research because of its focus on the exchange relationship between 
organization and individual. The psychological contract is of interest because of its effects 
on attitudes and behavior of organizational members.  
 
For an organization to achieve desired performance goals, violations and fulfillment of 
employees’ psychological contracts are important factors. We use the term violation for 
indicating a situation in which employees perceive the obligations of the employer as not 
being completely fulfilled. Violation of the psychological contract has been empirically 
linked to individual’s attitudes and behaviors, such as for instance trust, loyalty, 
commitment and intention to leave (e.g. McLean Parks & Schmedeman, 1994; Robinson & 
Rousseau, 1994; Robinson & Morrison, 1995; Ten Brink et al., 2001). 
 
We consider organizational practices such as HRM practices and elements of 
organizational structure as communicating mechanisms. We investigate if these 
organizational practices send signals that are relevant for employees’ assessment of the 
degree of violation of their psychological contracts.  
 
The psychological contract will be the factor against which we evaluate effectiveness of 
HRM and more general design factors as organizational structure. We investigate to what 
extent two approaches towards HRM (universalistic and configurational) are helpful to 
understand the relationship between the signals an organization sends and employee 
perceptions of their employment relationship.  
 
Insight is gained into the connections between HRM, organizational structure, context 
factors and psychological contracts, thereby exploring the relationship between 
organizational and individual level elements and the process by or through which this 
might lead to organizational effectiveness.  
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1.2 Research question  
The goal of this research is to gain more insight into the relationship between HRM and 
performance by studying the signalling effect of HRM on employees’ assessment of their 
psychological contracts. HRM and more general design factors as organizational structure 
and context are seen as structural signals: “vehicles people use to convey commitments and 
offer inducements for present and future behavior”. HRM is the subset of organizational 
design characteristics that is most closely related to the employment relationship. 
We assume that signalling exists when the organization is perceived by employees as 
sending signals. It thus assumes interaction between both parties as a result of the way an 
organization designs HRM. Signalling in this way is considered to be a characteristic of the 
organization that influences the attitudes and behavior of the employee (employees’ 
assessment of degree of the degree of psychological contract violation).  
 
The main research question is characterized as follows:  
What is the signalling value of HRM for employees’ assessment of the degree of violation 
of their psychological contracts? 
 
In line with Beer et al. (1984) we defined HRM as “involving all management decisions 
that affect the relationship between the organization and employees – its human 
resources”. Based on the work of Rousseau (1989/1990/1995) we defined psychological 
contract as “an individual’s belief, shaped by the organization, regarding reciprocal 
obligations”. 
 
This main question raises a number of related questions that have to be answered in 
order to explore the relationship between organizational level HRM and individual level 
psychological contracts. In order to gain more clarity on the construct of the psychological 
contract, we first need to answer the following questions (chapter 2):  
¾ How is the psychological contract defined? 
¾ Which variables (at organizational and individual level) have been related to the 
psychological contract in previous research? 
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Considering the signalling effect of HRM practices on employees’ perceptions of the 
employment relationship asks for a specific reading of our present understandings of the 
influence of HRM in organizations. Minimal signalling is necessary for employees to be 
able to build any view of their employment relationship at all. An increase in the amount of 
organizational information may provide richer information for the employee to build his 
own understanding of his employment relationship with the organization. The first 
approach we consider is, therefore, a universalistic approach in that regardless of its 
context, an increase the amount of (commitment oriented) HRM practices has a 
relationship with employees’ assessment of their psychological contracts 
Coherent organizational signalling could also be important. Alignment between 
different ‘signals’ or messages send by an organization, and alignment among HRM 
practices, may be important for constituting organizationally ‘desired’ behavior. The 
configurational approach focuses on alignment or fit, and is the second approach we 
consider in this study.  
 
In order to study the relationship between the signalling value of HRM and 
psychological contracts, we need to investigate (chapter 3): 
¾ The meaning of signalling 
¾ Universalistic and configurational approaches towards HRM 
 
Because our concepts of interest are situated at different levels (individual level 
psychological contract violation and organizational level HRM), we need theory on 
studying the interactions between multiple levels. Therefore, we need to gain insight into 
(chapter 4):  
¾ Theory and models for analysis of data at multiple levels 
 
Insight gained from these three streams of literature form the building blocks of our 
research model, investigating our main question concerning the signalling value of HRM 
for employees’ assessment of the degree of violation of their psychological contracts (see 
figure 1-1). 
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Figure 1-1 Building blocks of this study  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.3 Empirical Data 
Because our main focus concerns relationships between variables at two levels of 
analysis, on individual level psychological contract violation and on organizational level 
HRM, we collected data that has a nested structure and use an analytical strategy typically 
for handling such data (i.e. multi-level analysis). The empirical data is based on survey 
research derived from employers and employees within a variety of organizations. In 
general, survey research is aimed at exploring ‘what’ and ‘how much’ (Yin, 1994) is the 
relationship between the variables of interest. A standard questionnaire has been 
distributed among groups of employees in a variety of organizations. The questionnaire 
measures individual level work attitudes and perceptions of the employment relationship. 
Besides these questionnaires, the HRM manager of each organization characterized his/her 
organization on a number of predefined dimensions using a standard protocol. In total we 
collected data from 49 organizations and 2099 employees within these organizations. 
 
1.4 Relevance 
Both literature on organizational level HRM and performance and individual level 
research on the relationship between psychological contracts and employee behavior, point 
to the existence of a relationship between HRM and (violation of) psychological contracts 
of employees. Most of these indications, however, are conceptually based. 
 
Signalling theory, models for 
studying the relationship 
between HRM and performance
Exchange theory, notions of 
balance and reciprocity
Theory/ models
Organization/ employer
HRM (and more general design 
factors as structure)
Organizational level 
Multilevel modelling and analysisMethodology
EmployeePerspective
Psychological contract of 
employees
Subject
Individual level 
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Present individual level theorizing doesn’t give insight in organizational variables that 
influence the psychological contract, thus leaving a gap between organizational HRM 
theory and individual level psychological contract theory.  
 
A major and unique strength of this study is that it combines insights on organizational 
level HRM with insights on individual level psychological contracts. The multi-level 
approach of our study is of major scientific relevance. Rousseau already argued in 1985 for 
the importance of building and testing multi-level models in research on organizations. 
Nowadays authors like Ostroff & Bowen (2000) argue that especially in the area of HRM 
multi-level models are needed. Furthermore, this study focuses on a diverse set of 
employees within a variety of organizations and should, therefore, be able to present a 
good indication of the employee’s perceptions of their employment relationship. 
 
The managerial relevance of this research rests in the insight we provide into ways of 
influencing psychological contracts. It is in the interest of managers to have a clear 
knowledge of which organizational activities will elicit those attitudes and behaviors 
necessary to achieve the organizational goals. 
 
1.5 Overview of the chapters 
In chapter 2 we investigate the concept of the psychological contract and the influence 
of organizational- and individual level variables on the psychological contract. In chapter 3 
we provide insight into and evaluate existing literature on HRM and more general design 
factors (structural signals) and their relationship with psychological contract violation. We 
discuss approaches for studying HRM and develop our conceptual model and hypotheses 
in chapter 3. In chapter 4 we operationalize the conceptual model and hypotheses presented 
in chapter 3. We present our analytical strategy, the design of the study and our research 
model. In chapter 5 we present the results of our study by testing our hypotheses, leading 
us to answering our main research question. In chapter 6 we discuss the results of our 
study, and present limitations and suggestions for further research as well as the 
recommendations for practice. 
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CHAPTER 2 PSYCHOLOGICAL CONTRACT 
 
2.1 Introduction 
In this study the psychological contract is put forward as a framework for investigating 
the relationship between organizational variables, such as HRM, and the employment 
relationship. The psychological contract is defined as: “an individual’s belief, shaped by 
the organization, regarding reciprocal obligations”. The purpose of this chapter is to 
investigate the concept of the psychological contract and the relationship of organizational- 
and individual level variables with the psychological contract.  
 
In the first section we give a brief historical overview of the development of the 
psychological contract until now and discuss the definition of the concept (section 2.2). 
Furthermore, in this section we consider the issue of who or what represents the 
organization, which is critical in conceptually distinguishing between the psychological 
contract on individual level and organizational level variables influencing this concept. In 
section 2.3 attention is given to underlying theory and concepts. A great deal of research 
has focused on the aftermath or evaluation of psychological contracts and their 
consequences for individual performance. Reasons for this are indications that the degree 
of psychological contract fulfillment, breach and violation has substantive consequences 
for the behavior of employees. The insights gained from this type of research will be 
discussed in section 2.4. Section 2.5 provides an overview of individual and organizational 
elements influencing the development and evaluation of the psychological contract, 
providing the basis for the following chapters.  
 
2.2 Defining the psychological contract 
In general, employment contracts serve to bind together individuals and organizations 
and regulate their behavior, making possible the achievement of organizational goals 
(Robinson et al., 1994).  
Employment contracts aim to connect the employee with the employer or organization 
with regard to future contributions and inducements of the parties involved in the contract. 
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These contributions and inducements are partly put on paper in the written formal contract 
of employment, but are for the most part unwritten and implicitly held.  
Spindler (1994) argues that “in law, contracts create and define enforceable rights and 
obligations between parties who knowingly create the relationship”. Legal and 
psychological contracts are both important aspects of the employment relationship. The 
difference between legal and psychological contracts is that legal contracts are specified, 
explicitly defined, in contrast to psychological contracts, which are unwritten, are held 
individually and which are perceptual in nature.  
 
Researchers on the psychological contract focus their attention within the employment 
relationship on perceived expectations, obligations and promises regarding future 
inducements and contributions. The basic idea behind this kind of work is that employees 
develop a psychological contract with their employer based on their formal contract as 
well as many other formal and informal organizational signals and individual 
characteristics, and this formed psychological contract influences their behavior. 
 
The psychological contract is nowadays a well-known concept for most researchers in 
the fields of Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management. During the past 
years a relatively high amount of attention has been given to the concept of the 
psychological contract, with a surge of attention in the 1990’s. Interest in the psychological 
contract started in 1960 with a publication of Argyris. In the first period (1960-1991) only 
a small amount of attention was paid to the subject. During the period 1994-2004 
psychological contract became frequently a subject of publication, with special issues in 
1994 (Human Resource Management), 1998 (Journal of Organizational Behavior) and 
2002 (Gedrag & Organisatie). Interestingly, it was not until 1989 with the seminal work of 
Denise Rousseau that the psychological contract became a popular concept to perform 
research on. Commonly mentioned is that this rise in attention towards the psychological 
contract was due to changes in the employment relationship. According to Coyle-Shaprio 
et al. (2002), interest in the psychological contract emerged during, or partly as a 
consequence of a period of organizational restructuring and downsizing in the USA.  
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As a result of amongst others a rise in global competition, more intense product market 
competition, changes in ownership of organizations, the growing use of contingent 
employment, developments of technology and production techniques (e.g. Blyton & 
Turnbull, 1994) and the changing nature of the relationships between employers and 
employees. It is argued that employment relationships are evolving into less stable, more 
complex relationships, with a variety of contract forms for similar work (which will be 
partly discussed in section 2.3). Anderson & Schalk (1998) presented an overview of 
factors influencing the growth in psychological contract research (figure 2-2). 
 
Figure 2-2 Factors influencing the growth in psychological contract research (Anderson 
& Schalk, 1998: 643) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As a result of these changes, the perception of the employment relationship became 
increasingly a matter of interest. Focusing on perceptions, the psychological contract has, 
therefore, been put forward as a framework for studying the perceptions of employment 
relationships (e.g. Shore & Tetrick, 1994; Herriot et al., 1997; Shore & Tetrick, 1994; 
Guest, 1998). There is, however, debate about the proper definition of the concept, which 
we will discuss in the following subsection. 
 
 
• Downsizing
• Globalization of markets
• Flexibilisation of labour 
contracts
• New technology
• Segregation of ‘core’ and 
‘peripheral’ labour markets
• Outsourcing and sub-contracting
of work functions
• Flexible forms of
work organization
• Redundancy
• Job insecurity
• Flexible working patters
• Temporary, fixed term 
and zero- hours contracts of 
employment
• Fragmented, cross-function 
career trajectories
• Market driven reskilling and 
retraining imperatives in order to 
retain future employability
Growth of 
research 
interest into 
the 
psychological 
contract
Environmental, and organisational level factors Individual level factors
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2.2.1 Development of the concept 
Two studies can be seen as the founding “fathers” of the psychological contract 
concept: the work of Argyris (1960) and the work of Levinson et al. (1962). Argyris 
(1960) first introduced the term psychological contract. In describing the relationship 
between employees and the leadership style of their foremen, he pointed at the informal 
culture as the important factor in the understanding of the agreement between the 
employees and their foremen, i.e. the psychological contract. According to Argyris (1960), 
the management of the employee-foreman relationship was “dominated” by the 
psychological contract. He defined violation of this psychological contract as the result of 
a situation in which the foreman behaved in contrast with the cultural norms. Argyris 
(1960) described the psychological contract as the perceptions by two parties of their 
employment relationship and as a mutual understanding on the content of these perceptions 
or the psychological contract.  
 
Levinson et al. (1962) described the psychological contract as a series of mutual 
expectations between the organization and the employee, some of which are conscious and 
other unconsciously held. Levinson et al. (1962) focused at expectations having to do with 
psychological needs, such as growth and aggression and expectations having to do with 
specific aspects of the work itself, such as job security and rewards.  
 
Both definitions assume an exchange relationship between employer (organization 
and/or leader) and employee, in which the expectations of both parties involved are taken 
into consideration.  
 
Rousseau (1989) introduced a definition of the psychological contract from the 
individual’s point of view: “An individual's belief regarding the terms and conditions of a 
reciprocal exchange agreement between the focal person and another party (typically 
between employee and employer)”. Rousseau breaks with the work of Levinson et al. 
(1962) and Argyris (1960), by shifting to the individual level (instead of the relational 
level).  
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In 1990 Rousseau published an article called ‘new hire perceptions of their own and 
their employer's obligations: A study of psychological contracts’. In this article she 
formulated the following definition of psychological contract: “an individual’s beliefs 
regarding reciprocal obligations”. In this definition, one could notice a shift from 
expectations to obligations (see also Roehling (1997) for an extensive historical overview). 
Rousseau’s (1989/1990) definitions take into account the fact that both parties do not 
necessarily have to agree with regard to the terms of the psychological contract, in contrast 
to Argyris’ (1960) ‘mutual understanding’. Instead, Rousseau considers mutuality as 
perceived by individual employees. Furthermore, she focuses on the conscious beliefs by 
employees, where Levinson et al. (1962) also consider unconscious expectations. 
 
In 1995 Rousseau formulated the following definition of psychological contract: 
“individual beliefs, shaped by the organization, regarding the terms of an exchange 
agreement between individuals and their organizations”. This definition differs from the 
one formulated by Rousseau in 1989 and 1990, in that although the words ‘individual 
beliefs’ are still present in the definition, they are extended by using the new fragment 
‘shaped by the organization’. This could be an indication for more emphasis on the 
elements that shape a psychological contract, and a narrowing of the interest towards only 
these elements that are manageable by an organization. Hereby she excludes the influence 
of personal characteristics and the (social) background of these individuals. All these 
Rousseau’s definitions, however, imply that she sees the psychological contract as a 
construct at the individual level.  
 
In contemporary literature roughly two schools can be distinguished. On the one hand 
the ‘Rousseau-school’ (with authors like Rousseau, Robinson, Morrison, McLean Parks, 
Kraatz, Greller, Guzzo, Noonan, Lewis-McClear & Taylor, Schalk), which mainly focuses 
on the individual employee, and, on the other hand, the ‘traditional school’ that focuses on 
both sides, the employer and the employee (e.g. Guest, Herriot, Pemberton, Coyle-Shapiro, 
Manning, Kidd).  
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At present there is only a relatively small group of researchers that actually examine 
the employers’ side of the psychological contract in terms of the traditional-school 
definition of the concept (e.g. Coyle-Shapiro & Kessler, 2000; Guest & Conway, 2002; 
Coyle-Shapiro, 2001).  
 
Lewis-McClear and Taylor (1998:3) argue that “only by studying the interactions 
between these two parties, and the way these interactions evolve over time, can we begin 
to understand the essence of the employment exchange”. Therefore, one contribution of 
including the employer’s perspective is that it provides a more complete picture by 
allowing an investigation of the actions and reactions of both parties to the exchange.  
 
When studying this matter, it becomes important to establish the boundaries of the 
psychological contract, and consider the question if the psychological contract resides 
solely in the individual or that both the employer and the individual are part of the 
psychological contract. Furthermore, the question who or what represents the organization 
or the employer’s perspective is important to gain insight into. There is a vividly debate on 
this matter, which we will discuss in more detail in subsection 2.2.2.  
 
A variety of elements have been used in definitions of the psychological contract, 
ranging from expectations, beliefs, promises, obligations and perceptions (Conway, 1996; 
Guest, 1998). According to Rousseau (1990:309), psychological contracts differ from the 
more general concept of expectations in that contracts are promissory and reciprocal, 
offering a commitment to some behavior on the part of the employee, in return for some 
action on the part of the employer or the other way around (as can be captured in the words 
‘reciprocal promised based obligations’).  
 
This focus on promised-based obligations is very typical of Rousseau’s later 
conceptualizations. Obligations can be defined as “beliefs held by an employee or 
employer, that each is bound by promise or debt to an action or course of action in 
relation to the other party” (Robinson, Kraatz & Rousseau, 1994).  
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According to most researchers within the Rousseau line of reasoning, if a perceived 
obligation is not accompanied by the belief that a promise has been conveyed (e.g. if the 
perceived obligation is based for instance on past experience in other employment 
relationships) then it falls outside the psychological contract (McLean Parks & 
Schmedemann, 1994; Rousseau & Greller, 1994; Shore & Tetrick, 1994).  
 
Robinson (1996) found in her study support for the use of obligations instead of 
expectations. She provides us with indications that fulfillment of psychological contract 
obligations contributes more substantively to the prediction of outcome variables as trust, 
satisfaction and commitment than expectations do (which are non-promissory in nature).  
Subsequently, only those expectations that stem from perceived promises made by the 
employer are considered by most researchers as part of the psychological contract (in line 
with Rousseau). Although promises regarding future courses of action express intent, it is 
not what the promise maker intends but what the receiver perceives (Rousseau, 1995). 
Communication is thus the essence of a promise, promises are perceptions of what was 
sent and meant (Rousseau, 1995: 27). 
 
So a lot of debate in this field is due to the divergent use of definitions of the 
psychological contract. The most frequently used definitions are the definitions of 
Rousseau (1989/1990/1995). According to Rousseau (1989) individuals can have 
psychological contracts and organizations cannot: organizations provide the context in 
which individuals create psychological contracts. In order to be able to conceptually 
distinguish between the psychological contract on individual level and organizational level 
variables influencing this concept (which could be seen as the employer’s perspective), we 
will study the psychological contract in line with the conceptualizations of Rousseau.  
 
We define the psychological contract as: “an individual’s belief, shaped by the 
organization, regarding reciprocal obligations”. The psychological contract consists of 
three elements: perceived employee obligations, perceived employer (organization’s) 
obligations and perceived fulfillment/violation of employer obligations (Robinson et al., 
1994; Schalk & Freese, 1997). 
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In the following subsection we provide more insight into the matter of who or what 
represents the organization in the light of the psychological contract debate.  
 
2.2.2 Who or what represents the organization 
As stated before, there is a lot of debate going on regarding the issue of the employer’s 
or organization’s perspective1. Researchers suggested several contract makers as 
representatives of the organizations’ point of view. One way of capturing the 
organization’s perspective is as Coyle-Shapiro (2001) suggested through the lens of the 
manager. Coyle-Shapiro & Kessler (2002) for instance, examined the relationship between 
employer and employee, in which they suggest that the organization’s perspective can best 
be represented by a higher level manager. 
 
Guest & Conway (2000), however, suggest that not all managers can be seen as 
representing the organization’s point of view in the eyes of employees: line managers are 
not perceived (by both managers as well as employees) as representing the organization, 
unless the line manager is a senior manager. For this reason Guest & Conway (2002) used 
in their study senior managers to represent the organization’s point of view. In the 
qualitative part of their research (interviews in four organization with 80 managers and 
staff at different levels) they found that senior managers were seen by the interviewed as 
agents representing the organization. But, then again, there were different views of what 
defined seniority, which seemed to depend on the seniority of the respondent, “a junior 
staff member might identify a head of department in this role, while more senior staff, 
themselves in management positions, were more likely to identify someone at board level.”  
 
According to Rousseau (1995), the organizational part of the psychological contract 
may consist of multiple agents (as owner, top management, co-worker, managers etc). 
Especially in large organizations it seems difficult for employees to interpret who or what 
represents the employers’ perspective. Rousseau (1995) makes the distinction between 
primary and secondary contract makers (see figure 2-3).  
                                                 
1 In this study, employer and organization are used interchangeable 
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Primary contract makers are people. Secondary contract makers are ‘structural signals: 
vehicles people use to convey commitments and offer inducements for present and future 
behavior”. In this line of reasoning elements of organizational design (including structure 
and HRM) can be considered as ‘contract makers’, or representing the organization’s point 
of view.  
 
Figure 2-3 Contract makers (Rousseau, 1995:63) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Following this model of Rousseau (1995), considering the perceptions of managers as 
representing the organization’s point of view is indeed problematic, since they (whatever 
level) do not necessarily represent the whole picture of human contract makers: recruiters, 
coworkers and mentors also interact with employees. Based on this model, several 
elements in the organization can influence the psychological contract. Since it might be 
problematic to capture all these elements or contract-makers at once, we have to decide on 
the focus of our study.  
 
Basically, this model of Rousseau (1995) suggests that employees are involved in at 
least two exchanges. An organization can act through its agents but also through its 
processes, systems and structure. In this sense, HRM has been regularly put forward as a 
key aspect of the organization. Structural signals (Rousseau, 1995) may provide continuity 
regardless of the variety of line and senior managers and HRM people acting as specific 
agents (Robinson & Morrison, 1995: 290).  
 
Through observation
• Managers
• Co-workers
• Top management
Through interaction
• Recruiters
• Managers
• Co-workers
• Mentors
Human contract makers 
(primary contract makers)
Structural signals
• Compensation
• Benefits 
• Career path 
• Performance review
• Training
• Personnel manuals
Administrative contract makers 
(secondary contract makers)
Chapter 2 - Psychological Contract 
 
 
 
16 
Support for this can be found in the work of Levinson (1965), who argues that people 
project human qualities upon an organization, and relate to organizations in such a way as 
if it had human qualities. He further argues that as a result of organizational policies, 
similarity in behavior by different agents of the organization at different times and places 
will be established. All together these insights clearly provide us with the argument for 
investigating the influence of organizational features on employees instead of only those of 
specific agents.  
 
This model of Rousseau (1995), and our focus on structural signals, invites a more in 
depth examination of the influence of organizational level elements such as organizational 
structure and HRM on the psychological contract. In our definition of the psychological 
contract, these organizational level aspects (which can be seen as part of the employers’ 
perspective) are not included in the psychological contract itself, but are expected to affect 
the individual level psychological contract.  
 
To study the relationship between organizational level elements or structural signals 
and the psychological contract, we need to gain insight into the dynamics of the exchange 
relationship between the organization and its employees. We thus need theoretical 
foundations for studying the psychological contract and its relationship with these 
organizational-level elements. This will be the focus of the following section.  
 
2.3 Underlying theory and concepts 
Exchange (Blau, 1964), reciprocity (Gouldner, 1960) and balance (Barksdale & Shore, 
1995) are central concepts in the literature on employee-organization contracts (Rousseau, 
1989/ 1990; Rousseau and McLean Parks, 1993). These concepts and the relationship with 
the previous discussions on the psychological contract will be shortly discussed.  
Exchange theory provides the basic foundation of the psychological contract. Two sorts 
of exchanges can be distinguished, economic and social. Pure economic exchange exists in 
the case where the employer offers short-term, purely economic inducements in exchange 
for well-specified contributions by the employee (Tsui, et al., 1997).  
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According to Tsui et al. (1997) “At least for job complexity and external adaptation 
reasons, the employer may find it advantageous to leave some obligations unspecified and 
to treat the employment relationship as a combination of economic and social exchange, 
rather than as a purely economic exchange”. Blau (1964) reasons that, although the formal 
or legal relationship in employment is economically driven a social element to such 
relationships typically evolves, since each party has a perception of the contract that they 
have with each other. Such perceptions can be derived from direct or indirect 
communication with the other party (primary and secondary contract makers in Rousseau’s 
terminology).  
 
Based on theory of social and economic exchange of Blau (1965), researchers on the 
psychological contract make a distinction between transactional and relational 
psychological contracts. Transactional psychological contracts are based on specific, close-
ended, easily definable and primarily economic transactions (focusing mainly on short 
term and monetizable exchanges). Relational contracts consist of open-ended relationships 
involving considerable investment by both employees and employers (social exchange): 
“Relational contracts are more developmental and value-laden in nature” (Rousseau & 
Parks, 1993).  
 
The transactional/relational dimension of psychological contract has been studied 
foremost in context of the interest in the ‘changing employment relationship” (see figure 2-
2). Anderson and Schalk (1998) for instance present an overview of past and emergent 
forms of the 'typical' working relationship (table 2-1), representing a shift from relational 
towards transactional elements in contracts. 
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Table 2-1 Past and emergent forms of working relationships (Anderson & Schalk, 
1998) 
Characteristic Past form Emergent form
Focus Security, continuity, loyalty Exchange, future employability
Format Structured, predictable, stable Unstructured, flexible, open to (re)negotiation
Underlying basis Tradition, fairness, social justice, socio-
economic class
Market forces, saleable, abilities and skills, 
added value
Employer's responsibilities Continuity, job security, training, career 
prospects
Equitable(as perceived), reward for added 
value
Employee's responsibilities Loyalty, attendance, satisfactory performance, 
compliance with authority
Entrapreneurship, Innovation, enacting 
changes to improve performance, excellent 
performance
Contractual relations Formalized, mostly via trade union or 
collective representation
Individual's responsibility to barter for their 
services (internally or externally)
Career management Organization's responsibility, in-spiraling 
careers planned and facilitated through 
personnel department input
Individual's responsibility, out-spiraling careers 
by personal reskilling and retraining
 
 
Authors like Anderson & Schalk (1998) suggest that employment relationships are 
increasingly based upon the possibilities of both parties in the market place and are getting 
more transactional in nature. Herriot & Pemberton (1995) argue that due to a tendency to 
pursue cost competitiveness, employers have generally become less committed to a 
relational employment relationship.  
 
In general it seems to be very difficult to (conceptually or empirically) come up with 
psychological contracts that are only transactional or relational in essence and also other 
differentiations between types of contracts seem to confirm the lack of support for a 
changing relationship between employer and employee in general.  The distinction 
between transactional and relational obligations seems to be not so clearly cut, as can be 
seen in the work of amongst others, Huiskamp & Schalk (2002), Guest & Conway (1997) 
and Guest et al. (1996), who did not find clear support for the transition from relational 
towards transaction psychological contract: ‘the traditional psychological contract built 
around job security and career is still alive and surprisingly well”. Furthermore, the study 
of Van den Brande et al. (2002) towards the state of the psychological contract in Belgium 
provides indication for a limitation of this transition towards emergent forms of 
employment relationships to a relatively small group of highly educated and young 
professionals.  
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Guzzo & Noonan (1994) suggest that psychological contracts can have both 
transactional and relational qualities, which can influence each other. Contracts have been 
found that combine performance requirement of a transactional nature with long-term 
investments between employee and employer characteristic of relational agreements 
(Rousseau, 1995; Rousseau & Tijoriwala, 1996).  
 
There seems to be not much evidence for the distinction between transactional and 
relational contracts, or based on this distinction, for a new employment contract in which 
there is supposed to be a shift from more relational elements to transactional elements.  
 
A related aspect of the employment relationship that is considered to be of major 
importance is (perceived) balance. In general the assumption is that employees feel obliged 
to reciprocate in order to create (perceived) balance in the exchange with the organization. 
 
Barksdale & Shore (1995) present a typology of exchange relationships based on 
perceived balance, in which the level of obligation and degree of balance is taken into 
account (see figure 2-5). To develop their typology they performed a clustering procedure, 
in which individuals (327 part-time MBA students USA) were assigned to one of four 
groups. They found that the mutual high and low obligations groups were most commonly 
found, which gives support for the norm of reciprocity (Gouldner, 1960) and the notions of 
Blau (1965) regarding social exchange; in that people seek balance in exchange 
relationships and actions of one party thus have consequences for the actions of the other.  
 
According to Blau (1964), balance in a relationship is expected as well as preferred. 
There is balance when the employee perceives the employment relationship as consisting 
of high levels or low levels of employee and employer obligations. According to Shore & 
Barksdale (1998) although two forms of unbalance can be present (employee under and 
over obligation), this might be a temporary unstable situation. Robinson et al. (1994), 
provide support for this situation. Based on their longitudinal study, they found that 
individuals may perceive some sort of unbalance when just hired (i.e. employee over-
obligation).  
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Figure 2-4 Typology Barksdale & Shore (1998)  
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Over time, employees felt that the obligations towards them increased while their own 
obligations decreased. According to Barksdale & Shore (1995) an explanation of the 
unbalanced types could be that individuals tend to overestimate their own contributions 
and underestimate the contributions of the other part. Employees can, therefore, feel they 
owe the organization less, and the organization owes them more. This typology of 
Barksdale & Shore provides us with insights in the relationship between perceived 
employee and employer obligations. 
 
In studying the psychological contract (economic and social) exchange, reciprocity and 
balance are central phenomena. We discussed two ways of categorizing the psychological 
contract (1) transactional and relational psychological contracts and (2) degree of balance 
of psychological contracts. Although the most frequently used typology is the 
transactional/relational one, as a consequence of the lack of empirical support, there has 
been considerably critique on this distinction. Exchange theory suggests that the 
relationship between an individual and organization is a result of mutual influence. In 
order to study this interaction between the organization and the employee, we will use 
insights derived from exchange theory, in that employees seek balance in their 
employment relationship and reciprocate according to their perception of the degree of 
balance.  
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Psychological contract obligations reflect future contributions and thus may or may not 
be fulfilled and are thus contingent upon the perceived behavior of the other party. When 
employees perceive that the obligations of the organization compared to their own 
contributions are not fulfilled, they will reciprocate by adjusting their attitudes and 
behavior.  
 
Imbalance in the psychological contract has frequently been operationalized as 
violation or breach of the contract. In the following section we evaluate previous research 
investigating the impact of psychological contract violations on employee behavior.  
 
2.4 Fulfillment, breach and violation 
Evaluation of the psychological contract includes assessments of contract fulfillment, 
breach and violation. There exists psychological contract fulfillment when the employer or 
organization is perceived of keeping its contract terms. When an employee perceives the 
organization has failed to fulfill one or more of the perceived obligations of the 
psychological contract, there is a breach of contract. If there is a perceived breach of the 
psychological contract and the breach is significant, it constitutes a violation (Morrison & 
Robinson, 1997: 230): “Perceived breach refers to the cognition that one’s organization 
has failed to meet one or more obligations within one’s psychological contract in a 
manner commensurate with one’s contributions. Violation is the emotional and affective 
state that may, under certain conditions, follow from the belief that one’s organization has 
failed to adequately maintain the psychological contract”. 
 
According to these authors, breach does not necessarily have to lead to violation, but 
this depends for instance on the value of the perceived breach item, the context 
surrounding the breach and the reason for the breach. Insight into the degree of fulfillment, 
breach and violation of the psychological contract and their causes is important in light of 
their different consequences for employee behavior. Researchers found a relationship 
between psychological contract breach and civic virtue, intentions to remain, intention to 
turnover and psychological withdrawal (Robinson, 1996; Bunderson, 2001; Kickul, Lester 
& Finkl, 2002; Lo & Aryee, 2003).  
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Furthermore, research indicated a relationship between psychological contract violation 
and neglect, intention to quit, satisfaction, organizational citizenship behavior, turnover, 
intention to remain, loyalty and voice (Robinson & Rousseau, 1994; Robinson & Wolfe 
Morrison, 1995; Lewis-McClear & Taylor, 1996; Turnley & Feldman, 1998/1999/2000; 
De Witte & Van Hecke, 2002; Tekleab & Taylor, 2003).  
 
Prior research has come up with somewhat inconsistent results regarding the extent to 
how extensive the issue of breach/violation is, or how many employees experienced 
psychological contract violation (Turnley & Feldman, 1999b). Robinson & Rousseau 
(1994) for instance reported that approximately 55 % of a sample of MBA graduates 
indicated violation within the first two years of employment. Some researchers 
acknowledge that violations are quite common in today’s workplace. In the study of 
Robinson & Rousseau (1994), violation was conceptualized as perceived having to 
fulfilled less than was promised on at least one element of the psychological contract, 
which is in other studies considered as perceived breach.  
 
Turnley & Feldman (1998) reported that approximately 25 % of their respondents 
reported violation, which is substantive lower. These results might have been influenced 
by the use of different measures, or operationalizations of psychological contract violation. 
First of all, not al researchers make this distinction between breach and violation this strict, 
and label situations of breach (failed to fulfill one or more obligations) as violations. 
 
Regarding the measurement of violation or breach, Turnley & Feldman (1998) have 
asked the overall extent to which the organization has kept its promises and obligations. 
Respondents might, in that case, be more positive, indicating the influence of the 
measurement used. An example of such a measurement of violation is the following 
question: “overall, how well has the organization fulfilled the commitments that were made 
to you when you were hired?” (Rousseau, 1994). Furthermore, Turnley & Feldman (2002) 
argue that when an employer is perceived as over-fulfilling its obligations (i.e. more than 
perceived to be promised), this could as well be perceived as violation, although there is no 
substantive research on this matter.  
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Fulfillment and violation are negatively related, but are not by definition the opposite 
of each other (Rousseau & Tijoriwala, 1998). Employees can experience some sense of 
violation, while giving the employer high marks on contract fulfillment overall. According 
to Rousseau (1989), psychological contracts are best understood when they are violated.  
 
This provides one of the reasons that it might be more interesting for researchers to 
study breach and violation, instead of fulfillment. Maybe psychological contracts are not 
considered that important till they are violated or breach occurs, which can also be related 
to insights derived from motivational theories like the distinction between hygiene factors 
and motivators of Herzberg et al. (1959). It might be the case that psychological contracts 
operate more like a hygiene factor, in that when a contract is not perceived to be fulfilled, 
it is in some way unbalanced and it will, therefore, become a de-motivator instead of a 
hygiene factor, with all subsequent consequences. As suggested before, individuals will 
take actions to rebalance the employment relationship, and one way to do this is to reduce 
contributions towards the organization.  
 
In summary, researchers focus mainly on violation and breach. A reason for this is that 
as Robinson & Rousseau (1994) note, psychological contract breach and violation are 
relatively common, but can have big consequences on employee behavior. The distinction 
between breach and violation is not always applied. Because psychological contracts are 
best understood when they are breached or violated this will be the main focus of our 
study. We will use the terms breach and violation both for indicating a situation in which 
employees perceive the obligations of the employer as not being completely fulfilled.  
 
To capture the conditions under which psychological contract violation arise, we will 
review existing work studying the relationship between individual level as well as 
organizational level variables and the psychological contract (section 2.5).  
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2.5 Variables influencing the psychological contracts 
Individuals may perceive that promises were made based on their own interpretation of 
explicit or implicit information. Contract makers may not even be aware of the other 
party’s contract terms, let alone agree to them (Lewis-McClear & Taylor, 1998). As 
discussed before, individual behavior is to a certain degree influenced by the psychological 
contract that is perceived promises, that is communication of future intent.  
 
According to Rousseau (1995: 34), a series of organizational and individual processes 
affect the creation and evaluation of the psychological contract. Since we are interested in 
understanding which factors influence the formation and evaluation of the psychological 
contract, in this section we discuss empirical and conceptual findings on individual level 
and organizational level variables and their relationship with the psychological contract.  
 
Because our main focus is on organizational level variables, we limit our discussion of 
individual level variables. We conclude by providing a table (2-2) with an overview of the 
various variables influencing the development and evaluation of psychological contracts, 
as mentioned (based on conceptually and empirically established relations) in existing 
literature. Although this overview has not the pretension of being complete, frequently 
mentioned variables associated with the psychological contract are presented, and this 
provides us with a basis of empirically studying the psychological contract. 
 
2.5.1 Individual level variables 
Existing empirical research provides us with indications of an influence of the 
employees’ experience and initial level of trust in an employer (Robinson, 1996), past 
experiences (Grant, 1999; Rousseau, 1995); personality (Orvis & Dudley, 2002); contract 
status (Coyle-Shapiro & Kessler); careerism (Robison & Rousseau, 1994); and age 
(Turnley & Feldman, 1999) on the psychological contract. 
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Turnley & Feldman (1999b) reason in their conceptual article on psychological 
contract violation, that there might be differences across groups of employees in terms of 
what is considered as violation. Age for example: younger employees are less likely to 
expect spending their whole careers within one organization compared to older workers 
and are, therefore expected to respond less strong to violation when there is downsizing. 
 
Furthermore, a lot of studies limit their analysis to fulltime-employees (e.g. Robinson 
& Rousseau, 1994; Robinson, 1996). A reason for this is that part-time workers may have 
a different view of their psychological contract because of their contract’s focus on 
flexibility and another way of identification with the organization.  
 
The findings of the study of Coyle-Shapiro & Kessler (1999) towards contingent versus 
non-contingent workers, suggest that contract status plays an important role in how 
individuals view the exchange relationship and how they respond to the inducement they 
receive from that relationship. As a result of the fact that contingent employees spent less 
time in an organization, they might have lesser knowledge about the organization functions 
and have greater tolerance for organizational policies than permanent employees (Coyle-
Shaprio & Kessler 1999).  
 
Empirical literature thus provides us with indications of a relation between specific 
individual characteristics and psychological contracts (for an extended overview, see table 
2-2). In the following subsection, we focus on the relationship between organizational 
level elements and the psychological contract. 
 
2.5.2 Organizational level characteristics 
Although individual characteristics influence the psychological contract, psychological 
contracts develop in interactions between individuals and organization (Herriot & 
Pemberton, 1996; Westwood et al., 2001). Research also provides us with (mostly 
theoretical) indications that organizational structure and especially HRM are important 
sources of interaction with employees, and, therefore, influence psychological contract 
formation and evaluation.  
Chapter 2 - Psychological Contract 
 
 
 
26 
Human Resource/personnel departments of organizations through their policies, 
practices and actions, are in front line of employment relations and are, therefore, 
considered to be particularly instrumental in the determination of psychological contracts 
(Rousseau & Greller, 1994; Rousseau, 1995; Westwood et al., 2001; Koene & Van 
Riemsdijk, 2005).  
 
According to Rousseau (1995) events expressing plans for the future, signalling future 
inducements and contributions often occur during personnel actions (hiring, socialization, 
promotion, and development activities, which can be part of the activities of HRM 
departments) or during organizational changes (e.g. downsizing, restructuring). Rousseau 
& Greller (1994) suggest that one of the roles of HRM should be the creation and 
maintenance of the psychological contract between organizations and their employees. 
They state that HRM practices convey promises of future intent in exchange for 
contributions of employees, thus influence the forming and evaluation of the psychological 
contract. In line with this, they reason that each HRM practice represents a choice by the 
organization about what they expect from its employees and what the employees can 
expect in return.  
 
According to Rousseau (2001), promises are inherent in day-to-day HRM practices 
(Rousseau & Greller, 2001). HRM policy and practices thus (should) have a major impact 
on the shaping and evaluation of employee and employer obligations (Rousseau, 1995: 
162; Grant, 1999).  
 
Robinson & Morrison (2000) discuss the importance of the recruitment process in the 
development of the psychological contract and Rousseau (1995) argues that (amongst 
others) the performance appraisal process provides an important moment for 
communicating the psychological contract. HRM practices like recruitment and 
performance appraisal are thus considered to be sending messages regarding the skills and 
competencies that the organization expects from its employees, but also signal what the 
employees can expect or are promised in return.  
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HRM practices are seen as communicating the nature of effectiveness the organization 
expects from its employees (Sparrow, 1998), “One of the most powerful messages sent 
through these human resource processes has to do with the nature of effectiveness”.  
 
Guzzo & Noonan (1994) also conceptually relate human resource practices with the 
psychological contract. They consider HRM practices as communications mechanisms, and 
are interested in how these messages translate into attitudinal and behavioral outcomes. 
They suggest that much of the information for psychological contract formation and also 
for subsequent violation stem from the HRM practices of an organization. HRM practices 
send signals that are interpreted by employees, and are relevant to their assessment of the 
fulfillment of the psychological contract. In other words, they state that HRM practices 
have communicative value. 
 
Rousseau & Wade-Benzoni (1994) make an argument why business strategy, HRM 
practices and psychological contracts are related. They also considered HRM practices as 
major determinants of employees’ psychological contract and developed a conceptual 
framework for understanding these relationships. Based on the work of Miles & Snow 
(1984), who distinguish between various strategic positions (defenders, prospectors, 
analyzers, responsive) they consider related choices in the HRM Practices (make or buy) 
and subsequent psychological contracts (transactional/ relational/ balanced). As an 
example of their line of reasoning, defenders focus their strategy at maintaining their 
markets share; HRM practices should in that case be “make oriented” (e.g. focus on 
socialization, formal career paths in which employees can work their way up); and as a 
result the psychological contracts of employees can be typologized as relational.  
 
HRM practices thus shape the behavior of employees. Rousseau & Wade-Benzoni 
(1994) see HRM practices as an important mechanism for implementing the organizational 
strategy. Based on this research, they suggest organizations to align their HRM practices 
with their business strategy to avoid sending mixed messages to employees.  
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Guest & Conway (2002) empirically investigated the relationship between 
organizational variables as organizational communication and HRM and the psychological 
contract. The results of a survey of 1306 senior UK managers show amongst others a 
positive relationship between organizational size and sector and psychological contract 
breach. Larger organizations and those in the public sector were associated with more 
breaches of the psychological contract. Furthermore, they found a negative significant 
association between the number of HRM practices and several communication 
mechanisms (job-, top down-, recruitment,-) and psychological contract breach.  
 
Robinson & Morrison (2000) in discussing causes of contract breach, provide us with 
more indications for the relationship between organizational features and psychological 
contract breach. According to them, when the process of socialization in organizations is 
fairly formalized or structured in nature, they expect new employees to form a set of 
beliefs and assumptions that is similar to those held by agents of the organization, which 
implies congruence and less potential for breach of psychological contract.  
 
Huiskamp & Schalk (2002) found some empirical support that psychological contracts 
are at least partly context specific; they found differences in psychological contracts 
between employees working in organizations in different sectors. Further indications for a 
relation between contextual elements and the psychological contract can be found in the 
research of Janssens et al. (2003). In their research towards types of psychological 
contracts in Belgium, Janssens et al. (2003) empirically distinguish between six types of 
psychological contracts which were associated with the specific sector and size of the 
organizations in which employees were employed. 
 
Rousseau (2001) argues that employees are likely to interpret promises similar in 
settings characterized by mutually reinforcing messages. Convergent human resource 
practices increase the likelihood for similar elements of psychological contracts. She 
defines human resource practices as structural signals regarding the organizations’ 
intentions towards their employees (Rousseau & Greller, 1994; Rousseau, 2001; see also 
figure 2-3). Rousseau (2001) concludes that in line with the work of McDuffie (1995), 
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structural signals derived from human resource practices tend to send more coherent 
signals when bundles of practices mutually reinforce each other. “Lack of integration or 
alignment between HR practices and between HR and business strategies often signals 
problems from the perspective of managing the individual’s psychological contract 
because they might not send consistent messages to employees“(Rousseau & Wade-
Benzoni, 1994). Rousseau & Greller (1994) even go a step further in suggesting that a 
contract based on mixed messages would not be a very efficient contract. 
 
In general, Rousseau (2001) acknowledges the fact that less attention has been given to 
promises implied by management actions or human resource policies “we need to 
understand more about whether it is the practices themselves, or other signals that 
accompany them (e.g. the co-occurrence of sets of practices such as training and follow-up 
performance evaluations) that shape interpretations”.  
 
Summarizing, psychological contracts can develop from the interaction of the 
individual with his or her organizational environment through several means, including 
HRM practices (Rousseau & McLean Parks, 1993; Rousseau & Greller, 1994). Although 
contracts tend to be unique to each individual, organizational variables as the particular 
HRM design, the particular sector and size of the organization, influence the development 
and evaluation of psychological contracts through the sort of message or ‘signal’ it sends 
to employees. Furthermore, consistency between the messages send by organizations 
seems important in terms of fulfillment of psychological contracts. Authors like Guzzo & 
Noonan (1994), Coyle-Shapiro (2001) and Rousseau (2001), acknowledge the fact that 
more research is needed on the relationship between organizational variables, such as 
specific HRM practices or bundles of practices and the psychological contract. In table 2-2 
we provide an overview of the various elements influencing the psychological contract, as 
mentioned in existing literature.  
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2.6 Conclusions 
The psychological contract will be the lens through which we study the organization 
(for instance in terms of HRM). In line with the conceptualization of Rousseau 
(1989/1990/1995), we defined the psychological contract as: “an individual’s belief, 
shaped by the organization, regarding reciprocal obligations”.  
 
Defining features of the psychological contract in this study are:  
¾ The psychological contract is a concept at the individual level and considers individual 
or idiosyncratic perceptions regarding the employment relationship 
¾ Psychological contracts are formed upon perceived obligations 
¾ They are held by individuals with respect to the organization 
¾ The psychological contract is shaped and can be managed by the organization 
¾ The psychological contract consists of three aspects, perceived employee obligations, 
perceived employer obligations and perceived fulfillment/ violation of employer 
obligations 
¾ These three aspects are inherently related to each other 
 
Underlying theory and concepts in research towards the psychological contract are 
(social and economic) exchange, balance and reciprocity. Based on insights derived from 
exchange theory and related concepts of balance and reciprocity, we assume that when 
employees perceive that the obligations of the organization compared to their own 
contributions are not fulfilled, they will reciprocate by adjusting their attitudes and 
behaviors. Psychological contracts are thus contingent upon the perceived behavior of the 
other party. Because of reported negative effects of not completely fulfilled psychological 
contracts, on individual attitudes and behavior, our main focus is on breach/violation of the 
psychological contract. We will use the terms breach and violation both for indicating a 
situation in which employees perceive the obligations of the employer as not being 
completely fulfilled.  
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Research on the psychological contract has mainly focused on individual level analyses 
of work perceptions of individual employees. In this study we are interested foremost in 
organizational level elements influencing the psychological contract.  
 
Because of the in previous research reported negative behavioral effects of 
psychological contract violation on individual performance, it is interesting to investigate 
the influence of organizational level variables on the psychological contract. There are 
only a few empirical studies (e.g. Guest & Conway, 2002) which consider the relationship 
between organizational level variables and the psychological contract, although many 
authors provide indications for this relationship in more conceptual work.  
 
HRM has been regularly put forward as a key organizational level element influencing 
the development and evaluation of the psychological contract. The outcomes of these 
previous studies ask for further studying this relationship. This could be done well by 
using the definition of Rousseau, separating the employer side from the psychological 
contract (the employee side), in studying the influence of organizational level elements as 
HRM on the psychological contract, with the assumption that these elements (which can be 
seen as part of the employers’ perspective) are, by this definition, not included in the 
psychological contract itself.  
 
In line with Rousseau (1995) HRM can be seen as part of the so-called secondary 
contract makers, or “structural signals: vehicles people use to convey commitments and 
offer inducements for present and future behavior”.  
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From this perspective, organizational practices (as HRM practices and elements of 
organizational structure) can be seen as communicating mechanisms which are relevant for 
employees’ assessment of the degree of violation of their psychological contracts. These 
practices are expected to have an optimal influence on psychological contracts when the 
practices promote a coherent organizational signal. Alignment between different ‘signals’ 
or messages sent by an organization, and alignment among organizational practices can, in 
light of the psychological contract literature, be seen as important for constituting 
organizationally ‘desired’ behavior.  
 
In the following chapter we will gain more insight into the conceptualization of 
structural signals and present our conceptual model and hypotheses for studying the 
relationship between these structural signals and the psychological contract. 
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Table 2-2 Overview of variables associated with the psychological contract 
 Individual level elements Organizational level elements 
Empirical Age  
(Robinson, 1996; Turnley & Feldman, 
1999; Janssens et al. 2003) 
Sector  
(Guest & Conway, 2002; Huiskamp & Schalk, 
2002; Janssens et al. 2003) 
 Seniority 
(Janssens et al. 2003; Guest & Conway, 
2002)) 
Size  
(Guest & Conway, 2002; Janssens et al. 2003) 
 Level of education 
(Janssens et al. 2003)  
Number of HR practices  
(Guest & Conway, 2002) 
 Trade union membership 
(Janssens et al. 2003)  
 
 Gender  
(Ten Brink et al. 2001) 
 
 Careerism  
(Robison & Rousseau, 1994) 
 
 Personality  
(Orvis & Dudley, 2002) 
 
 Wage 
(Janssens et al. 2003)  
 
 Operational/ management position  
Janssens et al. 2003) 
 
 Level of experience in organization  
(Robinson, 1996), 
 
 Part-time/fulltime  
(Ten Brink et al. 2001; Conway & Briner, 
2002; Coyle-Shapiro & Kessler) 
 
Conceptual  Structural signals: 
compensation/benefits/career path/performance 
review/ training/ personnel manuals 
(Rousseau, 1995) 
  Personnel actions:  
hiring, socialization, promotion, and 
development activities (Rousseau, 1995) 
  Business, political and market environments; 
organizational structure and the balance of 
power (Herriot & Pemberton, 1996) 
  Recruitment process  
(Robinson & Morrison, 2000) 
  HRM  
(Sparrow, 1998; Grant, 1999; Westwood et al. 
2001; Rousseau & Greller, 1994; Guzzo & 
Noonan ,1994; Rousseau & Wade-
Benzoni,1994) 
  Formalization of the socialization process 
(Robinson & Morrison, 2000) 
  Goal of organization  
(Farmer & Fedor, 1999) 
  Sector and size  
(Rousseau, 1995) 
  Consistency between HRM practices and its 
organizational context:  
(e.g. Rousseau, 2001 ; Rousseau & Wade-
Benzoni, 1994; Rousseau & Greller, 1994) 
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CHAPTER 3  HRM SIGNALS 
 
3.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter (mostly derived conceptually) indications were found of 
relationships between organizational level elements and the content and evaluation of the 
psychological contract. An important role was predicted for HRM factors but also the more 
general design factors that have a less direct relationship with the (perception of the) 
employment relationship (such as age and size of the organization) where considered as 
related with the psychological contract (see table 2-2). Furthermore, in this kind of 
literature attention has been paid to the importance of coherence between the various 
organizational practices or the so-called ‘structural signals’ (Rousseau, 1995/2001).  
 
The aim of this chapter is to provide insight into and evaluate existing literature on 
HRM and more general design factors (structural signals) and their relationship with 
psychological contract violation. Furthermore, we combine these insights into a conceptual 
model and hypotheses. In the first section, we discuss the concepts of signal(ling), 
structure and structural signals (section 3.2) and present our basic conceptual model. In 
order to capture the scope of the field of HRM and the range of activities HRM can pay 
attention to (which can all have their signalling effect), we discuss domains or areas which 
can be considered to be part of HRM (section 3.3). Within the field of HRM a distinction 
can be made in various approaches of studying HRM, universalistic approaches versus 
configurational approaches. These approaches are expected to have different signalling 
effects in terms of psychological contract violation. We discuss these approaches and 
develop our hypotheses in section 3.4.  
 
3.2 Defining structural signals 
In this study our interest is in the signalling effect of HRM and more general design 
factors (as organizational structure) on the psychological contract of employees within 
organizations. As defined in the previous chapter on psychological contracts ‘structural 
signals are vehicles people use to convey commitments and offer inducements for present 
and future behavior” (Rousseau, 1995).  
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There are two concepts in this definition that we discuss in this section, namely the 
concept of signal(ling) and the concept of structure. We clarify in short the origins of the 
concept of signalling and after that discuss the signalling role of HRM.  
 
3.2.1 The signalling perspective: what does signalling mean? 
Signalling models are used in a variety of research areas. In International Economics 
for instance, signalling is considered as an intervention strategy by a central bank for 
influencing the market’s view of the future (e.g. Krugman & Obstfeld, 1994). Furthermore, 
signalling approaches can be found in the area of Marketing in which signalling is 
considered as an organization’s strategic behavior in signalling private information to 
customers and competitors.  
 
Signalling approaches are also common in Micro-economic Labor Relations, in which 
signalling is used to explain the bonding or the (establishment) of a relationship between 
an organization and its employees in the labor market (Spence, 1973). Because in this 
study we are interested in the relationship between organizations and employees (in terms 
of the psychological contract) we will elaborate on this last stream of research. 
 
Spence (1973) discusses signalling in labor markets where as a result of information 
asymmetry it is difficult for organizations to establish the quality or worth of employees. 
Even though over time an employer can gain better information on the quality of 
employees, at the time of hiring in particular, lack of information on the quality of an 
employee for the organization can become a problem. Spence (1973) argues that hiring is 
an investment decision because the capabilities of the person are not known beforehand, 
which makes the decision to hire a person an uncertain decision.  
 
Spence (1973: 357) uses the term signals for “observable characteristics attached to 
the individual that are subject to manipulation”. Age for instance is not considered to be a 
signal because although age changes, that fact is not at the discretion of the individual. 
Education on the other hand, can be considered as a signal.  
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Signals are assumed to be potentially open for manipulation even though there are costs 
associated with this, considering the fact that education is costly. Spence further reasons 
that individuals will decide to invest in education when there is sufficient return, and thus 
will only invest in education when the signalling costs of this do not exceed the return (for 
instance wage). This provides a reason why degrees are valued by employers since they 
provide a signal with regard to the quality of the employee.  
 
Spence develops a model in which he distinguishes between two types of workers: 
workers that are highly productive and workers at a much lower level of productivity. The 
first group is able to get education at lower cost than the second group. The signalling 
equilibrium according to Spence exists in that higher productivity workers will seek and 
find more training opportunities than lower productivity employees and as a result of this 
process education signals quality of an employee. Organizations will prefer to hire and 
might offer higher wages to employees with higher level of education because it provides 
an indication of their level of productivity. Seen this way education can be a signal for the 
productivity quality of workers.  
 
Spence acknowledges that just as organizations receive less than perfect information 
from applicants so do the applicants receive less than perfect information on their future 
employer. Following this line of reasoning, the recruitment policy of an organization can 
be considered as a signal concerning the qualities of an organization in the eyes of an 
applicant. The cost associated with the recruitment policy can be enormous compared to 
the returns when employees do not perceive these signals as intended.  
 
In signalling models one party sends signals that the other party interprets, thereby 
assuming an interaction between two interested parties. A signal is considered to be an 
action/ behavior or characteristic of one party (the signaller) that influences the behavior of 
the other party (the signal receiver). Signalling models clearly have links with agency 
theory.  
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Agency theory considers situations in which one party requires services from another 
in a situation where uncertainty exists, where both parties will behave in their own interest 
and where an information asymmetry between the principal (signal receiver) and the agent 
(signaller) creates problems of trustworthiness of the signals sent out by the agent (see for 
example Wright & McMahan, 1992 for a translation to the field of HRM). 
 
Summarizing, signalling theory from an economic perspective is based on the 
assumption of rational evaluation of both costs and benefits of signalling actions by parties 
in a potential contract relationship. The agency perspective adds to this the issues of 
information asymmetry and self-interested behavior of both parties. In signalling (and 
agency) theory there is always an informed party (principal) and a not completely informed 
or imperfectly informed party (agent). The basic problem is that two parties have access to 
different information, and because their interests do not coincide entirely (conflict of 
interest), they will not share their private information completely; as a result each has an 
incentive not to be honest or not to fulfill its side of the bargain. Signals convey 
information about the signaller to a signal receiver. Both interpret the information received 
as signalling the true intentions of the other party. Signals are costly to produce and to 
send.  
 
In line with Spence (1973) and Rousseau (1995), we will use the term signals for 
observable characteristics attached to the organization that are subject to manipulation by 
organizations. These characteristics are vehicles that organizations use to convey 
commitments and to offer inducements for present and future behavior (i.e. HRM and 
organizational structure).  
 
We assume that signalling exists when the organization is perceived by employees as 
sending signals and thus assume interaction between both parties as a result of the way an 
organization designs HRM and structure. A signal in this way is considered to be a 
characteristic of the organization that influences the attitudes and behavior of the other 
party (degree of psychological contract violation).  
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Signalling theory makes us aware of the relationship between the signaller (in our case 
the organization in terms of HRM and organizational structure) and the signal receiver 
(employees in terms of their psychological contracts) based on issues such as information 
asymmetry. 
 
3.2.2 A signalling role for HRM and organizational structure 
Starting out to investigate the impact of structural signals on perceptions of the 
employment relationship, Rousseau (1995) focuses on the actual practices such as 
compensation, benefits, performance review, training and personnel manuals within 
organizations. She considers the signals these practices send as structural signals. HRM 
practices are in this way seen as communicating mechanisms or vehicles (Guest & 
Conway, 2002:22) signalling expectations of the organization regarding required behaviors 
of employees and communicating its own reciprocal promises to employees. Furthermore, 
research in this area acknowledges the signalling value of organizational structure in the 
sense that structure is not seen as neutral, but as expressions of intentions, aspirations and 
purposes (e.g. Greenwood & Hinings, 1993).  
 
Although Rousseau (1995) focuses on HRM practices, structure in organization theory 
is defined much more broadly encompassing HRM practices, but also focusing often on its 
functional relevance in the process of organizing. Organizational structure has been 
extensively studied in literature on organizational design (see for instance Mintzberg, 
1979). Mintzberg (1979/1983) described organizational structuring as a mechanism to 
reduce behavior variability, as: “the sum total of the ways in which labor is divided into 
distinct tasks and then its coordination is achieved among these tasks”.  
 
Literature on organizational design focuses on structural forms of organizations, such 
as matrix and divisionalized structure, based on structural mechanisms as specialization 
(the differentiation of tasks and positions), formalization (the formulation of rules and 
procedures), and decentralization (the prescriptions of authority) (e.g. Pugh, Hickson & 
Hinings, 1969; Galbraith,1977; Mintzberg, 1979; Miller, 1981).  
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In general HRM can be considered as an aspect of organizational design. Greenwood & 
Hinings (1993: 1054) make a distinction between three elements constituting design in 
which they explicitly position aspects of HRM as elements of organization design: (1) 
vertical and horizontal structures of roles and responsibilities; (2) decision systems, or 
policy and resource allocation mechanisms; and (3) HRM systems, such as recruitment, 
appraisal, and compensation.  
 
Mintzberg (1997/1983) also considers HRM as an aspect of organizational design. He 
discusses a set of design parameters, which he considers to be the basic component of 
organizational structure: e.g. job specialization, behavior formalization, training and 
indoctrination, planning and control systems and vertical and horizontal decentralization. 
This subset of design parameters captures elements that are the specific focus of HRM 
researchers who conceptualize these as HRM practices, such as training and 
decentralization (e.g. Arthur, 1992; Boselie, 2002).  
 
Based on this kind of literature, we consider HRM and the structure of an organization 
as part of the design system. HRM research focuses on those aspects of organizational 
design that most directly effect the employment relationship and organizational structure 
reflects the broader context in which HRM is interpreted and understood. Organizational 
structure and HRM can be seen to represent ‘structural signals’ in terms of Rousseau 
(1995) affecting the employee’s perception of the employment relationship. 
 
Concluding, in this research we are interested in the signalling value of HRM and 
structure in organizations. Because HRM most directly influences the employment 
relationship, our main focus is on the signalling value of HRM in terms of the 
psychological contract. There can be a situation of information asymmetry in that the 
organization decides on certain HRM practices, signalling values towards its employees, 
which these employees might or might not perceive in terms of their psychological 
contracts.  
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3.2.3 Conceptual model 
The conceptual model in figure 3-1 presented the outcomes of our analysis of the 
literature until now. ‘Line B’ in de conceptual model represents the relationship between 
the three elements of the psychological contract. Based on exchange theory and notions on 
balance and reciprocity (see chapter 2) we expect that employees seek balance in their 
employment relationship and reciprocate (by adjusting their own obligations) according to 
their perception of the degree of balance. In a similar line of reasoning, signalling theory 
also assumes interaction between both parties.  
Based on literature on signalling, we assume that signalling exists when the 
organization is perceived by employees as sending signals through its HRM practices and 
organizational structure. HRM and organizational structure are considered to be 
characteristics of the signalling organization and are expected to be related to the degree of 
psychological contract violation of the employees, the signal receivers. Putting these 
insights together we expect actions of the organization, HRM practices and aspects of 
organizational structure, to have consequences for the employees’ psychological contract 
(indicated by the line ‘A’ in the conceptual model). 
 
Figure 3-1 Conceptual Model 
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Whilst focusing our attention on HRM we already emphasize those aspects of 
organizational design that most directly affect the employment relationship. However, it is 
necessary to understand that HRM practices do not constitute a monolithic range of 
practices and design elements. HRM itself is a multifaceted area of interest considering a 
range of topics or domains within organizations that can all have an effect on the 
psychological contract of employees. We discuss domains or areas in which HRM can be 
active in the next section.  
 
3.3 Domains of Human Resource Management 
According to authors such as Schein (1977), HRM focuses on those aspects that are 
critical in aligning employee and organization’s goals and needs. HRM is thus considered 
to have a central function in the materialization of the employment relationship of 
employees with the organization. As suggested in the previous chapter, researchers 
studying the psychological contract have convincingly argued for an effect of HRM 
practices on employees’ perceptions and evaluations of their employment relationship with 
the organization (e.g. Rousseau & Greller, 1994; Guzzo & Noonan, 1994; Rousseau & 
Wade-Benzoni, 1994). Studies investigating the impact of HRM, however, have been 
suffering from the fact that the field of HRM is lacking agreement on what exactly HRM is 
and how to operationalize HRM (e.g. Becker & Gerhart, 1996; Boselie & Dietz, 2003).  
 
There are several reasons for this, which can be traced back to the multidisciplinary 
nature and development of the field (e.g. psychology/ economics/ legal/ sociology). This 
has resulted in a diversity of areas or domains in which HRM is studied, such as industrial 
relations and organizational development. These various domains focus on a range of 
aspects in the management of the employment relationship that can influence the 
perceptions of the employees regarding their relationship with the organization in a variety 
of ways. Aspects of industrial relations for instance focus on the representational system 
and thus the influence (or power) employees might have within an organization, whereas 
the training policy of an organization provides an indication of the way organizations will 
invest in the actual development of their employees. To gain insight into the signalling 
value of HRM it is essential to understand these various domains. 
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Several researchers make a distinction between HRM areas (Buitendam, 1979; Van 
Bastelaer & Van Beers, 1982; Beer et al., 1985; Arthur, 1992; Gospel, 1992; Osterman, 
1994; Leijten, 1995). Beer et al. (1984) define HRM as involving “all management 
decisions that affect the relationship between the organization and employees – its human 
resources” and consider four areas as part of human resource policy: employee influence, 
human resource flow, reward systems and work systems.  
 
Leijten (1995) studies the manner in which personnel management stimulates the 
effectiveness of organizations and makes a distinction between four domains of personnel 
management based on the work of Beer et al. (Beer et al., 1989): 
1. Human resource flow: entails the process of input, throughput and output of personnel, 
thereby covering practices such as recruitment & selection, training & development; 
2. Reward systems: focus on the way in which managers develop fair and equitable 
(im)material reward systems to satisfy and motivate personnel; 
3. Work systems: focus on the design of work, for instance coordination of tasks, and on 
elements such as safety, health and well-being; 
4. Employee influence: focus on the choice managers make regarding the extent to which 
they decentralize authority and power (in this domain works counsels and unions also 
play a role). 
 
The development of these domains can be considered as an attempt to summarize the 
different areas in which HRM plays a role. In this research we use a Dutch interpretation of 
these domains as developed by Buitendam (1979) and tested by Van Bastelaer & Van 
Beers (1982). They factor analyzed 24 HRM practices resulting in a distinction between 
four domains of HRM, made up of combinations of HRM practices related to key issues in 
the organization (staffing/ employee relations) and the degree to which these practices are 
internally or externally oriented. For an overview of these domains see table 3-1.  
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Table 3-1 Overview of HRM domains (Buitendam, 1979)  
HRM Domains  
Industrial relations system: developing and legitimizing specific arrangements 
for labor deployment; mobilizing of resources and negotiations concerning 
labor agreements; regulation of collective relations 
Work systems: development and maintenance of motivational and cultural 
contexts for the regulation of tension between employees and the organization; 
the development of commitment to the organization. 
Development of HRM policy and organizational development: development 
and maintenance of the consistency between the parts of the organization and 
between social groups within the organization, striving towards integration and 
solidarity. 
Human resource flow: mastering and regulation of external relations and 
internal processes concerning acquisition and allocation of personnel. 
 
Following Buitendam (1979), Van Bastelaer & Van Beers (1982) thus differentiate 
between the following domains: Industrial relation system, referring to the representational 
system which exist within an organization; Work systems, focusing on the design of work 
(e.g. coordination of tasks, safety, health and well-being); Development of HRM policy 
and organizational development focusing on consistency, integration and solidarity within 
the organization; and Human resource flow, consisting of general practices such as 
selection and appraisal. Van Bastelaer & Van Beers (1982) discuss that organizations can 
differ in the attention they pay (dominance) to the various domains of HRM, based on 
characteristics of the organization as the degree of homogeneity and stability of the 
working force.  
 
To indicate the relevance of these domains and their practices, we discuss various 
approaches towards studying HRM and their relationship with psychological contract 
violation in the next section. 
 
3.4 Models/ approaches for studying HRM 
The signalling value of HRM on employees’ perceptions of the employment 
relationship requires a specific view on the influence of HRM in organizations. Minimal 
signalling is necessary for employees to be able to build any view of their employment 
relationship at all. An increase of the amount of organizational information may provide 
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richer information for the employee to build his own understanding of his employment 
relationship with the organization. The specific focus of HRM (e.g. organizational 
development) is of course considered as important, since it signals required behavior of 
employees. Furthermore, coherent organizational signalling is considered important. 
Alignment between different ‘signals’ or messages send by an organization, is seen as 
important for constituting organizationally ‘desired’ behavior. 
 
In their approach to the role of HRM in organizations, researchers provide evidence 
and theory on the impact of HRM in organizations along these avenues of reasoning (e.g. 
Boxall & Purcell, 2003; Paauwe, 2004). Universalistic HRM research focusing on best 
practices and empirically investigating the influence of these HRM practices on 
organizational outcomes, mainly provides evidence that helps to build our understanding 
of the role of HRM practices in providing information about the (fulfillment of) 
organizational expectations of the employment relationship (the higher the amount of 
HRM practices, the better, see Guest et al., (2003)). 
 
Furthermore, another stand of this type of research emphasizes that some HRM 
practices are more important than others for influencing individual behavior (so called 
High Performance Work or High Commitment Practices, see for instance Appelbaum et al. 
2000). The so-called ‘fit’ or configurational approaches, on the other hand, help to build 
the case for coherence of signalling. Fit approaches as contingency (vertical fit) and 
configurational, emphasize the importance of coherence of organizational signalling (e.g. 
Mintzberg, 1979; Verburg, 1998). In these approaches signalling is not only related to 
HRM, but also to aspects of organizational structuring. Both the universalistic and the 
configurational approach provide explanatory mechanisms for investigating the 
relationship between HRM and the psychological contract.  
These two approaches and their specific relation with the psychological contract 
(leading to the formulation of our hypotheses) are discussed in the following subsections. 
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3.4.1 Universalistic approaches 
Typically for a universalistic approach towards HRM is that researchers in this stream 
do not incorporate contingency factors, so regardless of the context of the organization 
these HRM practices (or their combinations) have a relationship with performance. When 
conceptualizing HRM in terms of HRM practices, it becomes important to distinguish the 
specific practices compromising HRM. There are several authors who provide us with an 
overview of practices used by researchers in the field.  
 
Paauwe & Richardson (1997) for instance, extensively reviewed empirical research on 
the relation between HRM and performance. They conclude that research has been 
conducted towards the relationship between the following HRM activities and aspects of 
performance: recruitment/selection, HRM planning, rewards, participation, intern 
consistent HRM- bundles, decentralization, training/employee development, organizational 
structures/ internal labor market and formal procedures. When reasoning from the 
psychological contract, the availability of HRM policies and practices specifying the 
employment contract enhances the amount of information about the employment 
relationship. There does not seem to be a broad consensus on which practices have a 
universalistic relationship with aspects of organizational and/or behavioral performance 
and which do not. To gain more insight in this, we consider two universalistic approaches: 
the first regarding the amount of HRM practices employed by the organization; and the 
second regarding the specific focus of HRM or combinations of HRM practices. 
 
3.4.2 Amount of HRM practices 
Following the best practices or universalistic approach, there is a relationship between 
psychological contract and HRM based on the messages the organization sends through its 
separate HRM practices. In light of the psychological contract, every added HRM practice 
then provides additional information regarding employee and organizational obligations.  
This information is relevant for employees’ assessment of fulfillment of the 
organization’s obligations, thus leading to less violation of these expectations. In a similar 
line of reasoning, Guest et al. (2003), in their study towards the relationship between HRM 
and performance in a sample of UK companies, found relationships between the greater 
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use of HRM practices and (subjective) indicators of performance. Thus the more HRM 
practices, the more signals or information sent by the organization, the less violation of 
psychological contracts. This leads us to the first hypothesis: 
 
H1: The more HRM practices, the less psychological contract violation. 
 
3.4.3 The focus of HRM 
Several HRM researchers investigated the relationship between combinations of HRM 
practices (HRM systems) and their relationship with performance. According to 
researchers in this stream, although each HRM practice can be important, in order for an 
organization to be high performing the HRM system should consist of an effective 
combination with a specific focus of these practices.  
 
One of the reasons for paying attention to combinations of HRM practices is to avoid 
combinations that work in opposite directions, for example combining the practices of 
teamwork and rewarding individual performance. Another reason for studying 
combinations of practices is the costs associated with the duplication of practices. The 
underlying premise of this kind of literature is that the use of certain kinds of systems with 
their specific focus will be positively related to performance of the organization when 
compared to other systems. Considering these combinations, we need to gain insight into 
the specific practices that constitute a HRM system and the basis on which practices would 
be bundled together.  
 
Several authors identify a set of ‘best practices’. Delery & Doty (1996) for instance 
identify seven HRM practices that they consider as having a relationship with 
organizational performance based on the work of amongst others Osterman (1987) and 
Miles & Snow (1984): internal career opportunities, formal training systems, appraisal 
measures, profit sharing, employment security, voice mechanisms and job definition. 
These practices are considered strategic HRM practices in the sense that they are supposed 
to have a relationship with organizational performance.  
 
Chapter 3 –HRM Signals 
 
 
 
48 
Pfeffer (1994) concluded in his research towards the relationship between practices and 
performance, that the greater use of the management practices as employment security, 
selectivity in recruiting, high wages, incentive pay, employee ownership, information 
sharing, participation and empowerment, training and skill development, wage 
compression, the higher the productivity and profit in organizations in general.  
 
Boselie & Dietz (2003) investigated the relationship between HRM and performance 
by reviewing empirical articles in leading journals. In searching for common elements in 
practices constituting HRM, they conclude that the five most common policies and 
practices which are considered to be part of HRM are: training (general and/or specific)/ 
employee development; incentive-based payment systems; decentralization/ employee 
participation in decision-making; investment in selection; and teamwork. According to 
Boselie & Dietz (2003), there is little consensus on which practices exactly should be 
combined, which according to them might be based on a lack of theory for selecting and 
classifying practices (which is amongst others reflected in the terminology of these 
combinations of practices).  
 
HRM theorists as Arthur (1992), Kochan & Osterman (1994) and Pfeffer (1994) 
propose high commitment and other types of high involvement work systems, thereby 
suggesting that there exist ‘optimal’ HRM systems for managing employees. This is 
clearly a universalistic argument in that regardless of the circumstances within the 
organization and of the environment of the organization, these systems are considered best 
for all organizations.  
Arthur (1992/1994) develops two possible HRM systems, the commitment maximizing 
system (encouraging discretionary employee efforts, a way to attract, motivate and retain 
qualified employees committed to the goals of an organization) and the cost reduction 
system (aimed at reducing direct labor cost and other employment-relations expenditures 
(see table 3-2). Arthur (1994) found within in his research on steel mini-mills, that HRM 
systems emphasizing employee commitment were associated with a higher productivity.  
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Table 3-2 Two systems of workplace industrial relations (Arthur, 1992: 491) 
Industrial Relations 
Functions 
Type of system  
Cost reduction 
Commitment Maximizing 
Organization of Work Job tasks narrowly defined Broadly defined jobs 
Employee Relations Very little employee 
influence over 
“management” decisions; 
No formal employee 
complaint/ grievance 
mechanisms; 
Little communication/ 
socialization efforts 
High level of employee 
participation/ involvement; 
Formal dispute resolution 
procedures (non-union 
firms) 
Regularly share business/ 
economic information with 
employees 
Staffing/ Supervision Low skill requirements; 
Intense supervision/ Control 
High percentage of skilled 
workers; 
Self-managing teams 
Training Limited training efforts More extensive, general 
skills training 
Compensation Limited benefits 
Relatively low wages 
Incentive-based 
More extensive benefits; 
Relatively high wages; 
All salaried/ stock 
ownership 
 
 
MacDuffie’s (1995) research on automotive assembly plants concludes that high 
commitment HRM practices (such as contingent compensation and extensive training) 
outperformed control oriented HRM practices. Furthermore, Osterman (1994) found that 
organizations that value employee commitment are associated with investing in innovative 
work practices. According to Osterman (1994), the use of these innovative work practices 
or flexible work systems (such as teamwork, job rotation, quality circles, total quality 
management) results in higher productivity for all (American) organizations. 
Appelbaum et al. (2000) in their study towards High Performance Work Systems 
(HPWS), examining three US industries (steelmaking, clothing manufacture and medical 
electronics manufacture) also adopt a universalistic systems perspective. According to 
them, work systems and employment modes that support high performance are: more 
rigorous selection, better training systems to increase ability levels, more comprehensive 
incentives to enhance motivation, participative structures (such as self-managing teams and 
quality circles) that improve the opportunity to contribute (Appelbaum et al., 2000).  
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Researchers thus acknowledge that organizations can differ in their approach towards 
managing its employees (for instance a focus on control or commitment) and there can be 
found indications that commitment oriented approaches outperform more control oriented 
ones. This raises the question whether certain combinations are better than others? 
Although researchers acknowledge that organizations can differ in their approach towards 
managing employees, several authors focus on commitment enhancing HRM systems 
because their research supports that these are associated with higher performance than do 
for instance control systems (e.g. Arthur, 1994). The rational for this is they align the 
interest of employees and organizations in a better way.  
 
According to Huselid (1995), employees will only contribute discretionary effort if 
they believe that their interest is aligned with the interest of the organization (reciprocal 
investment). Their premise is that high performance work (HPW) or innovative or high 
commitment oriented practices are the best for achieving high performance. A highly 
committed workforce is thus seen as important in realizing organizational goals.  
 
These researchers thus assume that adopting these commitment systems (or whatever 
terminology they use) are best for all organizations and do not specify alternative systems 
which could be equally effective. These commitment systems are supposed to generate 
high commitment as a result of their focus on enhancing skills and motivation of 
employees. The assumption is that organizations cannot be high performing without the 
commitment of employees. These researchers assume that commitment systems 
outperform universally all other systems.  
 
Concluding, there is no specific consensus on which practices can be considered as 
commitment HRM practices. In general there is agreement on their main focus: enhancing 
skills and motivation of employees. Organizations that focus on commitment HRM 
practices are considered as consciously paying attention to and investing in their human 
capital. HRM practices are aimed at motivation of employees by increasing their skills and 
involvement (as the degree to which HRM departments pay attention to and accompany 
training, communication, job rotation and so on).  
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Referring back to the four domains of Van Bastelaer & Van Beers (1982) as presented 
in table 3-1, commitment HRM practices are part of the domains ‘Development of HRM 
policy’ and organizational development’ (focusing on consistency, integration and 
solidarity within the organization) and ‘Work systems’ (focusing on the design of work, 
e.g. coordination of tasks, safety, health and well-being).  
 
In the previously discussed literature, not only these practices themselves, but also 
internal consistency or fit between these commitment or high performance practices, is 
seen as important for constituting high performance. Basically this literature suggests that 
unless there is consistency or fit between the practices, there will be no relationship with 
high performance.  
 
This raises the question on how to combine these commitment practices in a system. 
According to Delery (1998) this depends in large on the nature of these practices and their 
combinations: 
1. Additive: practices have independent non-overlapping effects on the outcome. An 
example of this would be the use of two assessment tests, measuring different aspects. 
Together they may have a good result, but not more than the sum of the two parts, 
they are independent; 
2. Substitutable: adopting combination of practices does not add something to the 
outcome of interest, but is only costly. Both practices lead to identical outcomes. 
When incorporating both practices, this would not lead to a better result, it just costs 
more; 
3. Positive synergetic effects: combination greater than the sum of parts; 
4. Negative synergetic effects: when the practices work against one another, 
organizations that combine the two practices will be less effective than if they just 
incorporated one of them: as Becker et al. (1997) call it: “a deadly combination”. 
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Even though commitment practices that constitute a commitment system are expected 
to be interrelated, when multiplying them in order to capture synergetic effects, they raise 
several problems: for instance when one practice is not present, this would result in a zero 
score on commitment. Although theoretically ‘commitment researchers’ post needs for fit 
between the practices, practically it is too complicated and out of the four possible ways of 
combining the practices into a system (Delery, 1998), adding the practices seems most 
appropriate (MacDuffie, 1995; Becker & Huselid, 1999).  
 
In line with the previous discussed literature on commitment HRM (e.g. Arthur, 1994; 
Huselid, 1995; Appelbaum et al., 2000), we expect that commitment HRM practices align 
the interest of employees and organizations. These practices are expected to have a 
universalistic additive and positive effect on the employees’ performance. Furthermore, we 
assume that the more the organization focuses at commitment HRM, the more consistent 
the signalling value of HRM in terms of the psychological contract.  
 
Based on these insights, we expect that violation of the psychological contract can be 
explained by the degree to which the organization employs commitment oriented HRM 
practices. This leads to the second hypothesis. 
 
H2 The more commitment focused HRM, the less psychological contract violation. 
 
In the previous discussed literature researchers thus assume that commitment oriented 
HRM practices outperform irrespective of the context. According to authors like Delery & 
Shaw (2001), this might not necessarily be the case. The effectiveness of a commitment 
system could depend on the circumstances within the organization and of the organization. 
This stream of research is based upon a configurational approach.  
We discuss the configurational approach towards HRM and organizational structure 
and its signalling implications in light of the psychological contract in the following 
subsection. 
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3.4.4 Configurational approaches 
Researchers within the configurational stream focus on combinations of HRM practices 
and its wider organizational context (MacDuffie, 1995; Delery & Doty, 1996). The 
configurational approach emphasizes the notion of fit, both between HRM practices 
(internal fit) and between HRM and its wider organizational context (external: 
organizational and vertical fit), reflected in such factors as structure, strategy, technology, 
environmental stability and organizational size (Delery & Doty, 1996; Schuler & Jackson, 
1996).  
 
The assumption of the configurational approach is that the closer an organization’s 
activities resemble one of the typologies (configurations), the greater the performance 
gains, because of the synergetic effects of the bundles of practices. In most cases the 
typologies stem from theory (theoretical constructs) rather than practice (empirically 
observable). 
 
The configurational approach is based upon two assumptions or principles: (1) holistic 
principle of inquiry: identification of configurations or unique patterns of factors that are 
posited to be maximally effective; and (2) assumption of equifinality: multiple unique 
configurations can result in maximal performance (Miller & Friesen, 1984; Doty et al., 
1993; Delery & Doty, 1996). According to the assumption of equifinality, a situation can 
be reached from different initial conditions and in different ways (Gresov & Drazin, 1997). 
In this line of reasoning a variety of combinations of organizational structures and HRM 
can exist.  
 
A constraint on the amount of effective configurations could be the presence of 
contingency factors (e.g. Doty, Glick & Huber, 1993). According to the principle of 
equifinality, however, the forms an organization adopts can be equally effective. This is 
clearly a break with the approach discussed in the previous subsection, where researchers 
assume that optimal combinations of HRM practices exist in general (i.e. commitment).  
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The configurational and contingency approaches have inspired a number of currently 
very influential perspectives on the strategic design of HRM. Regarding contingency 
approaches, many researchers advocate that HRM should be linked to strategy, and 
consider strategic HRM as the focus of their research (e.g. Arthur, 1992/1994; Schuler & 
Jackson 1996). According to Boxall & Purcell (2003: 48) “the term strategic implies a 
concern with the ways in which HRM is critical to the firm’s survival and its relative 
success”.  The strategic nature of HRM incorporates that the objectives of an organization 
have an influence on the way it manages employees, it emphasizes the strategic role of 
HRM in meeting business objectives (Delery, 1998).  
 
Various authors (Arthur, 1992; Delery & Doty, 1996; Lepak & Snell, 1999; Ostroff, 
2000; Boxall, 2003) propose typologies of HRM based on the strategy of the organization, 
thereby taking a contingency perspective on HRM, combined with a configurational 
perspective, in that they propose typologies of equally effective combinations of HRM 
depending on the strategy of an organization.  
 
As suggested in the work of for instance Delery & Doty (1996) and Verburg (1998), 
the configurational approach can be seen as based on a combination of a special sort of 
contingency approach and bundles or systems approach because it combines notions of 
horizontal vertical and organizational fit. Since we are interested in structural signals, our 
main focus is on HRM and organizational structure as elements of the configurational 
approach, and not on the typical strategy of the organization.  
 
Typically, configurational approaches were used in organizational design, in which 
some sort of classification based on structure was made (Pugh et al., 1969; Mintzberg, 
1979). In these types of approaches the emphasis is on structural forms, design and 
context/ contingency factors. Coherence between the various design elements (horizontal 
and organizational fit) is seen by various researchers as more important than fit of the 
design with external demands (see Gresov & Drazin (1997: 407/408) for further 
explanation on this topic).  
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In the past decades various HRM Researchers have attempted to identify several ideal 
types, i.e. combinations of structure, HRM and context factors that naturally go together 
and form logical coherent sets of mutually reinforcing practices (e.g. Paauwe, 1989; 
Verburg, 1998; Pichault & Schoenaers, 2003). These researchers take a configurational 
approach, integrating structural features of an organization with HRM systems. Paauwe 
(1989), Verburg (1998) and Pichault & Schoenaers (2003) investigated the relationship 
between HRM and characteristics of the organization and the environment, based on the 
work of Mintzberg (1979). Mintzberg (1979) combines notions of internal and external fit. 
He states that in order for organizations to be effective, they should design configurations 
that are internally consistent and are aligned with contextual elements such as age, size and 
technology. According to Mintzberg (1979) ideal types of organizational structures are 
coherent organizational systems that are extremely effective in dealing with certain 
environmental factors. External factors or context factors are for instance stability, level of 
knowledge, diversity and hostility. Internal factors are for instance size, age, technical 
system and distribution of power.  
 
The elements of organizational structure in the work of Mintzberg include: 
1. Five basic parts of the organization: the operating core, strategic apex, middle line, 
techno -structure, and support staff; 
2. Five basic mechanisms of coordination: mutual adjustment, direct supervision, and the 
standardization of work processes outputs, and skills; 
3. The design parameters: job specialization, behavior formalization, training and 
indoctrination, unit grouping, unit size, action planning and performance control 
systems, liaison devices, vertical decentralization, and horizontal decentralization; 
4. Contingency factors: age size, technical system, environment and power. 
 
Mintzberg (1979) distinguishes between various basic configurations: Simple 
Structure; Machine Bureaucracy, Professional Bureaucracy, and Adhocracy (in later work 
he also makes a distinction between the Divisional, Missionary and Political 
configuration). Each of these configurations relies on one of the five coordinating 
mechanism and tends to favor one of the five parts. 
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According to Mintzberg (1983), coordinating mechanisms, design parameters and 
situational or context factors all seem to fall into natural clusters, or configurations. 
Effective organizations achieve an internal consistency among their design parameters as 
well as compatibility with their situational factors (Mintzberg, 1983: 152). An organization 
is often driven towards one of the configurations in its search for harmony in its structure 
(Mintzberg, 1983: 288): “It may experience pulls towards different configurations but it 
often exhibits a tendency to favor one of them. The organization with an integrated 
structure also faces an environment, a technical system, a size, even an age and a power 
system consistent with that structure. Thus, we sometimes find that different organizations 
in the same industry prefer different configurations depending on which pull they decided 
to respond to”. 
 
In an attempt to summarize the conclusions of the configurational and contingency 
approaches and incorporate HRM within these approaches, authors like Paauwe (1989), 
Pichault & Schoenaers (2003) and Verburg (1998) developed ideal typical HRM systems 
expected to be most effective within the configurations of Mintzberg, incorporating 
elements of the studies discussed before. We will shortly discuss the work of these authors. 
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Paauwe (1989) 
Paauwe (1989) conducted longitudinal qualitative research towards the relationship 
between HRM policy, organizational structure and the environment of the organization. 
For each of three configuration of Mintzberg, he conducted research within two 
organizations.  
 
With regard to aspects of HRM, Paauwe (1989) makes a distinction between: 
• Procedural HRM rules: rule setting and process of decision making (formal/informal, 
planned/unplanned, top down/ bottom-up, etc.).  
• Substantial HRM rules: HRM-activities (number, detailed/not detailed, 
(un)formalized, etc.) 
 
Based on the work of Mintzberg, he related these two aspects of HRM with three of 
Mintzberg’s ideal types, namely the Simple structure, the Machine bureaucracy and the 
Professional bureaucracy.  
 
In his study Paauwe found support for the existence of these ideal type configurations 
incorporating HRM. In his model Paauwe incorporated both commitment oriented HRM 
(in line with Van Bastelaers & Van Beers, 1982), and internal and external contingency 
elements (e.g. Mintzberg, 1979). Table 3-4 presents an overview of the insights of the 
work of Paauwe (1989) and also two elaborations of this kind of perspective by Verburg 
(1998) and Pichault & Schoenaers (2003). 
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Verburg (1989) 
The model of Verburg (1998) combines fit among elements of organizational design, 
contextual factors and HRM. In order to study fit between HRM practices, Verburg (1998) 
defines HRM along two dimensions: 
• The nature of the HRM policy: defined as control versus commitment oriented;  
• Locus of responsibility for employee development (company versus individual). 
 
Combining these two dimensions in line with the work of Mintzberg, Verburg (1998) 
has developed four types of organizations each with their own typical design of HRM: 
machine model, market model, development model and flexibility model (see table 3-3).  
 
Table 3-3 Dimensions of Configurations (translated from Verburg 1998: 46) 
Goal of HRM Responsibility outcomes 
 Organization Individual 
Control  Machine model 
- Many rules and procedures 
- Few possibilities for 
development 
- HRM department 
Market model 
- Few rules and procedures 
- Few possibilities for 
development 
- Owner  
Commitment Developmental model 
- Many rules and procedures 
- Many possibilities for 
development 
- Decentral. departments 
(working with HRM-dep.) 
Flexibility model 
- Few rules and procedures 
- Many possibilities for 
development 
- Line managers 
 
Based on cluster analysis, Verburg (1998) found support in his data on 175 Dutch 
organizations for two of the four models, the developmental (Mintzberg’s professional 
configuration) and machine model (Mintzberg’s machine bureaucracy), which he explains 
as due to the nature of his sample (high share of relatively formalized companies). As did 
Paauwe (1989), Verburg (1998) incorporates the earlier mentioned dimension of 
commitment as well as context elements.  
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Pichault & Schoenaers (2003) 
Based on the work of Mintzberg (1979), Pichault & Schoenaers (2003) developed five 
HRM models, referring to the way in which social relations are managed: 
 
1. Arbitrary model related to Mintzberg’s simple structure: characterized by an absence 
of any codified criteria (for instance, absent industrial relations). The leaders’ absolute 
power is an obstacle to any recourse to formalized criteria; 
2. Codifying model, which is related to Mintzberg’s machine model: systemizes the 
various dimensions of HRM policy. It involves impersonal criteria, defined by 
analysts, notably in the context of labor agreements, in which the right to union 
representation is exerted, ruling social relations by applying them uniformly to all 
members of the organization. Characterized by high involvement of unions and 
coordination by formal mechanisms; 
3. Value model which is related to Mintzberg’s missionary organization: HRM operates 
on an implicit mode, strongly based on the notions of self-sacrifice, with constant 
reference to values; 
4. Agreement model, which is related to Mintzberg’s professional configuration: the 
members of an organization agree to collectively define the context and terms of their 
coexistence. There is a presence of skilled operators, coordinated by standardization of 
skills. Operators have much room to maneuver (decentralization); 
5. Individualizing model which is related to Mintzberg’s adhocratic configuration: is 
based on the personalization of social relations. There is a presence of skilled 
operators and a highly flexible structure based on interpersonal relationships.  
 
The HRM models of Pichault & Schoenaers (2003) mainly focuses on the distribution 
of power, and the conditions under which work is performed, on aspects of Van Bastelaers 
& van Beers (1982) domains Industrial relations and Work systems.  
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3.4.5 Configurational approach of this study 
Building on the model of Mintzberg (1979), (and without aiming at being complete) 
table 3-4 provides an overview of the insights of the previously discussed approaches of 
Paauwe (1989), Verburg (1998) and Pichault & Schoenaers (2003). In line with Verburg 
(1998), we focus our attention on four ideal types of Mintzberg: simple structure, machine 
bureaucracy, professional bureaucracy and adhocracy.  
 
Considering our focus on commitment HRM (as discussed in the previous section), 
these four ideal types can considered to be the most straightforward in their underlying 
parameters. The divisional ideal type for instance, can be seen as a hybrid form, since 
within the divisional configuration each division can have its own typical design, which 
can well be described using the three other configurations (Paauwe, 1989). As presented in 
table 3-4, these four configurations differ clearly from each other on their combination of 
HRM, organizational structure and context.  
 
Because our interest in structural signals, which are defined as “observable 
characteristics attached to the organization that are subject to manipulation”, in this study 
we will focus at the most defining and frequently used structure-concepts of these 
configurations, namely formalization and decentralization. One of the most defining 
concepts of organizational context in these approaches clearly is the complexity and 
stability of the environment or the degree of uncertainty of the environment.
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With regard to HRM the professional bureaucracy and the adhocracy are clearly 
focused on commitment of employees. Furthermore, the configurations differ substantially 
in the degree to which they are formalized and decentralized and the environment the 
organization faces (degree of uncertainty). Summarizing these insights, we developed a 
configurational model along the lines of Mintzberg’s classification on organizational 
structure and context and extended this classification with insights derived from the work 
of Paauwe (1989), Pichault & Schoenaers (2003) and Verburg (1998) on the design of 
HRM within these configurations and the notions of commitment HRM as discussed in the 
previous section. This leads us to the following model for studying the configurational 
approach (table 3-5): 
 
Table 3-5 Configurational approach of this study  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Simple structure 
Organizations than can be characterized as a simple structure are typically young and 
small organizations that are starting up. The environment is typically uncertain. The 
owner is directly involved in all organizational processes, resulting in a highly 
centralized but low formalized organization. Because of its small size, there is 
typically no formal HRM within this type of organization and HRM is the 
responsibility of the owner. This results in relatively no/little use of formal 
commitment HRM practices.  
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2. Machine bureaucracy 
Organizations that can be characterized as a machine bureaucracy are typically large 
organizations that have existed for a long time (for instance in the manufacturing and 
construction sectors). The environment is stable and as a result relatively certain. Big 
HRM departments are responsible for HRM, practices are formalized and HRM is 
characterized by a strong emphasis on control.  
3. Professional bureaucracy 
This type of organizations can be found in big service organizations, like universities, 
hospitals, and ministries. These organizations are aimed at delivering complex 
services in a relatively stable environment. HRM is commitment oriented, focusing on 
enhancing skills and motivation of employees, with a strong emphasis on training and 
development. Because of the nature of the work, the organization is highly 
decentralized.  
4. Adhocracy 
Organizations that can be characterized as an adhocracy are organizations thriving in a 
complex and unstable environment (for instance organizations in informational 
technology). As a result of this there is little formalization of rules and procedures and 
decision power is highly decentralized. HRM is commitment oriented.  
 
The essence of the configurational approach is that coherence between organizational 
elements is important, that context matters. This approach extends commitment HRM by 
focusing on the alignment between commitment HRM, organizational structure (in our 
study operationalized by the concepts of formalization and decentralization) and 
organizational context (in our study: degree of uncertainty). In light of the psychological 
contract, these four ideal types are expected to send consistent signals, leading to less 
violation of psychological contracts, because employees will have less conflicting 
expectations of obligations. This leads us to the following hypothesis: 
 
H3: The more an organization resembles an ideal type, the less psychological contract 
violation. 
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3.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter we discussed conceptualizations of HRM and various approaches of 
studying the signalling value of HRM and structure within organizations. In line with 
Spence (1973) and Rousseau (1995), we use the term signals for observable characteristics 
attached to the organization that are subject to manipulation by organizations, namely 
vehicles organizations use to convey commitments, offer inducements for present and 
future behavior (i.e. HRM and organizational structure).  
 
In line with Beer et al. (1984) we defined HRM as involving “all management 
decisions that affect the relationship between the organization and employees – its human 
resources”. To study HRM within organizations, we followed the distinction within 
various domains of HRM by Van Bastelaer & Van Beers (1982), namely: Industrial 
relations, Work systems, Development and Human resource flow. The different domains 
each show areas of influence of HRM within organizations and represents choices 
regarding the management of human resources. 
 
For empirically studying the signalling effect of HRM and structure on the 
psychological contract, we discussed three approaches towards studying HRM, two 
universalistic or ‘best practices’ approaches and a configurational approach. These three 
approaches are expected have different signalling effects on the psychological contract of 
employees, leading us to an extended version of our conceptual model (presented in figure 
3-2).
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Figure 3-2 Extended conceptual Model 
Amount of HRM
practices
Commitment 
oriented 
HRM practices
Fit between 
HRM, 
structure 
and context
Control variables individual level, e.g. age, years of work experience in this function
Employee and 
employer 
obligations
Psychological 
contract 
violation
Control variables organzational level: e.g. sector, age, size
O
rganizational 
level
Individual level
H1 -/- H2 -/- H3 -/-
 
 
H1: The more HRM practices, the less psychological contract violation 
Universalistic HRM research gives insights into the role of HRM practices in providing 
information about the organizational expectations of the employment relationship. Based 
on this kind of research, we concluded that every added HRM practice provides additional 
information regarding employee and organizational obligations. This information is 
relevant for employees’ assessment of fulfillment of the organization’s obligations, thus 
leading to less violation of their psychological contract. Thus the more HRM practices, the 
more signals or information sent by the organization, the less violation of psychological 
contracts.  
 
H2 The more commitment focused HRM, the less psychological contract violation. 
Literature on commitment focused HRM practices helped to build the case for the 
relationship between the focus of HRM and psychological contract violation. In line with 
the literature on high commitment HRM systems (e.g. Arthur, 1994, Huselid, 1995; 
Appelbaum et al., 2000), we expect that commitment HRM practices better align the 
interest of employees and organizations than do other practices.  
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The focus on commitment is expected to have a universalistic positive effect on 
employees’ psychological contract violation, meaning that independent of the context 
commitment HRM has a positive effect. We expect that violation of the psychological 
contract can be explained by the degree to which the organization employs commitment 
oriented HRM practices 
 
H3: The more an organization resembles the ideal type, the less psychological 
contract violation. 
 
In light of the psychological contract, coherence between the signals send by an 
organization is seen as important. Based on the configurational approach, we extended the 
previous approach on commitment HRM by combining commitment HRM with 
organizational structure (formalization and decentralization) and organizational context 
(degree of uncertainty). Based on the work of Mintzberg (1979), Paauwe (1989), Verburg 
(1998) and Pichault & Schoenaers (2003) we developed a model for studying the 
configurational approach, consisting of four ideal types. In light of the psychological 
contract, these four ideal types are expected to send consistent signals, leading to less 
violation of psychological contracts, because employees will less conflicting expectations 
of obligations.  
 
In this chapter we developed our conceptual model and hypotheses. In the following 
chapter (chapter 4) we translate our concepts into indicators and measurements. Because 
the focus of our study concerns the relationship of concepts at two levels, individual and 
organizational, in chapter 4 we also present the appropriate analyzing strategy (multi-
level). The conceptual model and hypotheses as presented in this chapter, their specific 
ways of operationalizing and analyzing strategy (chapter 4), provide the input of the results 
based on our empirical analysis in (Chapter 5). 
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CHAPTER 4 RESEARCH DESIGN  
 
4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter we operationalize the conceptual model and hypotheses presented in 
chapter 3. Because the key research issue concerns relationships between variables at two 
levels of analysis, namely the individual level psychological contract and the 
organizational level HRM, we collected data that has a nested structure and use an 
analytical strategy typically for handling such data. In section 4.2 we will discuss theory 
and methods for analyzing nested data. In section 4.3 we will propose the analytical 
strategy of this research, the design of the study and our research model. Our method for 
collecting data and the actual indicators and measures will be presented in the remaining 
sections.  
 
4.2 Analysis of data at multiple levels 
Multi-level data requirements 
The approach of our study is multi-level, in the sense that we are interested in the 
relationship between macro level or organizational level concepts (HRM and more general 
design factors as structure) and micro-level or individual level concepts (psychological 
contract). We, therefore, have to gather data of organizations on HRM, their organizational 
structure and the environment of their organization and of individuals within these 
organizations concerning their psychological contract. Consequently, our data will have a 
nested structure. Rousseau already argued in 1985 for the importance of building and 
testing multi-level models in research on organizations. Nowadays there is more interest in 
a multi-level perspective on organizations, with authors like Ostroff & Bowen (2000) 
arguing that especially in the area of HRM multi-level models are needed. 
 
Multi-level data analysis 
In general, we could decide on two options in handling our multi-level data: 
(dis)aggregation and hierarchical models. If lower-level data (individual level) is 
aggregated, the aggregated variable is expected to measure some phenomenon not evident 
at the lower level (Bliese, 2000: 368).  
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A problem with aggregating the data is that this might result in a group-level variable 
with questionable construct validity. Disaggregating on the other hand leads to an 
exaggerated sample size (Snijder & Bosker, 1999). Consider for example a two-stage 
sample of 10 universities and 100 students per university. In total there are 10 * 100= 1000 
students. If we disaggregate the data to the level of students, and estimate a relationship 
between characteristics of the university and the students - without taking into account that 
there are students who are in the same university - we implicitly assume there are 1000 
independent observations, while actually there are only 10 independent observations of 
university characteristics. 
 
A more suitable approach to analyzing multi-level data is offered by multi-level 
analysis. Multi-level analysis refers to statistical methods that explicitly take account of the 
relationships among constructs at multiple levels of analysis (Klein & Kozlowski, 2000). 
The main statistical model of handling multi-level theory is the hierarchical linear model. 
 
Hierarchical models 
Hierarchical models explicitly recognize that individual within groups may be more 
similar to another than they are to individuals in another group and may, therefore, not 
provide independent observations (Hofmann et al., 2000: 471).  
Hofmann et al. (2002: 489/490) consider the following methodological assumptions 
underlying multi-level theory: 
• Lower-level units are nested within higher-level units (in our study individuals/ 
employees within organizations); 
• Lower-level units are exposed to and influenced by characteristics and/ or processes of 
the higher-level units (in our study HRM and organizational structure influencing 
psychological contract violation); 
• The outcome variable is measured at the lowest level of interest (in our study is the 
dependent variable psychological contract violation measured at the individual level); 
• The outcome variable varies both within the lower-level units and between the higher-
level units (as can be translated in an intraclass correlation coefficient >0, as presented 
in the following chapter). 
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According to Snijders & Bosker (1999), multi-level statistical models are always 
needed when interested in relationships between constructs at different levels. The 
individual and the organization are both considered as sources of variability, and should, 
therefore, be modeled not as fixed but as random parts of the model. Specific in multi-level 
analyzing is the possibility of assigning the source of the unexplained variance (random 
error) in the dependent variable to two levels, organizational and individual level. 
Hierarchical models explicitly model both the individual level and the higher 
organizational level random-error components thereby recognizing the interdependence of 
individuals within the same groups.  
 
Hierarchical relationships occur when events at one level of analysis influence or are 
influenced by events at another level of analysis (Hofmann et al., 2000: 468). The reason 
for not using more mainstream statistical techniques as Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) lies 
in the fact that the observations in multi-level models cannot be seen as independent from 
each other (e.g. Hox, 2002). According to Hox (2002:5): “Standard statistical test lean 
heavily on the assumption of independence of the observations. If this assumption is 
violated (and in multilevel data this is almost always the case) the estimates of the 
standard errors of conventional statistical tests are much too small, and this results in 
many spuriously ‘significant’ results.”  
 
4.3 Analytical strategy 
To allow for a multi-level design we collected nested data, i.e. data of organizations 
and individuals within these organizations. In line with multi-level approaches and a 
hierarchical way of analyzing our data we propose the following research model, in which 
we are interested in relationships between organizational level concepts (structural signals: 
amount of HRM activities /commitment HRM/ configurations) and the degree of 
psychological contract violation. 
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Figure 4-1 Research Model 
Organization Z
Individual X Individual Y
O
rganizational 
level
Individual level
Independent
variables
Dependent
variable
 
• Individual level dependent variable Y= psychological contract violation 
• Individual level independent variables X = obligations employee/ obligations 
employer 
• Organizational level independent variables Z = structural signals (amount of HRM 
practices/ commitment HRM / configurations)  
 
The logic of hierarchical models can be viewed as a two-stage procedure (although the 
model is estimated simultaneously). Relationships among individual level variables 
(psychological contract obligations and violation) are estimated separately for each 
organization. The outcome of this first stage is the intercept (and slope terms when 
considering cross-level interactions) estimated separately for each organization (Hofmann 
et al., 2000). These intercept (and slope) estimates are then used as outcome variables in 
the second stage. The equation format of hierarchical linear models is presented in figure 
4-2.  
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Figure 4-2 Equations of multi-level model 
Yij = βoj + β1j (Xij) + Rij  
Β0j = γ00 + γ 01 (Zj) + U0j Represents the main-effect 
Β1j= γ10 + γ 11 (Zj) + U1j Represents the cross-level interaction 
Yij = degree of Y of individual i in organization j 
Βoj = intercept value for organization j 
Β1j = regression slope for organization j 
Rij = random individual error 
Xij = individual level variable for same individual i in organization j 
Zj = organizational level measure 
γ00 and γ10=  organizational level intercept terms 
γ01 and γ11=  organizational level slope terms 
U0j and U1j = organizational level residuals 
 
Rij, U0j and U1j are assumed to follow normal distributions with mean 0, and to be 
independent of each other 
 
In this research our main interest is not in cross-level interactions (for instance the 
degree to which HRM will moderate the relationship between obligations and violation of 
the psychological contract). A reason for this is that in literature on psychological contracts 
and HRM there are no indications for such effects. In a more explorative manner we will 
check for the existence of random cross-level interaction. We are thus foremost interested 
in the main effect of organizational level HRM and organizational structure on 
psychological contract violation. We, therefore, use a basic model of the hierarchical linear 
model considering only the random intercept. 
 
Although there are many software packages available for handling hierarchical linear 
modeling (for an overview see for instance Snijders & Bosker, 1999) for convenience 
reasons we used SPSS 12.  
 
The research design will be translated in specific models (see chapter 5) for the various 
approaches we distinguished in studying the relationship between HRM and more general 
design factors (as structural signals) and the psychological contract. 
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4.4 Data collection method 
A standard questionnaire was distributed among groups of employees in 49 
organizations during the time period 1999-2001. The questionnaire was distributed with 
the help of Masters students of the Dutch Open University, who studied HRM and worked 
within the organizations in the area of HRM. The students had to make sure their sample 
consisted of at least 40 respondents. The students were free to decide which stratification 
variables to use (such as individual-, and job characteristics and type of employment 
contract). The total number of individual responses was 2099. The questionnaire measured 
individual level work attitudes and perceptions of the employment relationship. Besides 
these questionnaires, the HRM manager of each organization characterized his/her 
organization on a number of predefined dimensions using a standard protocol. Because we 
are mainly interested in HRM practices within organizations the HRM manager whose 
primary responsibility is HRM, was the one who filled in the questionnaire.  
 
Characteristics organization 
The organization characteristics protocol consisted of questions related to the branch of 
industry, size and age of the organization, labor force characteristics, HRM practices, 
HRM policy, organizational environment, degree of (de)centralization and degree of 
formalization. The sample includes organizations from various sectors.  
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Table 4-1 Sample of organizations: sector 
 Frequency  Percentage in 
this sample 
Percentage 
according to 
Statistics 
Netherlands3 
Manufacturing 7 14.3 8.6 
Construction 1 2.0 12.0 
Trade and hotels 3 6.1 38.6 
Transport and information 2 4.1 5.2 
Professional service 12 24.5 24.4 
Health care 3 6.1 7.9 
Public service 14 28.6 12.0 
Energy 3 6.1 0.1 
Other 4 8.2  
Total 49 100  
 
Individual level perceptions 
The second element of our study was a survey amongst individual employees. The 
survey consisted of questions about individual characteristics and job characteristics, 
employee and employer obligations and the fulfillment of these obligations, commitment 
and intention to leave.  
 
In total 2099 respondents filled out the questionnaire. 67.2 % were male and 32.8% 
female. Comparing demographics on male/female, this sample resembles the population 
demographics as reported by the organizations (68.7 % male versus 31.3 % female). The 
education level of the respondents was relatively high: 43 % of the respondents had a 
higher professional or university education. 71.6 % of the respondents worked in non-
leadership positions. Most employees where working in open-ended contracts (86.8%), of 
which 80% on fulltime basis.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 Source: Statline 2000 (the online database of Statistics Netherlands 
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Sample considerations 
Although the sample was not entirely representative for the Dutch situation, it includes 
a diverse sample of organizations and employees. For the focus of our research (exploring 
relationships), representativeness of our sample for the Dutch population is not required.  
 
In order to be able to generalize our findings concerning the relationship between the 
variables of interest it is required that there is enough variation in the specific variables we 
are interested in (which is the case as will be presented in the following sections).  
 
Concerning the required sample size, to be on the safe side in multi-level research one 
needs at least 30 organizations with 30 individuals per organization to make sure that the 
organizational level variance is not underestimated (Maas & Hox, 2000). This condition is 
satisfied because we collected data of 49 organizations, with approximately 40 individual 
employees per organization. 
 
4.5 Individual level measurement: psychological contract 
In this research we are studying the psychological contract in line with the 
conceptualization of Rousseau. In chapter 2 we defined the psychological contract as: “an 
individual’s belief, shaped by the organization, regarding reciprocal obligations”. 
According to Rousseau (1990:309), psychological contracts differ from the more general 
concept of expectations in that contracts are promissory and reciprocal, offering a 
commitment to some behavior on the part of the employee, in return for some action on the 
part of the employer. We operationalized the psychological contract in line with this 
conceptualization of Rousseau (1990), as can be seen in table 4-3. The specific items were 
translated in Dutch and tested by Schalk & Freese (1997).  
 
Scale construction 
Psychological contracts consist of three elements, individual perceptions regarding 
individual obligations towards the organization, perceived obligations of the organization, 
and the perceived fulfillment or violation of the organization’s obligations.  
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In line with this definition of Rousseau and previous research, we constructed three 
scales of the psychological contract items. As can be seen in table 4-2 the reliabilities of 
the scales (Cronbach’s alpha’s) were sufficiently high. These three scales were confirmed 
by evidence gained from factor analysis. 
 
Table 4-2 Scale construction psychological contract 
 Scale 
 Obligations 
employee 
Obligations 
employer 
Psychological 
contract fulfillment 
Dependent 
variable 
Range 1-5 1-5 1-5 
Mean 3.7 4.0 3.0 
SD 0.48 0.48 0.55 
Nr. of items 10 10 10 
Minimum 1.6 1 1 
Maximum 5 5 5 
Cronbach’s alpha 0.71 0.82 0.84 
Valid  
Observations 
2095 2096 2086 
 
The first part of the psychological contract measure consists of 10 perceived employee 
obligations, asking respondents (on a five-point scale ranging from 1 “not at all”, to 5 
“very highly”) to what extent they believe they are obliged to provide the organization 
with, for example, the following items: willingness to accept a transfer; to provide good 
service; voluntarily perform non-obliged tasks; working extra hours; to deliver good work 
in terms of quality and quantity.  
 
The second part consists of 10 perceived employer obligations, asking the respondents 
(using the same five-point scale) to what extent they believe their employer was obliged to 
provide them with for example the following issues: training and development; respect; 
candid and fair treatment; job and income security. The content of the psychological 
contract consists of the various perceived employer and employee obligations.  
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In line with this Rousseau-measure, we used a multi-item measure of perceived 
fulfillment (or breach/violation4), which is the third part of the psychological contract 
measure, consisting of 10 items, asking the degree to which respondents perceive 
employers to have (not) fulfilled their obligations on a five point scale from 1 “less than 
expected” to 5 “more than expected” (see table 4-3).  
 
Consistent with previous research (e.g. Robison & Roussseau, 1994; Turnley & 
Feldman, 2000) the majority of respondents (50.4 %) experienced some degree of violation 
(a score of less than 3 on the 5-point scale). The measure of psychological contract 
fulfillment provides us with a good indicator of the degree of psychological contract 
violation (as discussed in chapter 3). In general we assume, the higher the score of 
fulfillment, the lesser the degree of psychological contract violation. 
                                                 
4 . As discussed in chapter 3, we do not make a distinction between breach and violation. We will use the terms 
breach and violation both for indicating a situation in which employees perceive the obligations of the employer 
as not being completely fulfilled.  
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Table 4-3 Overview indicators psychological contract 
Psychological Contract measures 
 
Employee obligations 
Work well with others 
Accept external transfer 
Provide advance notice if taking a job elsewhere 
Protect confidential information 
Provide good service 
Volunteer to do non-required tasks 
Work extra hours 
Accept internal transfer 
Not support competitors 
Deliver good work quality and quantity 
 
Employer obligations 
Job that is challenging and stimulating 
Opportunities for promotion 
Training and development 
Good work climate 
Respect 
Open and direct communication 
Candid and fair treatment 
Bonuses based on performance 
Job and income security 
A competitive salary 
 
Fulfillment employer obligations 
Job that is challenging and stimulating 
Opportunities for promotion 
Training and development 
Good work climate 
Respect 
Open and direct communication 
Candid and fair treatment 
Bonuses based on performance 
Job and income security 
A competitive salary 
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4.6 Organizational level measurement: HRM, structure and context 
In line with Spence (1973) and Rousseau (1995), we defined structural signals as 
observable characteristics attached to the organization that are subject to manipulation by 
organizations and which are used to convey commitments and offer inducements for 
present and future behavior. This definition includes elements of organizational structure 
as well as HRM. First we provide an overview of the various elements of organizational 
structure and organizational context and after that we provide an overview of the measure 
of HRM and the measures of the three models we consider in this study. 
 
4.6.1 Measures of organizational structure 
Regarding organizational structure we focused in line with the work of Mintzberg 
(1979) on the indicators that are most often used, namely the degree of decentralization 
and formalization. These measures were based on the work of Hoeksema (1995) who 
translated the original scales of Miller & Droge (1986) into Dutch.  
 
Decentralization  
According to Pugh et al. (1963: 304) “(De)centralization concerns the locus of 
authority to make decisions affecting the organization”. The measure of decentralization 
consists of 11 items. The respondents have to indicate at what level the authority to make 
certain decisions is located, on a 6 point scale ranging from “0 = level above that of chief 
director; 1= chief executive; 2 = division/functional manager; 3 = sector or sub-department 
head; 4 = first level supervisor; 5 = operating core” (see table 4-4). Examples of decisions 
were the number of workers required; whether to employ a worker; internal labor disputes; 
dismissal of a worker; allocation of work among available workers. 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 4 – Research Design 
 
 
 
81 
Table 4-4 Indicators of the degree of (de)centralization 
Indicators of degree of (de)centralization 
a. the number of workers required g. dismissal of a worker 
b. whether to employ a worker h. methods of personnel selection 
c. internal labor disputes i. work methods to be used 
d. overtime to be worked at shop level j. machinery or equipment to be used 
e. delivery dates and priority of orders k. allocation of work among available 
workers 
f. production plans to be worked on  
 
Scale construction 
In line with Miller & Droge (1986) and Hoeksema (1995) we constructed a scale of 
(de)centralization by computing the mean of the total of scores of the underlying items. 
The higher the score on this measure, the more decentralized the organization. The 
reliability of the scale was sufficiently high (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.82) as presented in table 
4-6. 
 
Formalization  
According to the definition of Pugh et al. (1963:303) formalization distinguishes to 
which extent communications and procedures in an organization are written down and 
filed. The measure of degree of formalization consists of 5 items (as can be seen in table 4-
5). Respondents are asked which documents are used in their organization, for example: 
who received information booklets about, for example, security, working conditions; who 
received an organization chart; for what functional levels written job descriptions were 
made; whether the organization had a written business policy.  
 
Table 4-5 Indicators of the degree of formalization 
Indicators of Formalization Scale 
a. written contract of employment Dichotomous (yes/no) 
b. information booklets treating, for example security, 
working conditions, etc., are given to: 
- no one 
- only a few persons 
- many 
- all 
4 point scale, in which 
0=no one. And 3=all 
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c. an organization chart is given to: 
- chief executive only 
- two top executives 
- C.E. and most division or department heads 
- all supervisors 
4 point scale, in which 
1= chief executive only, and 
4 = all supervisors 
d. written job descriptions are made for:  
- direct production workers Dichotomous (yes/no) 
- clerical workers Dichotomous (yes/no) 
- supervisors Dichotomous (yes/no) 
- specialists Dichotomous (yes/no) 
- chief executive Dichotomous (yes/no) 
e. In your firm is there:  
- a written business policy Dichotomous (yes/no) 
- a written manual of procedures and fixed rules Dichotomous (yes/no) 
- written operating instructions to workers Dichotomous (yes/no) 
 
Scale construction 
In line with Miller & Droge (1986), we constructed a scale of formalization by adding 
up all scores on the total of 11 items of the five subscales. The higher the score on this 
measure, the more formalized the organization. The reliability of the scale was acceptable 
(Cronbach’s alpha = 0.67) as presented in table 4-6. 
 
Table 4.6 Descriptives of the organizational level structure scales 
 Decentralization Formalization 
Range 0-5 1-16 
Mean 3.0 14.6 
SD 0.56 2.0 
Min 1.82 6 
Max 4.09 16 
Nr. Of items 11 11 
Cronbach’s alpha 0.82 0.67 
Valid observations 39* 46 
* defined for organizations that answered at least 9 of the 11 items 
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4.6.2 Measurement of context 
Regarding possible contingency factors, we focused in line with the work of Mintzberg 
(1979) on the indicator that is most often used, namely the degree of uncertainty. The 
measure was based on the work of Hoeksema (1995) who translated the original scales of 
Miller & Droge (1986) into Dutch.  
 
Degree of uncertainty 
Degree of uncertainty consisted of 4 items. Uncertainty is a measure of the 
organization’s external environment and reflects the degree of change and unpredictability 
in market-related and technological dimensions (Miller & Droge, 1986: 547). We asked 
respondents to indicate the situation of the organization regarding the following items 
(table 4-7). 
 
Table 4-7: Indicators of the degree of uncertainty 
Our organization rarely has to change 
its activities to keep up to date 
1 2 3 4 5 Our organization must change its 
activities continually to keep up 
to date 
The rate at which our services becomes 
obsolete is very slow 
 The life-cycle of our services is 
very short 
Assignments and whishes of customers 
are easy to predict 
 Assignments and whishes of 
customers are difficult to predict 
Our working methods are not subject to 
very much change 
 Our working methods change 
continually and often in a major 
way 
 
Scale construction 
In line with Miller & Droge (1986) we constructed a scale of uncertainty by computing 
the mean of the total of scores on the underlying items. The higher the score on this 
measure, the more uncertain the environment of the organization. As presented in table 4-8 
the reliability of the scale (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.80) was sufficiently high. 
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Table 4-8: Descriptives of degree of uncertainty 
 Uncertainty 
Range 1-5 
Mean 2.9 
SD 0.96 
Min 1 
Max 5 
Nr. Of items 4 
Cronbach’s alpha 0.80 
Valid observations 43 
 
4.6.3 Measures of HRM  
In the previous chapter we distinguished between three approaches towards studying 
structural signals, namely two universalistic approaches and a configurational approach. In 
this section we provide an overview of the specific measures of HRM in line with these 
three approaches.  
 
As stated in chapter 3, HRM consists of various areas or domains. To capture these 
domains, we based the measurement of HRM on the activity list developed by Buitendam 
(1979). This list of activities was used by Paauwe (1989) in his study in which he 
employed a configurational perspective towards HRM and by Van Bastelaar & Van Beers 
(1982) in studying stress within organizations and the role of HRM or personnel 
department. The items cover the four domains of HRM as presented in Chapter 3. An 
important advantage of this list of practices is that it specifically applies to and is tested in 
a Dutch context (Van Bastelaers & Van Beers, 1982). Although the list of Buitendam is 
developed in 1979, it includes the major practices which are considered to be HPW 
practices or commitment enhancing practices, which are the focus of contemporary 
research towards the relationship between HRM and performance (as the degree to which 
HRM departments pay attention to or accompany training, communication, job rotation, 
employee benefits, job rotation and so on). The list consists of 24 items and is presented in 
table 4-9. Respondents had to indicate some form of presence/absence of HRM practices 
on a three point scale, ranging from “happens regularly” to “happens incidentally” to 
“never or almost never happens.”  
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Table 4-9 Indicators and descriptions HRM 
Indicator Definition 
1. Staff planning: long Estimation of staff need quantitatively and qualitatively, 
over a period of a half year or longer 
2.  Staff planning: short Estimation of staff need quantitatively and qualitatively, 
over a period of less than 6 months 
3. Recruitment and 
selection 
Identification of  sources of potential workers outside the 
organization using recruitment and selection methods 
4. Stakeholder 
organizations 
Establishing and maintenance of relations with stakeholders 
organizations (employers - and employee organizations) 
concerning the determination of employment conditions 
5. Preparation of labor 
agreements 
Designing of (components of) the package of employment 
conditions or of employment regulations (for example 
reward -, work - or function classification systems); 
preparation of negotiations with stakeholder organizations 
6. Labor agreements Application of and/or the control on the implementation of 
labor agreements. execution of pension schemes, social 
insurance legislation, gratifications, savings schemes, profit-
sharing, etc. 
7. Job classification Job analysis, task description, work - and function 
classification 
8. Staff appraisal Application of and/or assistance in appraisal procedures 
9. Placement Placement, reassignment, dismissal and procedures 
10. Task-oriented training Instruction, specific education for work, apprentice systems 
11. General training Introductory training and shaping of non-managerial staff; 
social development training for young employees (not task-
oriented); study advice 
12. Training and 
development of 
managerial staff 
Management training and - development (leadership 
programs etc.) 
13. Careers Career planning, career support, job rotation; partly based 
on staff appraisal and/or potential assessment 
14. Social support Individually based personnel support, social work, personal 
conversations, support of foreign employees etc. 
15. Analysis personnel data analysis of data from the personnel data bases for training, 
courses; to localize and fight sickness absence, turnover, 
etc. 
16. Social research Design and/or execution of research, for example labor 
market analyses, communication research, attitudinal 
surveys 
17. Task structuring and job 
consultation 
Development and/or application of task - and responsibility 
enlargement and/or discussion of progress 
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18. Organizational 
development 
Support of organizational change processes, group - and/or 
departmental consultation, internal organizational 
consultancy  
19. Development and 
formulation of social 
policy 
Formulation of social policy, social objectives or directives 
20. Works council Organization and support of works council work 
(preparation election, secretary function, shaping activities 
for work council members) 
21. Contacts with trade 
unions 
Contacts with trade union representatives concerning the 
company situation and specific subjects such as application 
of labor agreements, dismissal procedures, reorganizations 
22. Working conditions Activities related to the physical and mental well-being 
work safety etc. 
23. Internal communication 
and information 
Introduction booklets, company magazine, notice boards, 
suggestion box, informative (personnel) meetings 
24. Personnel care Housing, canteen, jubilees, sick-call, entertainment 
activities, personnel transport 
 
 
Universalistic approaches  
Amount of HRM practices 
With regard to the first approach, the best practices or universalistic approach, we 
concluded that every added HRM practice provides additional information regarding the 
(fulfillment of) organizational obligations and what employees are expected to contribute 
in return. This information is relevant for employees’ assessment of fulfillment of the 
organization’s obligations, thus leading to less violation of these expectations. Thus the 
more HRM practices, the more signals or information sent by the organization, the less 
violation of psychological contracts.  
 
Scale construction 
We operationalized this measure of HRM (in line with the work of amongst others 
Guest & Conway, 2002) by adding the number of HRM practices employed by the 
organization, ranging form 0-24 practices, resulting in the HRMCOUNT measure. This 
scale counts how many of the 24 HRM activities are employed regularly. For descriptives 
of this scale see table 4-10. 
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Table 4-10 Descriptives of HRM COUNT scale 
 HRMCOUNT 
Range 0-24 
Mean 14.7 
SD 4.22 
Min 3 
Max 22 
Nr. Of items 24 
Valid observations 43 
 
HRM Commitment 
The second universalistic approach focuses on commitment practices. The work of 
Buitendam (1979) and Van Bastelaers & Van Beers (1982) provides us with an overview 
of practices in four domains of HRM (see table 3-1). Organizations focusing on 
commitment HRM consciously pay attention to and invest in their human capital. HRM 
practices are aimed at motivation of employees by increasing their skills and involvement. 
In this study commitment HRM is defined in line with the work of amongst others 
MacDuffie (1995) and Becker & Huselid (1999), as the attention paid to the two domains 
of Van Bastelaer & Van Beers (1982): Development of HRM policy and organizational 
development and Work systems (see table 4-11). 
 
Table 4-11 Overview indicators of HRM commitment  
Domains  Items Descriptives 
Work systems:  10. taks-oriented training 
11. general training 
12. training and development 
of managerial staff 
14. social support 
24. personnel care 
Development of HRM policy and 
organizational development  
 
16. social research 
17. work design and 
consultation 
18. Organizational 
development 
19. development and 
formulation of social policy 
Nr of items: 9 
Min: 1.00 
Max.: 2.28 
Mean: 1.53 
S.D.: 0.32 
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Scale construction 
We have defined HRM commitment as consisting of the practices of the domains: 
Development of HRM policy and Work system. We calculated HRM commitment by 
computing the mean of these two domains. This HRM commitment variable (hrmcom) is 
used in further analysis of the relationship between HRM and psychological contract 
violation. 
 
Configurations 
For building a model capturing the configurational fit approach we developed ideal 
types of combinations based on the work of Mintzberg (1979), Paauwe (1989), Verburg 
(1998) and Pichault & Schoenaers (2003) consisting of: formalization, decentralization, 
degree of uncertainty and HRM commitment. In line with these studies, we provided an 
overview of the measurement of the ideal types that will be considered in this research (see 
table 4-12).  
 
Table 4-12 Ideal types, measurement of four configurations (same as table 3-5) 
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Scale construction 
We first calculated cluster means for the four Ideal Types. To control for the influence 
of divergence in ranges of the four scales, we standardized the four scales to scales with a 
similar range (min=0, max=5). The extreme values (theoretical maximum and minimum) 
were used to indicate the initial clusters (simple structure, machine bureaucracy, 
professional bureaucracy and adhocracy).  
 
Table 4-13 Initial cluster centers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Based on these ideal types (table 4-13), we can identify clusters of organizations that 
actually resemble these ideal types. We performed a k-means cluster analysis procedure, 
which is a cluster analysis in which the number of clusters is decided in advance. 
Subsequent clustering leads to optimization of the predefined clusters with the data. As a 
result of incomplete questionnaires on the variables of interest, not all organizations were 
taking into consideration resulting in 14 organizations missing).  
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Table 4-14 Number of organizations in each cluster 
Cluster Simple structure 0 
 Machine bureaucracy 2 
 Professional bureaucracy 31 
 Adhocracy 2 
36 Valid  
Missing 14 
 
This resulted in the final cluster centers (as can be seen in table 4-15). 
 
Table 4-15 Final cluster centers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For each organization, we then calculated a variable, measuring the distance between 
the closest ideal type and the actual situation of the organization. This distance variable 
(dis1) with a Min. = 2.68, Max. = 5.36, Mean = 4.01 (SD 0.67) is used in further analysis 
the relationship between this model and psychological contract violation. 
 
4.7 Control variables 
In research on the psychological contract we found (theoretically or empirically based) 
indications of associations between several variables and the psychological contract. 
Because in this study we are interested in the influence of characteristics of organizations 
on the psychological contract (violation), we have to control for the influence of other 
relevant variables on the psychological contract.  
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Based on this previous research (as presented in chapter 2) we can distinguish between 
the following potentially relevant control variables on which we have information 
available:  
 
Table 4-16 Potential control variables 
Individual level Organizational level 
-Gender 
-Age 
-Level of education 
-Union membership  
-Contract status  
-Position: manager/ worker  
-Years of work experience  
-Years of work experience in this 
organization 
-Years of work experience in this 
function 
-Sector 
-Age organization 
-Size (truncated at 150) 
-Level of education (share of employees with 
HBO/WO) 
-Degree of uncertainty  
-Degree of decentralization 
-Degree of formalization 
 
 
The decision whether to include each of these potential control variables is based on an 
explorative analysis as presented in the following chapter.  
 
4.9 Conclusions 
In this chapter we provided an overview of the definitions, measurements and 
indicators for our concepts, thereby operationalizing the various constructs of this research. 
Because the specific nature of our research approach requires an analytical strategy which 
is not very common in contemporary research on the psychological contract or HRM, in 
this chapter we discussed our analytical strategy resulting in our research model and the 
collection of our sample. In the next chapter we will provide the results of our analysis. 
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CHAPTER 5 RESULTS  
 
5.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to answer the research questions and to test the hypotheses as 
presented in the previous chapter. The first section focuses on preparing the data for multi-
level analysis (5.2). Before fitting the three models for answering our hypotheses (sections 
5.5 – 5.7), we first determine the so-called empty model (5.3) and two baseline models 
(5.4). The empty model is used to determine to which extent the variation in the dependent 
variable (fulfillment) is related to individual level and organizational level characteristics. 
When the empty model is extended with relevant control variables, it changes into a 
baseline model. By comparing the results of the final models with the results of the 
relevant baseline models, we will be able to test several of our hypotheses. After this, we 
present the three final models. In section 5.5 we develop the random intercept model for 
the universalistic approach. In section 5.6 we consider the random intercept model for the 
commitment approach and in section 5.7 the configurational approach. In section 5.8 we 
discuss general comparisons of the outcomes of the three estimated models. 
 
Data considerations 
Alternative scaling of variables 
To facilitate the interpretation of the intercept term, we can decide on alternative scales 
for the predictors. To be able to interpret the estimate of the intercept as ‘the expected 
value for the dependent variable (fulfillment) for a randomly drawn individual in a 
randomly drawn organization’, we used the alternative scaling option grand-mean 
centering. When a variable is centered around the grand mean, the grand mean is 
subtracted from each individual score on that variable. In our dataset we grand mean 
centered the HRM scale and the following organizational level control variables: age of an 
organization, organizational size, level of education, degree of uncertainty, degree of 
decentralization and the degree of formalization (see table 5-1).  
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Table 5-1 Overview of variables and alternative scales  
 Individual level Organizational level 
Dependent 
variable 
-Fulfillment/violation of 
obligations^  
 
Independent 
variables 
-Obligations employee 
(independent variable) 
-Obligations employer 
-HRM activities +/ HRM 
commitment +/ Configurations 
Control 
variables 
-Gender* 
-Age# 
-Level of education** 
-Union membership*  
-Contract status 
-Position: manager/ worker * 
-Years of work experience # 
-Years of work experience in this 
organization# 
-Years of work experience in this 
function# 
-Sector** 
-Age organization (truncated at 
150)+# 
-Size+# 
-Degree of uncertainty + 
-Degree of decentralization+ 
-Degree of formalization+ 
 
 
* = Dummy variable 
** = Categorical variable 
+ = Centered around the grand mean 
# = To allow for the possibility of a non-linear relationship, the logarithm is taken into 
consideration 
^ The measure of psychological contract fulfillment provides us with an indicator of the 
degree of psychological contract violation. In general we assume, the higher the score of 
fulfillment, the lesser the amount of psychological contract violation. 
 
Within and between group components of individual level variables 
In multi-level models it is common to distinguish a within and between group 
component for individual level variables. This is especially relevant when one expects that 
the within-group effect on the dependent variable may differ from the between-group 
effect. If this is the case, and if the relevant variable shows both within-group and 
between-group variation, one could decide to split the specific variable into a within-group 
and a between-group component. The between-group component would be obtained by 
aggregating the variable, while the within-group component would be defined as the 
difference between the individual score and the average organizational score.  
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In this study there are no (theoretically founded) a priori arguments that suggest that 
the within-group effect may differ from the between-group effect for the variables which 
we focus mainly on (i.e. perceived employee obligations and perceived obligations of the 
organization), so we will not explore this option in this study5. 
 
Correlations 
For all variables included we inspected the correlations. Since high correlations may 
indicate strong bivariate relationships and result in multicollinearity in regression analysis, 
we particularly looked for high correlations. Only one correlation turned out to be above 
0.50: the correlation between formalization and the (amount of HRM practices) hrmcount 
measure (0.56). This high correlation is a result of the influence of 1 outlier. We excluded 
this outlier from further analysis, resulting in a lower correlation of 0.40.  
 
Open ended contracts 
Several studies investigate the difference in work and psychological contract 
perceptions between employees with open ended and a variety of flexible contracts (e.g. 
Koene & Van Riemsdijk, 2005). HRM studies suggest that different HRM systems exist 
for different types of contract (e.g. Lepak & Snell, 1999). We limit our analysis to 
employees with open-ended employment contracts. More than 86 % of our respondents are 
working in open-ended contracts. From a theoretical point of view, this has the advantage 
that we do not have to control our results for the type of contract (i.e. our sample consists 
of a homogeneous group in this respect). From a more practical point of view, we are faced 
with the limitation that, on organizational level, our dataset does not include information 
on whether HRM policies and/or practices differentiate between types of contract.  
 
The structuring of the following sections is based on insights derived from the work of 
Hox (2002), Singer (1998) and Snijders & Bosker (1999) which provided us with a 
practical line of reasoning for fitting the various models to our data.  
 
                                                 
5 For some of the control variables, arguments may exist that suggest different within- and between group effects. 
However, since these control variables are not the primary focus of our research, we will not elaborate this issue. 
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5.3 The empty model 
The first model to develop and analyze is the so called empty model or unconditional 
means model. This model does not contain any explicit explanatory variable. It is the 
starting point for the analysis because it provides us with the basic partition of variability 
in the data between the two levels (Snijders & Bosker, 1999: 46). 
 
The empty model is used to estimate both the fixed effect (the average score on 
fulfillment) and the within and between group difference. These within and between group 
differences can be used for calculating the intraclass correlation, which represents the 
degree of dependency or the share of the total variance that is related to variation between 
organizations. The most basic condition that has to be satisfied when analyzing data with 
multi-level techniques is that there should be enough between organizational variance in 
the dependent variable (intraclass coefficient>0). This condition can be evaluated by 
estimating the empty model. Standard statistics like OLS do not take into account the 
weighting of the various organizations, but instead take the average of all organizations, 
thereby assuming an intraclass correlation of 0. An intraclass correlation that is greater 
than 0, indicates that standard statistics would likely lead to misleading results (Singer, 
1999: 330), as we will show in section 5.8.  
 
Since the empty model does not contain any explanatory variable, it can be expressed 
by the following equation: 
Yij = γ00+ U0j + Rij        (5.0) 
 
Interpretation of the equation 
Psychological contract fulfillment is in this model considered as a linear combination 
of: a grand mean γ00; a set of deviations from that grand mean of organizational j (U0j), 
which represents the random error associated with the organizational level; and a random 
error associated with individual i within organization j, or the random effect at the 
individual level (Rij).  
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γ00 is the population grand mean or the intercept, representing the expected value of 
the outcome measure (fulfillment) for a randomly selected individual (employee) i from a 
randomly selected organization j. Organization j has thus a true mean of γ00+ U0j and 
each individual within this organization deviated for this true mean by Rij.  
 
This model contains three parameters that can be estimated: a fixed effect (γ00) and 
two variance components, namely the variance between organizational means (τ00) and 
variance among individuals within organizations (σ2). The total variance in fulfillment of 
any individual employee equals σ2 + τ00. The empty model thus does not explain any 
variance in the dependent variable, but rather decomposes the variance in two independent 
parts, a between organization and a within organization part. This enables us to estimate 
the intraclass correlation as follows: ρ= τ00/ (τ00+σ2). 
 
Results  
The results of fitting this unconditional means or empty model are presented in table 5-2. 
 
Table 5-2 Estimates of fixed effects and covariance parameters for the empty model 
Model: M0: Empty model 
Fixed part: 
Predictor 
 
 
 
 
Intercept 
coefficient  
2.94***  
standard error 
0.03 
 
Random part: 
  
σ2 0.26 0.01 
τ00. 0.04  0.01 
Test: 
-2 Log Likelihood 
 
 
2771.551 
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Fixed part 
The estimate of the intercept γ00 is 2.94, which can be interpreted as the expected 
value for fulfillment (on a scale ranging from 1-5) for a randomly drawn individual 
(employee) i in a randomly drawn organization j.  
 
Random part 
In this model we found that the estimated value of the random component of the model 
σ2 is 0.26 (within group difference) and the estimated value of the random components of 
the model τ00 is 0.04 (between group difference). The total variance in fulfillment can be 
calculated by taking the sum of the between group and within group variance (τ00 +σ2), 
which equals 0.31. This results in an intraclass correlation of 0.14. According to Snijders 
& Bosker (1999:46) values between 0.05 and 0.20 are common in this type of research. 
This suggests that the intraclass correlation of 0.14 in our study can be interpreted as 
relatively high. It suggests that there is a considerable amount of variation in fulfillment 
that is due to organizational level effects (14%). In the following models we try to explain 
part of this organizational level variance by including organizational level variables, such 
as HRM. 
 
Tests 
When using multi-level modeling there is a main statistical assumption to be tested, 
concerning the independence and normality of the distribution of the random errors 
(Hofmann et al., 2000). Based on a plot of the random errors against their normal scores, 
we can conclude that this test was satisfying; the random errors were normally distributed.  
 
In order to be able to compare the estimated models statistically based on the deviance 
statistics, we used the full maximum likelihood (ML) estimation procedure. The deviance 
of the model indicates how well the model fits the data (Hox, 2002:16).  
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Deviance is a function of the likelihood, and is defined as –2Log Likelihood. Since this 
measure does not have a maximum, the absolute value of the deviance measure does not 
include much information6. However, in the case of nested models (where one model can 
be seen as an elaborate version of another model) it can be used to determine whether the 
elaboration of the baseline model significantly increases the amount of explained variance. 
Models with a lower deviance fit the data better than models with a higher deviance. The 
deviances of nested models can be used to compare their statistic fit. A chi-square test can 
be performed to test whether the more general model fits significantly better than the 
simpler model (Hox, 2002: 16).  
 
Conclusion  
Given that there is systematic between unit variance we are able to reject the null 
hypothesis that organizational effects on the degree of fulfillment of an individual’s 
psychological contract are absent.  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to arrive at a model that is interesting for answering our 
main question and describes the observed data to a satisfactory extent. To test the 
difference between two models based on a chi-square deviance test, the models should be 
nested. To test the hypotheses concerning the variation explained by the variables we are 
interested in (HRMcount, HRM commitment, Configurations), we need to develop 
baseline-models which can serve as a benchmark to which the other models are compared.  
 
The reason for not using the empty model for this purpose is that (based on theory) we 
will also include control variables in our final models and we want to extract only the 
importance of including the variable we are interested in. In the next section we gain 
insight into potential control variables and estimate these baseline-models. 
 
 
                                                 
6 For measures with a maximum (such as a correlation or the R2-value of a regression equation, which both have 
an upper bound of 1), the absolute values contain more information. 
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5. 4 Baseline models 
To assess potential relevant control variables we estimated a random coefficient model, 
with individual fulfillment as dependent variable and obligations employee and obligations 
employer as individual level independent variables and the variables as mentioned in table 
5-1 as potentially relevant control variables.  
 
Control variables were included in the baseline models if they explained part of the 
variability of fulfillment in these explorative regressions. Due to the focus of our research 
question and the fact that we did not have theoretical arguments to assume random slopes, 
at this point we only considered random intercepts leading us to estimating a random 
intercept model (in section 5.8 we check for random slopes of the various models). 
Furthermore, to allow for the possibility of non-linear relationship between several control 
variables and the level of fulfillment, we calculated the logarithm of the following 
variables: years of work experience, years of work experience in this organization, years of 
work experience in this function, age organization, size organization.  
 
We decided to include the control variables in our baseline models if they were 
significant at a 5% confidence level. Furthermore, we decided to include the variables 
‘degree of decentralization’ and ‘degree of uncertainty’ based on theoretical arguments 
(important variables of interest in this study as discussed in chapter 3), leading us to the 
following control variables: 
 
Table 5-3: Overview of control variables 
Individual level control variables Organizational level control variables 
- years of work experience in this function  
- employee age7 
- size of the organization  
- age of the organization  
- level of formalization  
- sector  
- degree of uncertainty  
- degree of decentralization 
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Including these control variables lead to the baseline models, with which we can 
compare more complex models for answering our hypotheses. Although the empty model 
provided us with a starting point for multi-level analysis, we need two extended models to 
which we can compare the more complex models (amount of HRM practices (HRMcount)/ 
HRM commitment/ configurations).  
 
The reason for estimating two models lies in the fact that when comparing models, 
models should be nested in structure and the complex models are not nested in each other 
(i.e. have different baseline models). Whereas in the HRMcount and HRM commitment 
model the variables degree of decentralization, formalization and uncertainty are 
considered as control variables, in the configurational approach they are considered as part 
of the explanatory variable. This leads us to estimating two baseline-models (see table 5-
4). 
 
The first baseline model will be used to compare the models estimated for answering 
the first two hypotheses concerning the relationship between the amount of HRM practices 
and HRM commitment systems and the degree of psychological contract violation. The 
second model (baseline – model configuration) will be used as a baseline to which we can 
compare the model estimated for answering the third hypothesis. The first baseline model 
is nested in the second baseline model. The main statistical assumption, concerning the 
independence and normality of the distribution of the random errors (Hofmann at al., 
2000) was tested and satisfying.  
 
In the following sections we estimate the random intercept models answering the 
hypotheses as formulated in the previous chapter. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                           
7 Although the logarithm of age was significant in the model which included all the control variables, in the base-
line model it was not significant. 
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Table 5-4 Estimates of fixed effects and covariance parameters for the baseline-models 
 Baseline -model HRM Baseline -model Configuration 
Fixed part: 
Predictor 
coefficient  standard error coefficient         standard error 
Intercept  1.94***  0.32 1.70***             0.30 
 
Individual level 
    
Obligations 
employee  
 0.33***  0.03 0.36***  0.03 
Obligations employer  -0.05  0.03 -0.05                 0.03 
Age employee   0.06  0.07 0.06                   0.06 
Years of experience 
in this function  
-0.08***  0.02 -0.08***           0.02 
 
Organizational level 
    
Size organization  -0.09*  0.04 -0.04                 0.03 
Age organization   0.08  0.04 0.06                   0.03 
Degree of 
formalization  
-0.06***  0.02   
Degree of 
decentralization) 
0.11  0.06   
Degree of uncertainty  -0.00  0.04   
Sector   0.06#  0.10#. 
Random part: 
σ2 
 
0.23  
 
0.01 
 
0.23                   
 
0.01 
τ00.  0.02  0.01 0.03                   0.01 
Tests  
-2 log Likelihood 
AiC 
 
1749.877 
1789.877 
  
2191.880 
2225.880 
 
 
*  p<0.1    *** p<0.01 
**  p< 0.05    #  level of significance of F-test 
 
 
5.5 Random intercept model 1 
In this model we are interested in the relationship between the amount of HRM 
practices employed (HRMcount) and the degree of psychological contract violation of 
individuals. With this model we want to test the first hypothesis: The more HRM practices, 
the less psychological contract violation.  
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This model is formulated as follows: 
fulfilij = βoj + β1j(obl_workij) + β2j(obl_orgij) +β3j(age_logij)+ β4j(logwfunij) + Rij       (5.1a) 
Βoj =  γ00 + γ 01(logsiz_mj) + γ 02(logfag_mj) + γ 03 (formal_mj) + γ 04(decent_mj) + 
 γ 05(uncert_mj) +  γ 06(sectorj) + γ 07(hrmcou_mj) + U0j 
 
Results  
The results of fitting this random intercept model are presented below. 
 
Table 5-5 Random intercept model 1 
Model: M1 HRMcount model 
Fixed part: 
Predictor 
coefficient      standard error 
Intercept  1.99*** 0.30 
 
Individual level 
  
Obligations employee (obl_work)  0.33*** 0.03 
Obligations employer (obl_org) -0.05 0.03 
Age employee (age_log)  0.03 0.07 
Years of experience in this function 
(logwfun) 
-0.08*** 0.02 
 
Organizational level 
  
Size organization (logsiz_m) -0.14*** 0.03 
Age organization (logfag_m)  0.12*** 0.03 
Degree of formalization (formal_m) -0.10*** 0.02 
Degree of decentralization (decent_m)  0.07 0.05 
Degree of uncertainty (uncert_m)  0.01 0.03 
Sector (sector)  0.00# 
HRMcount (hrmcou_m) 0.04 *** 0.01 
 
Random part: 
σ2 
 
 
0.23  
 
 
0.01 
τ00. 0.01 0.00 
Tests  
-2 Log likelihood 
AiC 
 
1732.026 
1774.026 
 
*  p<0.1   *** p<0.01 
**  p< 0.0 5  #  level of significance of F-test 
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Interpretation of the output 
Fixed effects (based on t-test) 
The parameter estimate of the organizational level explanatory variable HRMcount is 
0.04, which is significantly positive at a 1% confidence level. This tells us that a unit 
increase in the variable HRMcount results in an increase of 0.04 in the dependent variable 
fulfillment. Stated differently: for each added HRM practice the average level of violation 
goes down with 0.04 (which is 1% of the possible range in fulfillment). Because the actual 
values of the scale of the amount of HRM practices ranged from 3-22, the predicted 
difference between the organization with the least HRM practices and organizations with 
the most HRM practices is (19* 0.04=) 0.76 point on the violation score (which is a 
difference of 19 % in degree of fulfillment). 
 
Random effects 
In this model we found that the estimated value of the within-group difference σ2 = 
0.23 (compared with to the baseline model 0.23) and the estimated value of between-group 
difference τ00 = 0.01 (compared with the baseline- model 0.02). These findings indicate 
that including the variable the amount of HRM practices explains part of the 
(organizational level) variance in fulfillment.  
 
Tests 
When comparing models to their baseline-models, t-test and deviance-test are being 
used. We only reject the null-hypotheses if the t-test as well the deviance test is significant. 
To be precise, the deviance test can be used to test the null hypothesis that for each of the 
additional variables8 the model parameter is equal to zero. Under this condition, the 
difference in deviance between the two nested models has a chi-square distribution with 
degrees of freedom equal to the number of additional parameters in the enlarged model. As 
it turns out, χ2 = (1749.877-1732.026 =) 17.851. Since the enlarged model only includes 
one additional variable, this test statistic has one degree of freedom.  
                                                 
8 Additional as compared to the baseline model 
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The associated probability level equals p< 0.000, and we can thus conclude that this 
model fits the data better than the baseline-model. Including the amount of HRM practices 
adds significantly in explaining the degree of psychological contract violation, compared 
to the variables already included in the baseline-model. For this model, both the t-test as 
well as the deviance test are significant, which indicates that the null-hypothesis can be 
rejected. 
The proportion of total variance explained by this model at organizational level is 0.01. 
In comparison with the baseline model, the HRM count variable accounts for 62% of the 
variance at organizational level that remains after the control variables have been added. 
This means that 62% in the variation of psychological contract fulfillment that is due to 
organizational level effects can be influenced by the amount of HRM practices. The 
consequence of our operationalization of HRM in which we used an additive index, is that 
our results suggest HRM practices have independent non-overlapping effects on the 
psychological contract. Furthermore, using more practices results in a lower level of 
violation.  
 
The question arises if this is a direct effect or whether there are indirect effects of HRM 
on psychological contract violation, via perceived employee and/or employer obligations. 
Based on the results of the analyses in which the dependent variable is perceived employee 
obligations and the analysis in which the dependent variable is perceived employer 
obligations (as presented in appendix 3A and 3B), we are able to conclude that there are 
indications for a relationship of HRM with employee obligations. This relationship 
indicates that the more HRM practices in place, the more employees perceive they have 
obligations towards the organization. We did not find indications for such a relationship 
between HRM and employer obligations.  
 
5.6 Random intercept model 2 
In the second model we estimated we are interested in the relationship between 
commitment enhancing HRM (hrmcom) and the degree of psychological contract violation 
of individuals. With this model we want to test the second hypothesis: The more 
commitment focused HRM, the less psychological contract violation. 
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This model is formulated as follows:  
fulfilij = βoj + β1j(obl_workij) + β2j(obl_orgij) +β3j(age_logij) +β4j(logwfunij) + Rij       (5.2a) 
Βoj = γ00 + γ 01(logsiz_mj) + γ 02(logfag_mj) + γ 03 (formal_mj) + γ 04(decent_mj) + 
 γ 05(uncert_mj) +  γ 06(sectorj) + γ 07(hrmcom_mj)+ U0j 
 
Results  
The results of fitting this random intercept model are presented in the following table. 
 
Table 5-6 Random Intercept Model 2 
Model: M2 HRM commitment model 
Fixed part: 
Predictor coefficient      standard error 
Intercept  1.73*** 0.32 
 
Individual level   
Obligations employee (obl_work)  0.33*** 0.03 
Obligations employer (obl_org) -0.05 0.03 
Age employee (age_log)  0.05 0.07 
Years of experience in this function 
(logwfun) -0.08*** 0.02 
 
Organizational level   
Size organization (logsiz_m) -0.11*** 0.04 
Age organization (logfag_m)  0.11*** 0.03 
Degree of formalization (formal_m) -0.08*** 0.02 
Degree of decentralization 
(decent_m)  0.06 0.08 
Degree of uncertainty (uncert_m)  0.01 0.05 
Sector (sector)  0.06#  
 
HRM commitment (hrmcom_m) 
 
 0.31 *** 
 
0.11 
Random part: 
Σ2 
 
0.23 
 
0.01 
τ00. 0.01 0.00 
Tests: 
-2 Log Likelihood 
AIC 
1742.476 
1784.476  
*  p<0.1    *** p<0.01 
**  p< 0.05    #  level of significance of F-test 
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Interpretation of the output 
Fixed part 
The parameter estimate of the organizational level explanatory variable commitment 
HRM is 0.31, which is significantly positive (at a 1% confidence level). This tells us that a 
unit increase in the variable HRM commitment result in an increase of 0.31 in the 
dependent variable fulfillment. Stated differently: for a one-point increase in HRM 
commitment the average level of violation goes down with 0.31. Because the actual values 
of HRM commitment ranged from 1-2.28, the predicted difference between organizations 
which do not focus at commitment enhancing systems and organizations which do differ 
1.27* 0.31= 0.50 point on the violation score (which is a difference of 13% in degree of 
violation).  
 
Random part 
In this model we found that the estimated value of the within-group difference σ2 = 
0.23 (compared with the baseline model 0.23) and the estimated value of between-group 
difference τ00 = 0.01 (compared with the baseline model 0.02). These findings indicate 
that including the organizational level variable commitment HRM explains part of the 
variance in fulfillment. 
 
Tests 
Bases on the t-test and the deviance test (χ2 = 7.401; df=1; p< 0.00), we are able to 
reject the null hypothesis. Including the HRM commitment thus adds significantly in 
explaining the degree of psychological contract violation, compared to the variables 
already included in the baseline-model.  
 
The proportion of total variance explained by this model at organizational level is 0.01. 
In comparison with the baseline model, the HRM commitment variable accounts for 29% 
of the variance at organizational level that remains after the control variables have been 
added. This means that 29% in the variation of psychological contract fulfillment that is 
due to organizational level effects can be influenced by the HRM commitment. 
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5.7 Random intercept model 3: Configurations 
In the third model we estimated we are interested in the relationship between the 
coherence of HRM practices and organizational structure in terms of configurations and 
the degree of psychological contract violation of individuals. With this model we want to 
test the third hypothesis: The more an organization resembles the ideal type, the less 
psychological contract violation. 
 
In the previous chapter we discussed how we calculated the distance measure (which 
was based on a cluster analysis). This distance measure represents the coherence of an 
organization in terms of organizational structure, context and HRM. In this third random 
intercept model we examine to which extent this organizational level variable can explain 
differences in fulfillment of individuals of different organizations  
 
The third random intercept model can be written as follows:  
fulfilij = βoj + β1j(obl_workij) + β2j(obl_orgij) +β3j(age_logij) + β4j(logwfunij) + Rij   (5.3.a) 
Βoj = γ00 + γ 01(logsiz_mj) + γ 02(logfag_mj) +  γ 03(sectorj) + γ 04(dis1j)+ U0j 
 
Results 
The results of fitting this model are presented in table 5-7. 
 
Interpretation of the output 
Fixed part 
The parameter estimate of the organizational level explanatory variable distance (dis1) 
is -0.03, which is not significant, which was not as expected. Because the t-test of the 
distance variable is not significant we are not able to reject the null hypothesis that the 
effects of distance on the degree of psychological contract fulfillment do not explain part 
of the variance in fulfillment. 
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Table 5-7 Random Intercept Model 3 
Model: M3 Configurational approach 
Fixed part: 
Predictor 
coefficient      standard error 
Intercept  2.01*** 0.32 
 
Individual level 
  
Obligations employee (obl_work)  0.33*** 0.03 
Obligations employer (obl_org) -0.05 0.03 
Age employee (age_log)  0.04 0.07 
Years of experience in this function 
(logwfun) 
-0.09*** 0.02 
 
Organizational level 
  
Size organization (logsiz_m) -0.09** 0.04 
Age organization (logfag_m)  0.07*** 0.04 
Sector (sector)  0.07# 
Distance to ideal type cluster (dis1) -0.03 0.04 
 
Random part: 
Σ2 
 
 
0.23 
 
 
0.01 
τ00. 0.02 0.01 
Tests: 
-2 Log Likelihood 
AiC 
 
1757.393 
1793.393 
 
*  p<0.1    *** p<0.01 
**  p< 0.05    #  level of significance of F-test 
 
5.8 General model comparisons 
In this section we discuss the interpretation of the parameter estimates of the individual 
level explanatory variables as well as the control variables of the three models. Next, we 
statistically compare the three models. In table 5-8 we provide an overview of the  
(significant) estimates of the parameters of the estimated models9.
                                                 
9 For all models except M3, the main statistical assumption concerning the interdependence and normality of the 
distribution of random errors (Hofmann et al., 2000) was tested and satisfying. 
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Comparison of the three models 
To compare the three multi-level models, which are non-nested in structure but are 
based upon the same dataset, we can use the general fit index Akaike’s Information 
Criterion (AIC), which is a measure that adjusts for the number of parameters estimated 
(Hox, 2002: 45). Lower values of AIC are preferred above higher values. Based on this 
measure the first model (HRM count) is preferred. This result is in line with our previous 
findings, that the amount of variance explained by this model is higher than in the other 
models. 
 
Multi-level analyzing versus OLS 
As expected, although the estimates of the individual level variables are somewhat 
similar, when comparing our results based on multi-level analysis with OLS analysis, the 
latter leads to very different results in organizational level variables (as can be seen in 
appendix 2). Standard statistics like OLS do not take into account the weighting of the 
various organizations, but instead take the average of all organizations, thereby assuming 
an intraclass correlation of 0. An intraclass correlation that is greater than 0, as in our case, 
indicates that standard statistics would likely lead to misleading results (Singer, 1999: 
330). According to Hox (2002:5): “Standard statistical test lean heavily on the assumption 
of independence of the observations. If this assumption is violated (and in multilevel data 
this is almost always the case) the estimates of the standard errors of conventional 
statistical tests are much too small, and this results in many spuriously ‘significant’ 
results.” 
 
The results on basis of OLS statistics show much higher estimates for the coefficients 
of organizational size, age of the organization and degree of formalization. The estimates 
of the HRM count and HRM commitment coefficients also show a very different picture 
and the distance measure of the third model shows a significant estimate of the coefficient 
when using OLS, while this is clearly not the case using multi-level analysis.  
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Interpretation of the resulting parameter estimates  
Table 5-8 provides us with the (significant) regression coefficients of the explanatory 
and control variables. The results are very consistent, although not all outcomes are as 
expected. When comparing the three random intercept models M1-M3, the parameter 
estimate of the individual level explanatory variable perceived employee obligation is in 
all three models 0.33, which is significantly positive (at a 1% confidence level). This tells 
us that a unit increase in the variable employee obligation results in an increase of 0.33 in 
the dependent variable fulfillment (which is 8.25% of the possible range in fulfillment). 
Because the level of employee obligations is measured at a five point scale, the predicted 
difference between the person with the lowest level of obligations and the employee with 
the highest level of obligations is 1.3 point on their degree of violation. 
 
Based on social exchange theory and notions of balance (see for instance Barksdale & 
Shore, 1997) we expected the relationship between the employee and employer obligations 
or more specifically the degree of balance between these two parts to have a relationship 
with the outcome variable psychological contract violation. Although we found a 
significant relationship between employee obligations and degree of fulfillment, we did not 
find a relationship between employer obligations and the evaluation of the psychological 
contract. Psychological contract obligations reflect future contributions and thus may or 
may not be fulfilled and are thus contingent upon the perceived behavior of the other party. 
Since fulfillment is associated with perceived employee obligations, this provides an 
indication that employee obligations are dependent on the degree to which the organization 
has fulfilled its obligations.  
 
The parameter estimate of the individual level control variable years of work 
experience in this function is -0.08, which is significantly negative (at a 1% confidence 
level). This suggests that the more years of work experience an employee has, the more 
psychological contract violation the employee experiences (irrespective of possible 
differences in perceived employee obligations and other included variables). 
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We found a strong negative relationship with employee obligations (appendix 3A), so 
the more years of work experience, the less the employee feels he is owed to provide the 
organization with certain things, the more the employee expects from its organization 
(appendix 3B). This result is in line with existing literature on tenure, in which employees 
perceive reduced obligations when they work longer in the organization.  
 
The regression coefficients of the organizational level control variables of 
organizational size and the age of an organization were significant in the three models, 
providing support for a relationship between organizational characteristics and degree of 
psychological contract fulfillment.  
 
Formalization was found to have a significant relationship with degree of psychological 
violation. This result suggests that the more formalized the organization, the more 
employees perceive violations of their psychological contract. Although we did not find a 
direct effect of decentralization on degree of violation, we found indications of a random 
slope of decentralization with employee obligations (as presented in appendix 1). This 
suggests that the relationship between perceived employee obligations and psychological 
contract violation is moderated by the degree of decentralization. In other words, the 
relationship between perceived employee obligations and degree of perceived violation 
depends on the degree of decentralization of the structure of the organization. 
 
5.9 Conclusions 
The purpose of this chapter was to arrive at a model that is interesting for answering 
our main question concerning the relationship between HRM and the degree of 
psychological contract violation. In this chapter we developed and tested based on multi-
level analysis three models answering three hypotheses. 
 
The basic condition for handling our data with multi-level statistics was satisfied, in 
that there was an amount of variation in our dependent variable (fulfillment) that was due 
to organizational level effects (14%).  
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We decided to reject the three null-hypotheses based on whether as well the t-test of 
significance as the deviance test (which compares the model with its baseline model) were 
satisfied. We first developed a model concerning the relationship between the amount of 
HRM practices and the degree of psychological contract violation. The parameter estimate 
of the explanatory variable of interest (HRM count) was significant and the deviance test 
showed that including this variable did significantly add in explaining the degree of 
psychological contract violation compared to the variables already included in the 
baseline-model. Based on this insight we were able to reject the null-hypothesis. This 
means that the more HRM practices organizations, the less psychological contract 
violation.  
 
The second model we developed concerned the relationship between commitment 
HRM systems and the degree of psychological contract violation. Again (based on a t-test) 
the parameter was significant and the deviance test showed that including this variable did 
significantly add in explaining the degree of psychological contract violation compared to 
the variables already included in the baseline-model. Based on this insight we were able to 
reject the null-hypothesis. This means that HRM commitment practices do explain part of 
the variance in psychological contract violation (although it explains less than the amount 
of HRM practices).  
 
The third model we developed concerned the relationship between the coherence of 
structural signals (organizational structure, HRM and context: measured by the distance 
variable) and the degree of psychological contract violation. The regression coefficient for 
the organizational level explanatory variable (distance) was not significant Based on this 
insight, we were not able to reject the null hypothesis that effects of the distance on the 
degree of violation of an individual’s psychological contract are absent. In the following 
chapter we will elaborate on our findings and their limitations. 
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CHAPTER 6 DISCUSSION 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This study set out to explore the relationship of HRM and more general design factors 
with psychological contract violation. Because HRM is the subset of organizational design 
characteristics most closely related to the employment relationship the main focus of this 
study is on HRM.  
 
Both literature on organizational-level HRM and performance and individual-level 
research on the relationship between psychological contract and employee behavior, point 
to the existence of a relationship between HRM and the psychological contract of 
employees. Most of these indications, however, are conceptually based. Consequently, 
various authors explicitly claim there is a need for investigating this relationship. 
Investigating mediating constructs in the relationship between HRM and performance such 
as the psychological contract can help to understand the mechanisms by which this 
relationship is shaped better. In terms of Wright & Nishi (2004) there is a need to open the 
“black-box” of the relationship between HRM and performance.  
 
In this study we aim to open this “black box”, by focusing within the relationship 
between HRM and performance on the signalling value of HRM and organizational 
structure. Besides being instrumental in coordination and control of work in the 
organization, we expect HRM and organizational structure to send signals that are relevant 
for employees’ assessment of fulfillment of their psychological contracts. Based on a 
sample consisting of a cross section of 49 Dutch organizations we study the link between, 
on the one hand HRM and other organizational design characteristics, and on the other 
hand, psychological contract violation.  
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Because the constructs of our interest are on different levels (organizational and 
individual level), we based our analysis on a modeling technique that takes into account 
the dependence between these different levels: multi-level or hierarchical modeling. In 
both streams of research applying multi-level modeling and analysis is not common, 
although various researchers point to the importance of using this technique.  
 
In this chapter we discuss the results of our study. Our findings indicate that there is a 
significant relationship between HRM and organizational design factors and the degree of 
perceived psychological contract violation. We first present a short overview of the main 
findings of our literature review and our empirical study (section 6.2). Next, we discuss 
these findings in detail (section 6.3). In section 6.4 we pay special attention to the 
operationalization of the psychological contract in light of exchange theory and notions on 
balance. Subsequently the limitations of our study are evaluated and the implications for 
future research are addressed (section 6.4). Finally, we address some implications of our 
results for management and organizational practice (section 6.5).  
 
6.2 Summary of main findings 
 
6.2.1 Research model and hypotheses 
In this study our main interest is in understanding how HRM and more general design 
factors are related to performance by looking at the psychological contract of employees. 
The psychological contract can be seen as ‘the lens’ through which we study the influence 
of HRM and organizational structure on the employment relationship. In line with the 
conceptualization of Rousseau (1989/1990/1995), we defined the psychological contract 
as: “an individual’s belief, shaped by the organization, regarding reciprocal obligations”. 
Based on exchange theory and notions on balance and reciprocity (see chapter 2), we 
expect that psychological contracts are contingent upon the perceived behavior of the other 
party. Because of reported negative effects of not completely fulfilled psychological 
contracts on individual attitudes and behavior, our main focus is on violation of the 
psychological contract. We will use the terms violation for indicating a situation in which 
employees perceive the obligations of the employer as not being completely fulfilled.  
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Based on signalling theory, organizations are perceived by employees as sending 
signals concerning the employment relationship through HRM and organizational 
structure, thereby affecting their psychological contract. Putting insights of both streams of 
literature (HRM performance and psychological contract performance) and underlying 
theory of social exchange and signalling together, we expect HRM and aspects of 
organizational structure to have consequences for the degree of psychological contract 
violations of employees.  
 
The main research question is characterized as follows:  
What is the signalling value of HRM for employees’ assessment of the degree of violation 
of their psychological contracts? 
 
In our analysis of the literature we distinguish the two approaches to HRM for studying 
the signalling effect of HRM on the psychological contract: universalistic or ‘best 
practices’ approaches and configurational approaches. Universalistic approaches assume a 
relationship between HRM regardless of the internal and external organizational context. 
Configurational approaches take into account the degree of fit between HRM and its wider 
organizational context, thereby recognizing the dependence between organizational level 
elements.  
 
These approaches provide different explanations for the signalling effect of HRM and 
organizational structure on the psychological contract of employees, leading us to the 
development of three hypotheses, of which two hypotheses based on universalistic 
approaches (amount of HRM practices and commitment HRM practices) and one 
hypothesis on configurational approaches (fit between HRM, structure and context): 
 
H1: The more HRM practices, the less psychological contract violation. 
H2: The more commitment focused HRM, the less psychological contract violation. 
H3: The more an organization resembles an ideal type, the less psychological contract 
violation 
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The constructs underlying these three hypotheses and their relationships are graphically 
presented in our conceptual model (figure 6-1). 
 
Figure 6-1 Conceptual model 
Amount of HRM
practices
Commitment
oriented
HRM practices
Fit between
HRM, 
structure
and context
Control variables individual level, e.g. age, years of work experience in this function
Employee and 
employer
obligations
Psychological
contract 
violation
Control variables organzational level: e.g. sector, age, size
O
rganizational
level
Individuallevel
H1 -/- H2 -/- H3 -/-
 
 
In the research model we distinguished two levels of analysis, the organizational and 
individual level. 
 The individual dependent variable is psychological contract violation;  
 The organizational level independent variables are the amount of HRM practices, the 
use of commitment oriented practices and the degree of fit between HRM, structure 
and context; 
 The individual level independent variables are employee and employer obligations.  
 Based on existing research we include several control variables, both on 
organizational and on individual level. 
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Universalistic approaches 
In the first approach, following universalistic HRM thinking, we expect that every 
added HRM practice provides additional information that is relevant for employees’ 
assessment of fulfillment of the organization’s obligations, thus leading to less violation of 
these expectations. We operationalized the amount of HRM practices by counting the 
number of HRM practices employed by the organization.  
 
Following the second universalistic HRM approach, the ‘best commitment practices’ 
approach, we expect that violation of the psychological contract can be explained by the 
degree to which the organization employs commitment oriented HRM practices. Previous 
literature suggests that a subset of HRM practices, the commitment HRM practices, align 
the interest of employees and organizations better than other practices do. Commitment 
HRM practices are expected to build an intensified and high quality employment 
relationship with the objective to optimize organizational performance. Consistent with 
this type of research, we defined commitment HRM as an indicator of the attention that 
organizations demonstrate for the subset of commitment enhancing practices (such as 
social support and training and development).  
 
Configurational approach 
The third approach towards studying HRM argues for the importance of coherence or 
fit between various internal and external organizational-level element for individual and 
organizational performance. The importance of fit is mentioned mainly in conceptual work 
on the impact of HRM on the psychological contract.  
 
The essence of the configurational approach is that coherence between organizational 
elements is important, that context matters. This approach extends commitment HRM by 
focusing on the alignment between commitment HRM, organizational structure (in our 
study operationalized by the concepts of formalization and decentralization) and 
organizational context (in our study operationalized by the concept of degree of 
uncertainty).  
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Based on the work of Mintzberg (1979), Paauwe (1989), Verburg (1998) and Pichault 
& Schoenaers (2003) we develop a model for studying the configurational approach, 
focusing on four ideal types (or configurations).  
 
In light of the psychological contract, these four ideal types are expected to send 
consistent signals, leading to less violation of psychological contracts, because employees 
will have less conflicting expectations of obligations. Coherence between the signals send 
by an organization is thus expected to be of importance.  
 
6.2.2 Main results 
Because the hypotheses concern constructs of two levels of analysis, namely 
organizational level HRM and more general design factors, and individual level 
psychological contract, a multi-level approach is used. Multi-level analysis refers to 
statistical methods that explicitly take into account the relationships among constructs at 
multiple levels of analysis (Klein & Kozlowski, 2000). 
 
The hypotheses are tested by multi-level modeling, regressing the dependent individual 
level variable perceived contract violation on the independent individual and 
organizational level variables (HRM, organizational structure, perceived employee and 
employer obligations), together with a number of control variables. Our findings show that 
although psychological contract violation is clearly influenced by individual and job 
characteristics, we can conclude that 14% of the variation in degree of psychological 
contract violation is due to organizational level effects. Our hypotheses are graphically 
presented in figure 6-1. Our findings are summarized below.  
 
Universalistic approaches 
In the universalistic approaches towards HRM we expect that regardless of internal and 
external context factors HRM has a (negative) relationship with psychological contract 
violation. We tested two universalistic approaches with two hypotheses. We first discuss 
the hypothesis focusing on the amount of HRM practices. 
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Figure 6-2 Hypothesis 1: The more HRM practices, the less psychological contract 
violation 
Amount of HRM
practices
Control variables individual level: years of work experience in this function
Emplyee
obligations
Psychological
contract 
violation
Control variables organzational level: sector, age, size, degree of formalization
O
rganizational
level
Individuallevel
-/- 0.04***
-/- 0.33***
 
 
The results of our analyses provide strong support for a universalistic perspective. The 
parameter estimate of the organizational level explanatory variable representing the 
amount of HRM practices is 0.04. Stated differently: for each added HRM practice the 
average level of violation goes down with 0.04 (which is 1% of the possible range in 
fulfillment). Because the actual values of the scale of the amount of HRM practices ranged 
from 3-22, the predicted difference between the organization with the least HRM practices 
and organizations with the most HRM practices is (19* 0.04=) 0.76 point on the violation 
score (which is a difference of 19 % in degree of fulfillment). 
 
When HRM managers indicated that a greater number of HRM practices were used, 
individual employees, regardless of individual characteristics perceived less contract 
violation. What these results suggest is that when the organization pays active attention to 
HRM by employing many HRM activities, this will lead to less psychological contract 
violation on the part of the employees.  
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The proportion of total variance explained by this model at organizational level is 0.01. 
In comparison with the baseline model, the HRM count variable accounts for 62% of the 
variance at organizational level that remains after the control variables have been added. 
This means that 62% in the variation of psychological contract fulfillment that is due to 
organizational level effects can be explained by the amount of HRM practices. We can 
conclude that the amount of HRM practices is of importance for explaining variation in 
psychological contract violation. 
 
The second hypothesis addressed the relationship between commitment HRM and 
degree of perceived psychological contract violation. The results are graphically presented 
in figure 6-3. 
 
Figure 6-3 Hypothesis 2: The more commitment focused HRM, the less psychological 
contract violation 
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The results of our analyses also provide support for this perspective. The parameter 
estimate of the organizational level explanatory variable representing the amount of HRM 
practices is 0.31. This tells us that a unit increase in the variable HRM commitment result 
in an increase of 0.31 in the dependent variable fulfillment. Stated differently: for a one-
point increase in HRM commitment the average level of violation goes down with 0.31. 
Because the actual values of HRM commitment ranged from 1-2.28, the predicted 
difference between organizations which do not focus at commitment enhancing systems 
and organizations which do differ 1.27* 0.31= 0.50 point on the violation score (which is a 
difference of 13% in degree of violation).  
 
Although the parameter estimated of commitment HRM is higher then the parameter 
estimate of the amount of HRM practices, as a result of the range of the scale, the actual 
variation in violation associated with commitment HRM is much lower. 
 
When HRM managers indicated that a greater number of commitment HRM practices 
were used, individual employees, regardless of individual characteristics perceived less 
contract violation. Our findings show thus that commitment enhancing HRM practices 
have an impact on the degree to which employees experience psychological contract 
violation. However, the focus on commitment explains only about half of the variance in 
psychological contract violation that is due to the total amount of HRM practices: 29% of 
the variation in psychological contract violation due to organizational level effects was 
related to commitment HRM, compared to 62% that was related with the (total) amount of 
HRM practices in place.  
 
These results suggest that for a positive evaluation of employees’ psychological 
contract it is more important to have a higher amount of HRM practices in place than to 
focus specifically on commitment enhancing practices. 
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Configurational approach  
The third hypothesis focused on a configurational approach towards the influence of 
HRM and organizational structure on the psychological contract, taking into account the 
degree of coherence between organizational level factors that have a signalling function.  
 
Based on theoretically based configurational ideal-types (Simple structure, Machine 
bureaucracy, Professional bureaucracy and Adhocracy, see table 6-3), we performed a 
cluster-analytical procedure and were able to identify clusters of organizations that 
resembled 3 of these ideal types. Due to the nature of our data, in which we did not have 
small organizations, we did not find the “Simple Structure” ideal type.  
 
Table 6-3 Ideal types, measurement of four configurations (same as table 3-5, and 4-
12) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For each organization we calculated a variable measuring the distance between the 
closest ideal type and the actual situation of the organization. This distance variable 
represents the degree of fit or coherence of the organization’s HRM and internal and 
external context and is the variable used in our analysis. We expected that greater fit 
between these elements, would lead to more consistent messages sent by the organization, 
which, in turn, would lead to less violation of employees’ psychological contract. We did 
not find support for this hypothesis. The results are graphically presented in figure 6-4. 
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Figure 6-4 Hypothesis 3: The more an organization resembles the ideal type, the less 
psychological contract violation 
Control variables individual level: years of work experience in this function
Employee
obligations
Psychological
contract 
violation
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The results of our study do not show significant relationships between consistency or 
fit between various aspects of HRM, organizational structure and context and 
psychological contract violation.  
 
Summarizing, we can state that in line with previous research on the relationship 
between HRM and performance our findings support a universalistic approach. The results 
indicate that the more explicit attention an organization pays to HRM (i.e. the more HRM 
practices it has in place), the less employees feel their psychological contract is violated. In 
answering our main research question, HRM is significantly associated with psychological 
contract violation. This signalling effect stems from the amount of HRM practices in place. 
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We did not find clear support for the impact of fit between organizational design 
elements and the psychological contract violation as was expected in the line of reasoning 
of the configurational approach. Furthermore, our findings do not show a strong impact of 
commitment oriented HRM as is suggested in literature on commitment HRM. In the 
following two subsections we discuss the implications of these findings more in detail. 
 
6.3 Discussion of the findings  
 
Discussion of the findings of the universalistic hypotheses 
The universalistic approach concerns the relationship between the amount of HRM 
practices in place and the degree of psychological contract violation and the specific focus 
of HRM, i.e. commitment and the degree of psychological contract violation. A key 
characteristic of a universalistic approach is that regardless of the (internal or external) 
context, elements of HRM are expected to have an influence on performance.  
 
Although we found support for both approaches, we found that commitment enhancing 
HRM practices explained less than half of the variation in comparison to the model with 
the amount of HRM practices. In light of the degree of perceived psychological contract 
violation, the explanatory power of commitment HRM is less than the explaining power of 
the remaining HRM practices. The findings indicate that an exclusive emphasis on 
commitment HRM is insufficient when studying psychological contract violation, as other 
elements of HRM explain at least as much of the variance in violation as the commitment 
HRM variables.  
 
We discuss two possible reasons for this; one has to do with our operationalization of 
commitment HRM, and the other with the diversity of HRM within organizations. The first 
explanation for this result might be found in the basis on which we integrated the practices. 
We calculated commitment HRM by computing the mean of in total nine HRM practices 
which were considered in the literature to be commitment enhancing practices (as training 
and development, social support, work design and consultation, organizational 
development and development and formulation of social policy).  
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As a result of this operationalization, commitment HRM is a subset of all possible 
HRM practices (in this study: 24 HRM practices) an organization could use. Apparently, 
although theoretically not all practices are considered to have such strong effects on work 
perceptions and behavior as commitment oriented HRM practices, other practices also 
enhance psychological contract fulfillment (for instance practices as staff planning, 
recruitment & selection, job classification). In other words, commitment HRM seems to 
complement rather than replace the effect of the other HRM practices.  
 
A second explanation of the relatively weak results of the commitment HRM model is 
in line with suggestions made by researchers as Delery & Shaw (2001) and Lepak & Snell 
(1999). According to these researchers it might be disadvantageous for organizations to 
use commitment systems for all employees in all organization. It could be that certain 
combinations of practices are especially relevant for specific groups of employees (for 
instance core-employees versus contingent workers). Commitment HRM practices are 
mostly directed to core employees who are considered to be most of influence on 
organizations objectives. Because we did not specifically focus on core-employees and we 
have no additional information on this topic we cannot draw inferences on this issue. 
Additional analysis might shed some light on this topic.  
 
Bringing these results together we found empirical support for the universalistic 
approach, with a significant larger influence of a complete additive index of HRM than for 
a subset commitment oriented HRM practices. Our findings indicate that HRM practices 
send signals that are relevant for employees’ assessment of fulfillment of their 
psychological contracts. Thus every added HRM practice provides employees with more 
information, leading to less violation of psychological contracts, because employees will 
have more ‘realistic’ expectations of obligations. Thus the more HRM practices, the more 
signals or information sent by the organization, the less violation of psychological 
contracts. 
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Discussion of the findings of the configurational hypothesis 
The general theoretical idea of the configurational approach was that when there is 
alignment between HRM practices, organizational structure and the context of the 
organization, the consistency of organizational signalling would lead to less psychological 
contract violation.  
 
We investigated the configurational approach by regressing the distance between the 
actual situation of the organization and the theoretical optimal situation regarding 
organizational features on psychological contract violation. The distance represents the 
degree of coherence of the organizational-level dimensions HRM, organizational structure 
(formalization and decentralization) and degree of environmental uncertainty. Based on 
previous studies, we expected that the lower the distance, the more coherent the signals 
send by the organization, the fewer psychological contract violations employees would 
perceive.  
 
We did not find any indications for the importance of such an effect. Not only didn’t 
we find indications for the existence of a direct effect, we also did not find any indication 
of an indirect effect of the degree of coherence of organizational-level elements on 
psychological contract violation, i.e. via employee and/or employer obligations (as 
presented in appendix 3A and 3B). Also we found no indications for a moderating effect 
(based on the random slopes analysis, as presented in appendix 1).  
 
In other words, the results of this study do not support a configurational explanation for 
variations in perceptions in psychological contract violation based on our 
operationalization of the configurational approach. Various previous empirical studies on 
HRM and performance arrived at the same sort of conclusions, in that they also did not 
find convincingly results for such a configurational effect on a variety of other 
performance measures (see for instance Delery & Doty, 1996). 
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Considering the possibility that configurational effects might be there, but are difficult 
to measure, we discuss two possible explanations for our findings; the first related to the 
content of the ideal types, the second related to our operationalizations of the fit measure. 
 
The first explanation of the lack of empirical support could be found in the content of 
our ideal types. In general, there is always a trade off with the amount of variables 
included in classification scheme’s (see for instance Meyer et al., 1993). Incorporating 
multiple variables or dimensions improves the value of the model. When a classification is 
made based upon only one or two dimensions it seems not so significant. On the other 
hand, when incorporating too many dimensions, the ideal types become very complex to 
analyze.  
 
In general we found no clear indications in previous literature on some sort of optimum 
number of dimensions to include. In our study we incorporated the dimensions 
commitment HRM, decentralization, formalization and degree of environmental 
uncertainty. These were the most distinguishing variables that had been regularly used in 
previous literature. We thereby excluded other components of Mintzberg’s classification 
scheme, such as the age of the organization and the degree of specialization. A more 
complete description could possibly lead to different outcomes.  
 
We also could have incorporated more ideal types, such as the missionary organization. 
Unfortunately Mintzberg did not fully define these ideal types in a manner commensurate 
with the ones we used. Moreover, as results of Doty et al. (1993) suggest, fit is higher in 
the ideal types than in the hybrid forms. Another reason for not including for instance the 
missionary organization lies in the fact that in this organization HRM operates, unlike in 
the ideal-types of our focus, in a more implicit manner based on values that are supposed 
to influence employees. We could also have considered other classifications as for instance 
Miles & Snow (1984).  
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Looking more closely at the results of the variables measuring structure and context 
(see for instance table 5-8), we can conclude that even though including the three structural 
variables seems to be of theoretical importance, it is degree of formalization that has 
consistently shown a significant (positive) relationship with psychological contract 
violation. The results thus indicate that as a result of more formalization in the 
organization, employees experience more psychological contract violation.  
 
We did not find any significant relationships of degree of uncertainty at all. This might 
be due to the specific time-period of our data collection. Although previous research found 
degree of perceived uncertainty a useful indicator to distinguish ideal typical conditions, at 
present perceived uncertainty is high in almost all sectors.  
 
The work of Mintzberg and our measurement of degree of uncertainty stems from a 
relatively stable period (before 1980) compared to a later period in which in the 
Netherlands there was a flow towards extended market pressures as a result of an 
accelerating pace of developments in ICT, globalization processes and trends towards 
privatization in non profit organizations. Our sample consist of quite a few organizations 
facing these kinds of trends, like big energy companies and organizations working in 
health care. As result of this many organizations could have perceived their environment as 
highly dynamic and uncertain, that would in previous periods have not. This might have 
influenced the absence of a found relationship.  
 
The second explanation for the absence of evidence is associated with our measure of 
fit, the distance variable. In our operationalization the underlying constructs have equal 
weight; this might not necessarily be the case.  
 
Concluding, although we operationalized our ideal types in a theoretically logical 
manner, there is clearly a need for further investigating the practical relevance of the 
underlying construct of uncertainty; the dimensions to incorporate and the measure of fit. 
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Our results provide some indication for reasoning that although fit seems theoretically 
an important factor, practically it is very complex to measure and based on our results 
there is a question whether fit is of such importance or whether it are foremost the amount 
of HRM practices that is of importance, or the attention paid by the organization to 
employees.  
 
6.5 Strengths, limitations and suggestions for further research 
The aim of our study was to gain more insight into the relationship between HRM and 
performance by investigating the relationship between organizational level HRM, 
organizational structure variables and the individual level outcome variable perceived 
psychological contract violation. Our results provide clear empirical support for the 
existence of such a relationship. We find that especially the amount of HRM in place is 
clearly related to psychological contract violation. Furthermore we find that aspects of 
organizational structure such as the degree of formalization are also significantly related to 
the perceptions that employees have of their exchange relationship with the organization.  
 
A major strength of our research is the multi-level nature of our empirical research 
design and the use of multi-level analysis. Over the past years, various researchers have 
discussed the importance for organization researchers to move from standard statistics to a 
multi-level approach. This is particularly of importance when the constructs of interest 
exist at different levels. When analyzing such data multi-level techniques are able to take 
into account these various levels, leading to better estimates. To investigate the importance 
of using multi-level analysis in our study, we compared our findings using OLS with 
multi-level outcomes. 
 
When comparing our results based on multi-level analysis with OLS analysis, the latter 
leads (as expected) to very different results in organizational level variables (as can be seen 
in appendix 2). The results on basis of OLS statistics show for instance much higher 
estimates for the coefficients of organizational size, age of the organization and degree of 
formalization.  
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The estimates of the HRM count and HRM commitment coefficients also show a very 
different picture and the distance measure of the third model shows a significant estimate 
of the coefficient when using OLS, while this is clearly not the case using multi-level 
analysis. An important explanation for these results can be found in what was the main 
reason for using multi-level analysis in the first place, namely since OLS does not control 
for the multi-level nature of the underlying data, it assumes independence of the 
observations. As a result of this the standard errors of the estimates using are OLS much 
smaller (Hox, 2002:5). 
 
Although these results were as expected, they provide us with the insight that there is 
clearly a need for using multi-level theory building an analysis in studies on organizational 
behavior, when incorporating constructs on more than one level of analysis. 
 
Notable strengths of our research are not only the multi-level nature of our empirical 
research design and the use of multi-level analysis, but also the consistent (as theoretically 
expected) findings; the size of our sample; and the estimation of a model capturing 86% of 
the organizational level variance of the dependent variable (the influence of omitted 
variables on organizational level is not expected to be high in this study).  
 
The results, however, should be interpreted in light of its limitations. In this subsection 
we discuss limitations resulting and suggestions for future research.  
 
In this study we measured the ‘HRM practices that were employed regularly.’ As a 
result of this, we have no indications on the responsibility of HRM departments or the 
degree to which these activities were decentralized to line-managers. As Guest and 
Conway (2002: 35) stated it, the presence of a HRM practice does not say anything about 
the way is applied in the organization.  
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The question also rises whether each HRM practices has a similar weight. Furthermore, 
as Delery (1998) suggested, in combining the practices in this manner, possible 
substitutable and synergetic effects are thereby not captured. Although Delery (1998) 
proposed alternative operationalizations, these have problems of their own. For instance, 
when multiplying the practices in order to capture synergetic effects, in the case when one 
practice is not present in organizations, this would result in a zero score on commitment 
HRM. In general, there is no consensus on the basis on which the practices should be 
integrated. Future research in this direction is definitely needed. Promising is the 
development of alternative statistical methods for uncovering bundles of HRM practices. 
Guest et al (2004) for instance use sequential tree analysis for identifying bundles of HRM 
practices. Sequential tree analysis is based on a hierarchical way of ordering of the 
practices.  
There is debate around the measurement of the concept of fit and dimensions to 
incorporate to be able to develop meaningful systems of practices and ideal-types. 
Considering the theoretical importance of the concept of fit seems contradicted by the 
empirical findings, there is clearly a need for future research on this issue.  
 
One of the main assumptions underlying our study is that psychological contract 
violation has a strong relationship with individual behavior, as for instance: intention to 
leave the organization, loyalty, psychological withdrawal and organizational citizenship 
behavior. In other words, within the relationship between HRM and (individual) 
performance, psychological contract is seen as a mediating variable. As previous research 
provides indications for the existence of such a relationship, our emphasis has been on the 
connections between organizational level variables HRM and structure with individuals 
perceptions of the psychological contract. Addressing the question whether the 
psychological contract as an intermediate variable between HRM and organizational 
performance might be considered a manageable explanatory variable has not been the 
focus of this study.  
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Due to the cross-level design of our study we were not able to make statements about 
the causality of found relationship, or to control for specific events such as downsizing. As 
suggested by several researchers (e.g. Guzzo & Noonan, 1998) employees do not always 
actively pay attention to their psychological contract. There are indications that the 
psychological contract develops and is adapted mostly in special situations, such as during 
performance appraisal and recruitment, but also in the situation of downsizing. It might be 
interesting for future researchers to look specifically at these kinds of moments in time and 
the impact over time. Longitudinal research would shed more light on these kinds of 
issues.  
 
Furthermore, as a result of our study design, we were not able to study the influence on 
psychological contract violation over time. As pointed out by Rousseau & Wade-Benzoni 
(1994) the investigated relationships might be influenced by time. There might for instance 
be a time lag between the promise made or the design of HRM practices at a certain 
moment and the promise kept. Also, when HRM practices are in place longer, the 
expectation is that the result is more agreement concerning the contract terms and less 
violation of the contract (e.g. Rousseau & Wade-Benzoni, 1994). Similarly, the study of 
De Vos et al. (2002) provides indications that perceptions of employees regarding 
contributions of both parties change during the working period of an employee within one 
organization.  
 
Several researchers discussed the shortcomings of the “Rousseau operationalization” of 
the psychological contract. Shortcomings mentioned are for instance the amount of 
practices included, the way the questions are formulated and the focus on violation of 
employer obligations. This could have had an influence on the lack of support we found 
for a relationship between employer obligations and perceived psychological contract 
fulfillment, since the latter solely focused on the fulfillment of employer obligations. There 
are researchers that offer alternative operationalizations (Ten Brink et al., 1999; De Vos et 
al., 2003; Van de Brande et al. 2002). 
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A number of issues that might be of relevance to the relationship between 
organizational level HRM and individual level psychological contract could not be 
addressed in this study, for instance: 
¾ The role of collective agreements between employer and unions. These collective 
agreements between trade unions and the organization are part of the institutional 
context, but are an important facet of employee relationships or HRM influencing 
psychological contract, since they define the degree of dependence between 
employees and organizations.  
 
¾ The influence of the leader/ line-manager on the psychological contract and within 
the relationship between HRM and the psychological contract (Den Hartog, 
Boselie & Paauwe, 2004). Especially considering the tendency towards activities 
shifting HRM responsibility to line-manager, this might be an interesting line of 
future research. 
 
The results of our study should be interpreted in terms of the previous mentioned 
limitations of the study. We hope that future research may replicate our findings, in 
different countries, various contract forms and small organizations.  
 
6.6 Suggestions for practice 
This study suggests that when an organization pays deliberate attention to HRM, 
employees perceive less psychological contract violation. Because previous literature 
confirms that perceived psychological contract violation results in undesired behavior, 
such as intention to quit the organization, low organizational citizenship behavior, it seems 
important for organizations to actively pay attention to managing the psychological 
contract through HRM interventions. 
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The psychological contract is operationalized as a measure reflecting individual 
employees’ perceptions of employee and employer obligations, such as employee 
obligations to work well with others, voluntarily performing non-required tasks and 
working extra hours and employer obligations to provide employees with training and 
development possibilities and a good working climate. As a result of more HRM practices 
in place, employees perceive they have higher obligations towards the organization.  
 
Furthermore, HRM practices send signals that are relevant for employees’ assessment 
of fulfillment of their psychological contracts. Human Resource Management is, therefore, 
not only able to provide clarity on the amount of employee obligations, but is also able to 
provide clarity about those organizational design elements (as for instance recruitment, 
training, reward systems, task structuring), which directly affect the employment 
relationship. In this respect HRM is one of the crucial elements (next to for example 
leadership style) in managing the psychological contract. 
 
Psychological contracts are most influential (in terms of individual behavior) when 
they are violated. Our research suggests that violation can be reduced by actively paying 
attention to the employment relationship by developing many explicit HRM activities. 
More explicit HRM activities seem to help individual employees to develop expectations 
of their employment relationship, which safeguard them against disappointments.  
 
Thus HRM activities seem to have an important signaling function, helping employees 
sense what the organization expects of them and what the organization has provided the 
employees with in return. As employment relationships are based on reciprocity, employee 
behavior is dependent on the behavior of the organization. In this respect it is important to 
pay attention to issues of equity and fairness in shaping the employment relationship. 
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Although more explicit attention to HRM leads to a reduction of psychological contract 
violation, organizational formalization leads to more psychological contract violation. Our 
data point out that especially in large and/ or highly formalized organizations there is a 
danger of a high degree of psychological contract violation, which could result in lower 
performance of these employees. At first instance this finding seems to contradict our 
previous recommendation of making HRM practices more explicit. However, 
formalization here refers to rigidity in organizations due to an emphasis on coordination 
and control; rigidity in the application of formal written-down rules. This can easily lead to 
psychological contract violation as it leads to a ‘universalistic’ approach to HRM, in the 
sense of seeing individuals as members of categories (rather than a ‘particularistic’ 
approach in the sense of seeing individuals as individuals), which fails to take into account 
individual preferences of employees and their specific situations.  
 
This implies a plea for making HRM practices explicit in such a way that they still 
allow for individual choice and leeway. Examples in this respect are the development of 
labour and working conditions, which allow for choice by individual employees through 
web-based menus. (In Dutch: arbeidsvoorwaardenkeuze model, variaties in werktijden, 
verlofregelingen etc). So in making as many HR practices as explicit as possible it is 
important not to fall into the trap of stretching rigid formalization beyond its relevance.  
 
In contemporary literature special HRM systems as commitment or high performing 
work systems are being advocated as of major importance for high individual and 
organizational performance. However, this is not supported by our study. Although 
commitment HRM activities as social support, training and communication are of 
importance for the fulfillment of employees’ psychological contracts, the total amount of 
practices is a much better indicator. Advice is, therefore, not just to focus on the 
commitment HRM type. The focus of contemporary research on commitment HRM could 
well be interpreted as a denial of the relevance of other HRM practices. It is the total 
package that counts.  
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SAMENVATTING (SUMMARY IN DUTCH) 
 
Wat bepaalt de effectiviteit van HRM? Deze vraag staat sinds jaren in de 
belangstelling. Onderzoek richt zich op twee aspecten hiervan: op organisatieniveau richt 
het onderzoek zich op de relatie tussen HRM-activiteiten en organisatieprestatie en op 
individueel niveau richt het zich op de relatie tussen individuele karakteristieken, werk 
beleving en attitudes en gedrag van medewerkers, zoals intentie de organisatie te verlaten, 
tevredenheid en betrokkenheid. Hoewel de focus van HRM ligt op de werknemer-
werkgevers relatie, daar waar deze twee stromen van onderzoek samenkomen, is de relatie 
tussen HRM en werkbeleving onderbelicht geweest.  
 
In deze studie slaan we een brug tussen deze twee typen onderzoek door ons te richten 
op de relatie tussen HRM en het psychologisch contract van medewerkers. Het 
psychologisch contract wordt gedefinieerd als: “de individuele perceptie van wederzijdse 
verplichtingen, zoals beïnvloedt door de organisatie”.  
 
Het psychologisch contract omvat drie aspecten:  
- gepercipieerde werknemersverplichtingen, zoals de verplichting goed samen te 
werken, overuren te maken;  
- gepercipieerde werkgeversverplichtingen, zoals medewerkers de ruimte geven 
voor training en ontwikkelingen en het bieden van een goed werkklimaat; 
- de mate waarin de medewerker het gevoel heeft dat de werkgever tegemoet komt 
aan haar verplichtingen (mate van schending van het psychologisch contract ).  
 
Het psychologisch contract kan gezien worden als de lens waardoor we de invloed van 
HRM op de arbeidsrelatie bestuderen. Het concept psychologisch contract brengt 
onderzoek naar HRM op organisatieniveau en individueel niveau samen, door de focus op 
de uitwisselingsrelatie tussen medewerker en organisatie. Het psychologisch contract is 
van belang vanwege haar duidelijke relatie met attitudes en gedrag van medewerkers, zoals 
vertrouwen en verloop.  
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Deze studie biedt inzicht in de samenhang tussen HRM, organisatiestructuur, 
organisatiecontext en het psychologisch contract. We verkennen de relatie tussen 
organisatie- en individuele elementen en het proces waardoor HRM leidt tot effectiviteit. 
We veronderstellen interactie tussen medewerker en organisatie op basis van het aantal 
HRM activiteiten en de wijze waarop de organisatie HRM heeft ingericht.  
 
Indicaties voor het bestaan van zo een relatie zijn voornamelijk te vinden in 
conceptuele werken. Er is weinig empirisch onderzoek dat dit bevestigt. Verschillende 
auteurs claimen dan ook dat er een behoefte is om deze relatie verder te onderzoeken 
omdat dit ons helpt het proces waardoor de relatie tussen HRM en organisatieprestatie 
vormgegeven wordt te begrijpen. Om te spreken met de woorden van Wright & Nishi 
(2004) “er is behoefte aan het openen van de “black-box” van de relatie tussen HRM en 
organisatieprestatie”.  
 
Onze centrale onderzoeksvraag luidt:  
Wat is de signaalwaarde van HRM voor de mate waarin medewerkers schending van hun 
psychologisch contract ervaren?  
 
We verwachten dat HRM en elementen van organisatiestructuur communicatiewaarde 
hebben, in de zin dat ze signalen uitzenden die relevant zijn voor de evaluatie van 
medewerkers over de mate waarin de organisatie tegemoet komt aan haar verplichtingen 
(mate van schending van het psychologisch contract). Omdat uit eerder onderzoek blijkt 
dat schending van het psychologisch contract het sterkst samenhangt met individuele 
prestatie, richten we ons met name op dit element van het psychologisch contract.  
 
We onderzoeken in welke mate twee benaderingen (universalistisch en configuratie) 
ons helpen de relatie tussen HRM-signalen en ervaren schending van het psychologisch 
contract, te begrijpen. Universalistische benaderingen veronderstellen een relatie ongeacht 
de interne en externe organisatie context.  
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Configuratie benaderingen incorporeren de mate van samenhang (ook wel ‘fit’ 
genoemd) tussen HRM en haar organisatie context, waarmee het belang van het bestuderen 
van de afhankelijkheid tussen verschillende elementen van de organisatie erkend wordt.  
 
Deze benaderingen geven ons verschillende verklaringen voor een signaal effect van 
HRM op het psychologisch contract. Dit heeft geleid tot de ontwikkeling van drie 
hypothesen, waarvan de eerste twee gebaseerd zijn op de universalistische benadering en 
de derde op de configuratie benadering: 
 
H1: Hoe meer HRM activiteiten, hoe minder psychologisch contract schending 
H2: Hoe meer commitment-gericht HRM, hoe minder psychologisch contract 
schending 
H3: Hoe meer de organisatie te classificeren is al een ideaaltype, hoe minder 
psychologisch contract schending 
 
In de eerste benadering verwachten we (ongeacht de omgeving) dat met een toenemend 
aantal HRM-activiteiten, medewerkers over meer informatie beschikken die relevant is 
voor hun begrip van de wederzijdse verplichtingen en de tegemoetkoming van de 
organisatieverplichtingen. Dit leidt tot minder ervaren psychologisch contract schending. 
 
De tweede universalistische hypothese richt zich specifiek op commitment 
bevorderende HRM-activiteiten. Hierbij verwachten we dat de mate van ervaren 
psychologisch contract schending samenhangt met de mate waarin de organisatie 
commitment-gerichte HRM activiteiten inzet. In de literatuur bestaan indicaties dat HRM-
activiteiten de doelen van medewerkers en organisatie beter verenigen dan andere 
activiteiten. Van commitment HRM-activiteiten wordt verwacht dat zij een intensieve en 
hoge kwaliteit arbeidsrelatie opbouwen, wat zal leiden tot minder psychologische contract 
schending. We hebben commitment HRM geoperationaliseerd als de mate waarin de 
organisatie aandacht schenkt aan activiteiten als sociale ondersteuning en training and 
ontwikkeling. 
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De tweede benadering beargumenteert dat coherentie of fit tussen HRM, interne- 
(bijvoorbeeld formalisatie, decentralisatie) en externe organisatie-elementen (bijvoorbeeld 
mate van onzekerheid) van belang is voor individuele prestatie en organisatieprestatie. Om 
de waarde van deze benadering te bestuderen hebben we op basis van werk van Mintzberg 
(1979), Paauwe (1989), Verburg (1998) and Pichault & Schoenaers (2003) een model 
ontwikkeld dat bestaat uit vier ideaaltypen. In het licht van het psychologisch contract 
verwachten we dat doordat deze vier ideaaltypen duidelijke en op elkaar afgestemde 
signalen zenden, er minder sprake zal zijn van ervaren schending van het psychologisch 
contract.  
 
Het empirisch onderzoek omvat een steekproef van 49 Nederlandse organisaties 
(verschillende industrieën en grootte) en 2099 medewerkers. In de periode 1999-2001 
hebben we met hulp van Master studenten aan de Open Universiteit een standaard 
vragenlijst uitgezet. Deze Master studenten waren zelf werkzaam in deze 49 organisaties. 
De vragenlijst bevatte vragen over werkattitudes en de perceptie van medewerkers van hun 
arbeidsrelatie. Daarnaast heeft in elke organisatie de HRM manager een standaardprotocol 
ingevuld waarin zijn/haar mening werd gevraagd over de inrichting van de organisatie en 
een aantal standaard organisatie-karakteristieken, zoals HRM-activiteiten, 
organisatiegrootte, leeftijd van de organisatie, mate van decentralisatie en omvang 
personeelsbestand. 
 
Omdat onze constructen (HRM en psychologisch contract) verschillende niveaus 
beslaan (organisatie en individueel) hebben we gebruikt gemaakt van een analysetechniek 
die rekening houdt met de afhankelijkheid tussen verschillende niveaus: multi-level 
modellering en analyse. Afgelopen jaren hebben verschillende wetenschappers het belang 
van deze techniek voor dit type onderzoek gepropageerd. Door gebruik te maken van 
multi-level modellering en analyse kunnen we meer betrouwbare resultaten laten zien dan 
wanneer we onze analyses hadden gebaseerd op standaard statistische methoden (zoals 
OLS).  
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De uitkomsten van onze analyses geven een duidelijke indicatie voor een samenhang 
van het aantal HRM-activiteiten en de mate waarin medewerkers schending van hun 
psychologisch contract ervaren. Hoe meer HRM-activiteiten, hoe meer werknemers 
verplichtingen ten opzichte van de organisatie ervaren en hoe minder er sprake is van 
psychologisch contract schending. Dit is een indicatie dat HRM-activiteiten (zoals werving 
en selectie, training, beloningssystemen, taakstructurering) signalen afgeven die niet alleen 
relevant zijn voor perceptie van medewerkers van de mate waarin de organisatie tegemoet 
komt aan haar verplichtingen, maar ook voor de mate waarin de medewerker ervaart dat 
hij/zij verplichtingen heeft ten opzichte van de organisatie. Uit de resultaten volgt verder 
dat HRM één van de meest cruciale elementen is in het managen van psychologische 
contracten.  
 
Hoewel we bevestiging vinden voor beide universalistische benaderingen, zien we dat 
vooral het aantal HRM-activiteiten en niet zozeer het specifieke commitment HRM 
samenhangt met de mate van ervaren psychologisch contract schending. Deze bevindingen 
suggereren dat een exclusieve benadrukking van commitment HRM onvoldoende is om 
psychologisch contract schending te verminderen. Hoewel in hedendaags onderzoek HRM 
systemen als ‘High Performing Work Systems’ en ‘Commitment enhancing Systems’ 
worden gezien als belangrijk voor het stimuleren van individuele- en organisatieprestatie, 
vinden wij dit dus niet terug in de resultaten van dit onderzoek. Ons advies is te richten op 
het totaal aantal HRM activiteiten.  
 
We hebben in deze studie geen bevestiging gevonden voor een samenhang in de mate 
van ‘fit’ tussen HRM, organisatie-elementen en psychologisch contract schending. Dit kan 
te maken met de problematiek rondom het meten van het concept ‘fit’. Verder onderzoek is 
hier nodig.  
 
In het algemeen kunnen we stellen dat meer expliciete aandacht voor HRM-activiteiten 
medewerkers helpt realistische verwachtingen ten aanzien van verplichtingen in hun 
arbeidsrelatie te ontwikkelen. Hierdoor zullen zij minder vaak teleurgesteld worden in hun 
werkgever (psychologisch contract schending).  
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Omdat eerder onderzoek bevestigt dat psychologisch contract schending zal resulteren 
in ongewenst gedrag zoals verloop en verminderende organisatie-identificatie, lijkt het 
belangrijk voor organisaties om actief aandacht te besteden aan het managen van 
psychologische contracten door het ontwikkelen van veel expliciete HRM-activiteiten.  
 
Dit onderzoek geeft een duidelijke indicatie voor het bestaan van een signaal effect van 
HRM, waardoor medewerkers beter in staat zijn te bepalen wat er van hen verwacht wordt 
en wat de organisatie hen daarin tegenover stelt/ heeft gesteld. Omdat arbeidsrelaties 
gebaseerd zijn op wederkerigheid zal het gedrag van medewerkers afhankelijk zijn van 
hetgeen de organisatie biedt. Aandacht binnen organisaties voor het managen van het 
psychologisch contract door het inzetten van HRM-activiteiten is dus wenselijk. 
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APPENDIX 1: CHECK FOR RANDOM SLOPES 
Model: M1: HRMCOUNT  M2: HRM 
Commitment  
M3: Configurational  
Fixed part: 
Predictor 
 
coeff.                   st.error 
 
coeff.                  st.error 
 
coeff.                  st. error 
Intercept  2.13 ***                  0.25  2.38***                   0.43  1.83***                   0.47 
 
Individual level 
   
Obligations employee  0.33***                   0.04  0.24**                     0.11  0.41***                   0.13 
Obligations organization -0.05*                       0.03 -0.05*                       0.03 -0.05*                       0.03 
Years of work experience 
in this function 
-0.08**                    0.02 -0.08***                   0.02 -0.08***                  0.02 
 
Organizational level 
   
HRM COUNT -0.00                         0.04   
HRM Commitment  -0.19                         0.39  
Distance     0.09                         0.13 
Degree of decentralziation -0.30                         0.22 -0.28                         0.21   
Degree of formalization  0.03                         0.09  0.03                         0.09  
Degree of uncertainty  0.02                         0.15  0.02                         0.15  
Organizational size  0.41**                     0.16  0.40**                     0.15  0.41***                   0.14 
Organizational age -0.08                         0.11 -0.08                         0.10 -0.09                         0.10 
Sector   0.33#  0.59#  0.59# 
 
Random part 
   
obl_work* hrmcou_m  0.01                         0.01   
obl_work* hrmcom   0.09                         0.11  
obl_work * dis1   -0.03                         0.04 
obl_work*logfag_m  0.05*                       0.03  0.05*                       0.03  0.04                         0.03 
obl_work*logsize_m  -0.14***                   0.04 -0.13***                   0.04 -0.13***                   0.04 
obl_work*decent_m  0.11**                     0.06  0.11*                       0.06   
obl_work*formal_m  -0.02                        0.03 -0.02                         0.02  
obl_work*uncert_m  0.01                         0.04  0.01                         0.04  
    
σ2  =var(Rij) 
 0.23                         0.01  0.23                         0.01  0.23                         0.01 
τ00. = var (U0j)  0.06                         0.14  0.03                         0.14  0.02                         0.12 
τ11 = var (U1j) -0.01                         0.04 -0.01                         0.04 -0.01                         0.03 
τ01 = var (Uoj, U1j)  0.01                         0.01  0.00                         0.01  0.01                         0.01  
 
Test  
   
-2 resticted Log 
Likelihood10 
1921.466 1914.271 1894.917 
Akaike’s information 
Criterion (AIC) 
1929.466 
 
1922.271 1902.917 
 
* p<0.1 
**  p< 0.05 
*** p<0.01 
#  significance level of F-test
                                                 
10 For reasons of convergence, these estimates are based upon a restricted a maximum likelihood (REML) 
procedure, instead of the full maximum likelihood (ML) procedure used in estimating the empty model, the basic 
models and the random intercept models. As a result of this, the presented estimates of the random slope models 
can not be used to compare the statistical fit compared to the models estimated with ML.  
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APPENDIX 2: OLS REGRESSION MODELs  
Model: M1: HRMCOUNT  M2:  
HRM Commitment 
M3: Configurational  
Predictor 
 
 
coeff.11                  st.error 
 
coeff.                   st.error 
 
coeff.                  st. error 
Intercept  1.74***                   0.28  2.28***                   0.30  2.18***                   0.30 
Obligations employee  0.28***                   0.03  0.30***                   0.03  0.30***                   0.03 
Obligations organization -0.05*                      0.03 -0.05*                      0.03 -0.06*                      0.03 
Years of work experience 
in this function 
-0.10***                  0.02 -0.10***                  0.02 -0.11***                  0.02 
HRM COUNT  0.41***                   0.06   
HRM Commitment   0.26***                  0.08  
Distance    -0.06**                    0.17 
Age organization  0.36***                  0.02  0.23***                   0.01  0.14***                   0.01 
Organizational size -0.20***                  0.02 -0.10***                  0.02 -0.08**                    0.02 
Sector : 
Manufacturing 
Construction 
Trade and hotels 
Transport & Information 
Professional service 
Health care 
Other 
Public services 
 
 n.s. 
 0.13***                   0.09 
 0.24***                   0.09 
 010***                    0.11 
 0.26***                   0.07 
 0.22***                   0.07 
 0.20***                   0.05 
 n.s. 
 
 n.s. 
 0.10***                   0.09 
 0.15***                   0.09 
 0.09**                     0.12 
 0.20***                   0.07 
 0.20***                   0.08 
 0.20***                   0.06 
 n.s. 
 
 n.s. 
 0.10***                   0.09 
 0.13***                   0.08 
n.s. 
 0.12***                   0.06 
 0.07**                     0.07 
 n.s. 
 n.s. 
Degree of formalization -0.24***                  0.01 -0.17***                  0.01  
Degree of 
decentralization 
 0.73**                    0.03  0.08**                    0.03  
Degree of uncertainty  0.08**                    0.02 n.s.  
    
Adjusted R squared 0.202 0.175 0.138 
    
*  p<0.1 
**  p< 0.05 
*** p<0.01 
                                                 
11 Standardized coefficients 
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APPENDIX 3A: MODELS WITH DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
PERCEIVED EMPLOYEE OBLIGATIONS 
Model: Empty model M1: 
HRMCOUNT  
M2: HRM 
Commitment  
M3: 
Configurational  
Fixed part 
Predictor 
 
coeff.         st. error 
 
oeff.            st.error 
 
coeff.          st.error 
 
Coeff.        st. error 
Intercept  3.66***          0.02  3.32***          0.25  3.26***          0.26  3.26***          0.26 
 
Individual level 
    
Years of work 
experience in this 
function 
 -0.04**            0.02 -0.04**            0.02 -0.09**            0.02 
Employee age   0.13**            0.06  0.14**            0.06  0.16**            0.06 
 
Organizational level 
    
HRM COUNT   0.01*              0.01   
HRM Commitment    0.06               0.08  
Distance       0.00                0.03 
Age organization  -0.06                0.02 -0.02                0.03 -0.03                0.02 
Organizational size   0.01                0.03  0.03                0.03  0.03                0.03 
Formalization  -0.02                0.02 -0.07                0.02  
Decentralization  -0.06*             0.04 -0.06               0.04  
Uncertainty   -0.01               0.02 -0.02               0.03  
Sector  0.37# 0.43# 0.40# 
 
Random part 
    
σ2   0.21                0.01  0.21                0.01  0.21                0.01  0.21                0.01 
τ00.  0.01                0.00  0.00                0.00  0.01                0.00  0.01                0.00 
Tests       
Deviance  2300.036  1577.36  1580.479  1582.617 
Akaike’s information 
Criterion (AIC) 
 2306.036  1615.36 
 
 1618.479  1614.617 
 
*  p<0.1 
**  p< 0.05 
*** p<0.01 
#  significance level of F-test 
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APPENDIX 3B: MODELS WITH DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
PERCEIVED OBLIGATIONS ORGANIZATION 
 
Model: Basic model M1: 
HRMCOUNT  
M2: HRM 
Commitment  
M3: 
Configurational  
Fixed part 
Predictor 
 
coeff.         st. error 
 
coeff.          st.error 
 
coeff.          st.error 
 
coeff.        st. error 
Intercept  4.03***          0.02  3.95***          0.23  4.00***          0.24  3.89***          0.23 
 
Individual level 
    
Employee age   0.04                0.06  0.04                0.06  0.04               0.06 
Years of work 
experience in this 
function 
  0.05**            0.02  0.04**            0.02  0.04**            0.02 
 
Organizational 
level 
    
HRM COUNT  -0.00               0.00   
HRM Commitment   -0.07               0.06  
Distance      0.02                0.02 
Age organization   0.04**            0.02  0.04**            0.02  0.05**            0.02 
Organizational size  -0.01               0.02 -0.00               0.02 -0.01               0.02 
Formalization   -001                0.01 -0.00               0.01  
Decentralization   -0.00               0.03  0.00                0.03  
Uncertainty   0.00                0.02  0.00                0.02  
Sector    0.08# 0.11#  0.04# 
 
Random part 
    
σ2   0.22                0.01  0.21                0.01  0.21                0.01  0.21                0.01 
τ00.  0 01                0.00  0.00                0.00  0.00                0.00  0.00                0.00 
 
Test  
    
-2 Log Likelihood  2379.676  1579.472  1578.227  1579.891 
Akaike’s 
information 
Criterion (AIC) 
 2385.676  1617.472 
 
 1616.227  1611.891 
 
*   p<0.1 
**  p< 0.05 
*** p<0.01 
#  significance level of F-test 
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The Signalling Effect of HRM on 
Psychological Contracts of Employees
What are the drivers of high performing organizations? During the
last decade, the contribution of HRM to organizational performance
has dominated HRM research and practice. Employees and their rela-
tionship with the organization take central stage in this perspective
since HRM aims to contribute to organizational performance while
optimizing the relationship between employees and the organiza-
tion. However, HRM research has failed to empirically establish this
relationship.
This study fills this important void in HRM research by empirically
investigating the relevance of HRM for the employee-organization
relationship. In doing so, this study ‘bridges’ two streams of HRM
research: organizational level research on HRM and performance and
individual level research on employee work perceptions and behavi-
oral performance. We focus our attention on the concept of the
psychological contract. The psychological contract is defined as: “an
individual’s belief, shaped by the organization, regarding reciprocal
obligations”. The psychological contract connects organizational
level and individual level perspectives because of its focus on the
exchange relationship between organization and the individual.
Based on a sample of 49 organizations with 2099 individual respon-
dents we investigated the signalling value of HRM for employees’
assessment of the degree of violation of their psychological contracts,
using a multi-level analytical technique. The findings indicate that
there is a significant relationship between HRM, organizational
design factors and the degree of perceived psychological contract
violation. These findings provide us with one of the first empirical
indications on how HRM leads to effectiveness.
ERIM
The Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM) is the Research
School (Onderzoekschool) in the field of management of the Erasmus
University Rotterdam. The founding participants of ERIM are RSM
Erasmus University and the Erasmus School of Economics. ERIM was
founded in 1999 and is officially accredited by the Royal Netherlands
Academy of Arts and Sciences (KNAW). The research undertaken by
ERIM is focussed on the management of the firm in its environment,
its intra- and inter-firm relations, and its business processes in their
interdependent connections. 
The objective of ERIM is to carry out first rate research in manage-
ment, and to offer an advanced graduate program in Research in
Management. Within ERIM, over two hundred senior researchers and
Ph.D. candidates are active in the different research programs. From a
variety of academic backgrounds and expertises, the ERIM community
is united in striving for excellence and working at the forefront of
creating new business knowledge.
www.erim.eur.nl ISBN 90-5892-119-0
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The Signalling Effect of
HRM on Psychological
Contracts of Employees
A multi-level perspective
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